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ABSTRACT 
 
In January 1808, the United States and Great Britain officially abolished their 
slave trades. However, Britain took the lead in policing the Atlantic slave trade by 
developing a “foreign policy of abolitionism.” This foreign policy led to almost six 
decades of tension over enforcing anti-slaving laws and policing the trade, but if the 
foreign policy of abolitionism threatened Whitehall’s primary foreign policy objectives 
of extending British influence and markets, or, jeopardized its preexisting diplomatic 
relationships, abolition of the trade would be relegated to an auxiliary position. By 1842, 
Great Britain successfully achieved a “right of search” clause with the Texas Republic in 
an attempt to end Texas’ involvement in the slave trade. British officials, however, 
appeared unbothered by the “other slavery” in Texas, which included the intricate 
process of enslaving individuals among Native American groups. Instead, they focused 
on ending the African slave trade. During the late 1830s and early 1840s, due to 
continued evasion of Anglo-Spanish anti-slaving treaties, Whitehall sent David 
Turnbull—and ardent abolitionist—to Cuba. It was there that the foreign policy of 
abolitionism reached its limit when Turnbull’s abolitionist actions threatened Britain’s 
larger foreign policy objectives. Therefore, Turnbull lost his position as Consul. 
Although the United States abolished its slave trade in 1808, it did not initially sanction 
the deployment of an official naval squadron to hunt slavers off the coast of Africa. 
More importantly, the U.S. government refused to allow the British Navy the right to 
search American ships suspected of slave trading. Because of this, slavers used 
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American colors to avoid British search, but by 1839 Whitehall had grown tired of these 
abuses. Several international incidents led to the 1842 Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 
which, officially committed the United States to policing the slave trade. Because 
scholars have neglected the ways in which abolitionists projected their values abroad 
through foreign policy, this dissertation reexamines debates between Whitehall and those 
countries Great Britain successfully or unsuccessfully compelled into signing anti-slave-
trading treaties, along with conversations from Britons and citizens in those nations. 
These communications illustrate the priority Britain placed on ending the slave trade 
during the nineteenth century. 
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To Grandma 
 All the gods, all the heavens, all the worlds, are within us. They are magnified 
 dreams, and dreams are manifestations in image form of the energies of the body
 in conflict with each other. —Joseph Campbell 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Historical interest in the rise and subsequent success of abolitionism has 
preoccupied scholars from a wide range of disciplines. British abolition of the Atlantic 
slave trade and the eventual emancipation of its some 800,000 slaves are at the center of 
that global history. Yet, as historian David Eltis noted, new interest in the abolition of 
slave trading “has [not] generated [any] new grand explanatory paradigms to match 
those of Eric Williams and David Brion Davis from an earlier era.”1 Although this recent 
attention to the slave trade has not produced a fundamental reinterpretation of why the 
trade ended, they have provided a much more detailed picture of the inner-workings of 
the slave trade. Specifically, these studies illuminate the ways in which the enslaved 
contributed to the trade’s abolition, class differences in attitudes toward the trade, and 
the mechanisms—primarily British—employed to enforce the ending of the trade.2 But 
these inquiries have thus far paid little attention to the role abolition of the transatlantic 
slave trade and abolitionism played in British foreign policy. Recent scholarship has 
                                                 
1 David Eltis, “Was Abolition of the U.S. and British Slave Trade Significant in the Broader Atlantic 
Context?,” William and Mary Quarterly 66, 3d Series, no. 4 (October 2009), 717. To examine the 
paradigms, see Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North 
Carolina, 1994, 1944); David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).  
2 For works describing non-elite participation in abolitionism, see Emma Christopher, Slave Ship Sailors 
and Their Captive Cargoes, 1730-1807 (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Eric 
Robert Taylor, If We Must Die: Shipboard Insurrections in the Era of the Atlantic Slave Trade (Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 2006); Marcus Rediker, The Slave Ship: A Human 
History (New York: Viking: 2007). Several studies examine the Royal Navy’s efforts to police the slave 
trade, such as Christopher Lloyd, The Navy and the Slave Trade: The Suppression of the African Slave 
Trade in the Nineteenth Century (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1968); Raymond Howell, The Royal Navy 
and the Slave Trade (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987); Peter Grindal, Opposing the Slavers: The 
Royal Navy’s Campaign Against the Slave Trade (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016). 
  
 
2 
emphasized that “slavery shaped American foreign policy” just as much as “American 
democracy and American capitalism.”3 More importantly, Southern slaveholders 
developed and vigorously pursued a coherent “foreign policy of slavery” in the 
nineteenth century.4 While it appears abundantly clear U.S. slaveholders did this, we 
must remember that abolitionists were busily erecting and articulating their own foreign 
policy at the same time. This is a history of their efforts to undermine the “foreign policy 
of slavery.” This dissertation therefore represents one of the first scholarly inquiries into 
what we might think about as Britain’s “foreign policy of abolitionism.”5 But, just as 
important, the project grapples with the limitations placed on Great Britain’s nineteenth-
century foreign policy of abolitionism. Therefore, a reexamination of debates taking 
place between Whitehall and those countries Britain successfully or unsuccessfully 
coerced into signing anti-slave-trading treaties, combined with communications from 
Britons and citizens in those nations, demonstrates the priority Great Britain placed on 
ending the slave trade and, more generally, the significance of an abolitionist impulse in 
its foreign policy. This reevaluation also illustrates the constraints placed on the foreign 
policy of abolitionism by the British Foreign Office, commonly known as Whitehall, 
when it came into conflict with other and competing foreign policy objectives 
throughout the nineteenth century. 
 
                                                 
3 Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 2006), 185, 182. 
4 Kagan, Dangerous Nation, 181-223; Matthew Karp, This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the 
Helm of American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 2016), 
5 Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy (New 
York: Alfred A. Knoff, 2012); Edward P. Carpol, “John Tyler and the Pursuit of National Destiny,” 
Journal of the Early Republic 17, no. 3 (Autumn 1997), 467-491. 
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Confronting a Lucrative Institution: Abolitionism in Great Britain  
To understand how abolition of the slave trade and abolitionism transformed into 
a distinct set of foreign policy goals in Great Britain, it is important to examine the 
events that catapulted the two issues to the forefront of Great Britain’s national politics. 
The Somerset case in 1772 outlawed slaveholding in Britain and prompted the initial 
challenge to slavery in Britain. In addition to this court case, the American War of 
Independence threatened slavery, because the war reoriented the ways in which 
abolitionists employed anti-slavery rhetoric and organizing. It was not until the 
American Revolution’s conclusion that abolitionism truly began to flourish in Britain, 
with the appearance of the first national anti-slavery campaign. Yet, British abolition of 
its own Atlantic slave trade in 1807 was the first instance in which abolitionist advocates 
witnessed concrete evidence of abolitionism’s influence. During the Napoleonic Wars, 
Great Britain exercised its powers as a belligerent, thereby allowing the Royal Navy to 
stop and search other nations’ ships. If British cruisers came across slaving vessels they 
applied Britain’s abolition laws, which prompted crews to confiscate slave ships and 
their human cargo. Once the Napoleonic Wars ended, abolitionism gained a major 
impetus when the Congress of Vienna condemned the slave trade. These incidents 
combined with abolitionists’ shift from their initial goal, universal abolition of slavery, 
to a more focused agenda of ending the slave trade, led to the development of Great 
Britain’s foreign policy of abolitionism. Ultimately, this new development prompted 
Britain to expand its slave trade policing efforts, but also marked the beginning of Great 
Britain aggressively seeking to enforce an anti-slave-trading policy with other nations. 
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Their efforts eventuated in the complete abolition of the Atlantic slave trade. 
In 1772, with the Anglo-American conflict looming, Granville Sharp, an 
innovative British abolitionist, won the highly publicized Somerset case. It was seen by 
abolitionists in both America and Britain as the official prohibition of slavery in Great 
Britain. Although Chief Justice Mansfield’s decision was much narrower, this case 
represents an important step in the abolitionist movement because its mass publicity 
illustrated how difficult it would become to protect the property rights of slaveholders in 
Britain itself.6 In addition, at this time Sharp began communicating with early American 
abolitionists, such as Anthony Benezet, who compiled several anti-slavery pamphlets.7  
The American Revolution is also of great importance to the evolution of anti-
slavery sentiment in Britain. The conflict of the 1760s and 1770s focused an 
extraordinary amount of attention on the “moral character of colonial institutions and 
imperial practices.”8 In North America, the revolt against imperial power nurtured a 
novel interest in exhibitions of separate and communal virtue. In Britain, it produced 
efforts to improve and rationalize the increased use of authority over the North American 
colonies. While the American Revolution was not the genesis of abolitionism in Britain, 
                                                 
6 Mansfield’s adjudication only freed James Somerset, who was forcibly placed on a ship destined to 
Jamaica because there was no British law that allowed the use of such coercion or the forcible export of a 
slave for sale abroad. In all actuality, planters continued to bring their slaves to Britain well into the 1820s 
where the Somerset decision did not apply. Davis, Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 499-500. 
7 For a recent, interesting account of the British abolitionist Granville Sharp and the American abolitionist 
Anthony Benezet and their relationship, see Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of 
British Abolitionism (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and 
Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, by the University of North Carolina Press, 2006). 
8 Brown, Moral Capital, 27. For an early view of the internal conflict between British abolitionist and the 
Royal African Company, see William A. Pettigrew, Freedom's Debt: The Royal African Company and the 
Politics of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1672-1752 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2013). 
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it did alter the political and cultural significance of anti-slavery organizing. The schism 
within the empire augmented the methods by which abolitionist activists utilized anti-
slavery opinion and heightened the status of anti-slavery initiatives.9  
Sharp also demonstrated the brutality of the Middle Passage. He did this with the 
aid of free Africans Ottobah Cugoano and Olaudah Equiano, who revealed the details of 
the 1781 Zong case.10 In 1783, British Quakers organized two committees to promote the 
abolition of the slave trade by presenting petitions to Parliament, along with 
disseminating articles to men of prestige. By this point an expanding moral concern over 
the Atlantic slave trade saw the creation of Britain’s Society for Effecting the Abolition 
of the Slave Trade (SEAST) in 1787. Although SEAST was a pioneering association, it 
represented an expansion of older Quaker committees, which included a few Anglicans, 
such as Sharp and Thomas Clarkson. While Granville Sharp favored a direct assault on 
the slave system, reformers made a significant strategic decision to focus almost 
exclusively on the slave trade. They did this under the assumption that if the trade were 
to end, planters would inevitably be obliged to take better care of their slaves, which 
would move them in the direction of emancipating their enslaved labor force.11 Britain’s 
loss of the influential American South also bolstered British abolitionists’ hopes that 
their goal would succeed because of the absence of southern slaveholders’ objections to 
                                                 
9 Davis, Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 213-54; David Brion Davis, Inhuman Bondage: The 
Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2006), 234 
10 The owner of the slave ship Zong tried to claim the insurance payoff for 133 slaves who had been 
thrown overboard in response to the captain’s orders after an epidemic had killed sixty Africans and 
seventeen crew members. Brown, Moral, 283-84. 
11 Davis, Inhuman Bondage, 2334-5; Davis, Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 219-42, 403-36; 
Roger Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition, 1760-1810 (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: 
Humanities Press, 1975). 
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end the slave trade. 
As regional abolitionist organizations began to form in Great Britain, 1788 
proved to be a watershed moment for the push to abolish the slave trade. The first 
national petition campaign began that year. In Manchester, in December 1787, 10,639 
men, a substantial number of Manchester’s eligible male voters, signed a petition against 
the slave trade. Women also represented a meaningful proportion of the subscribers and 
sponsors of the national campaign. The next year, total signatures reached close to one 
hundred thousand.12 Also in 1788, Prime Minister William Pitt, after hearing of the 
appalling conditions on slave ships, successfully presented and passed a bill in the House 
of Commons, over intense opposition from the House of Lords, that limited the number 
of captives that could be carried on a slave ship (per ton).13  
 In 1789, William Wilberforce presented resolutions against the slave trade to the 
House of Commons, provoking the first heated Parliamentary debate over ending the 
trade. Wilberforce continued to argue his case in 1790 and 1791, emphasizing atrocities 
associated with the traffic. In addition, a Select Committee of the House of Commons 
began examining eyewitness accounts and evidence presented to the investigative 
commission.14 Procrastination over dealing with the slave trade in the Parliament in 1789 
and the electoral defeat of 1791 saw the government receive 519 anti-slave-trade or anti-
                                                 
12 Seymour Drescher, Capitalism and Antislavery: British Mobilization in Comparative Perspective (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 67-88; J.R. Oldfield, Popular Politics and the British Anti-Slavery: 
The Mobilization of Public Opinion Against the Slave Trade, 1787-1807 (Manchester, U.K.: 1995), 46-54, 
113-19, 130, 137; Clare Midgley, Women Against Slavery: The British Campaigns, 1780-1870 (London: 
Routledge, 1992); Clare Taylor, Women in the Anti-Slavery Movement: The Weston Sisters (London: 
Palgrave Macmillian, 1995). 
13 Robin Blackburn, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776-1848 (London: Verso, 1988), 141. 
14 Drescher, Econocide and Davis, Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution. 
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slavery petitions, containing some 390,000 signatures in 1792.15 In 1796, Wilberforce 
succeeded in convincing the House of Commons to abolish the slave trade, due in large 
part to the mass-mobilization of the British population in 1792. Nevertheless, the bill 
collapsed in the more conservative House of Lords, which continued to delay 
discussions regarding the topic. Then, beginning in 1793, abolitionists experienced an 
almost fatal setback from the ideological effects of the French Revolution, the Reign of 
Terror, and the outbreak of war with France. At this time, Great Britain, while fighting in 
the Caribbean, attempted to preserve or reestablish black slavery, especially in 
revolutionary Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Saint-Domingue.16  
 By 1804, however, anti-slave trade activism experienced a reawakening; 
Napoleon’s unexpected restoration of slavery and the slave trade made abolition 
compatible with patriotic animosity towards the French. At this time, the House of 
Commons passed an abolition bill proposed by Wilberforce, but William Pitt’s cabinet 
suspended the debate in the House of Lords. However, abolitionists, led by James 
Stephen, astutely observed that they could divide the West India interest by 
concentrating on the British slave trade to foreign colonies, which at the time 
represented a large proportion of total British commerce. In 1805, Prime Minister Pitt 
issued an Order-in-Council officially banning the slave trade to foreign colonies, such as 
                                                 
15 Blackburn, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 144. 
16 Davis, Inhuman Bondage, 236. To see how the war with France and the French Revolution played out in 
the French Caribbean, see Laurent Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in 
the French Caribbean, 1787-1804 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early 
American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Va., by the University of North Carolina Press, 2004) and 
Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004). 
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Trinidad, which Great Britain had seized in 1797, and where entrepreneurs 
enthusiastically yearned to cultivate a major plantation society. Finally, in 1806 
abolitionists achieved their first great victory by skillfully “conceal[ing] all 
humanitarian motives.” They instead “pushed hard for a Foreign Slave Trade Bill in 
terms of national and military self-interest” due to continued warfare with France.17 
Therefore, when activists linked abolition of a lucrative branch of the slave trade to 
national interests, abolitionists set the stage for the complete abolition of the British 
slave trade in 1807.18  Ultimately, after the Slave Trade Act of 1807 passed both House 
of Lords and House of Commons it became illegal, after January 1, 1808, for British 
ships or citizens to participate in the Atlantic slave trade. This coincided with the United 
States’ official abolition of the transatlantic slave trade.  
 After accomplishing one of the most important victories for the abolitionist 
movement, Britain continued its crusade to end the slave trade. Once the Napoleonic 
Wars concluded, abolitionists received support from an extra-parliamentary movement, 
which sent 774 petitions to Whitehall insisting that Britain compel France and other 
maritime nations to abolish their slave trades.19 However, the conservative Congress of 
Vienna decided to issue a superficial and ineffective condemnation of the trade in 
                                                 
17 Quotes from this sentence and the preceding located in Davis, Inhuman Bondage, 236. 
18 Davis, Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 445. Although the British Parliament abolished the 
Atlantic slave trade for the Britain, recent scholarship has illustrated the continued involvement of British 
citizens in the Atlantic slave trade. Marika Sherwood, After Abolition: Britain and the Slave Trade Since 
1807, Library of International Relations Ser. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007). 
19 Blackburn, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 320. 
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1815.20 Ultimately, this perfunctory denunciation by the Congress did not hinder 
Whitehall’s efforts to end the slave trade. By this point, its foreign policy of abolition 
had received broad support from both Whigs and Tories in each chamber of Parliament, 
which firmly established abolitionism in the British government. Therefore, Britain’s 
foreign policy of abolitionism was well in place, which Great Britain employed to 
negotiate several anti-slaving-treaties with other nations that reduced the number of 
African slaves shipped to the New World and eventually culminated in the end of the 
transatlantic trade.21 
 Because Great Britain developed and utilized a foreign policy of abolitionism, 
my dissertation aims first to determine how nations responded to this foreign policy, 
specifically the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade, in their diplomatic relations and 
negotiations. It also seeks to determine whether this specific type of foreign policy 
succeeded by examining if countries conceded to British demands. This dissertation will 
also examine the circumstances under which Whitehall placed limits on the foreign 
policy of abolitionism through orders or reprimands given to British representatives. It 
will pay particular attention to both official and private correspondences between Britons 
abroad and the British government, along with messages sent from foreign nations’ 
                                                 
20 The Congress of Vienna was a gathering of European statesmen, held from September 1814 to June 
1815 in Vienna. The objective of the Congress was to administer the peace plan for Europe by resolving 
problems stemming from the French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic Wars.  
21 For a specific understanding of how British abolition affected France, France’s abolition movement, and 
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representatives to Whitehall, as well as between consuls stationed on the ground 
overseas. Although abolitionism achieved a major objective in 1808 when Great Britain 
and the United States abolished their Atlantic slave trades, the early and mid-nineteenth 
century witnessed an explosion in the trade even after anti-slave trade activism’s 
successes and Great Britain’s campaign to police the trade. The British Empire was the 
primary actor in influencing other nations to abolish their trades, and thus successfully 
ending the African slave trade in the Atlantic. Therefore, it is imperative to understand 
how Whitehall applied its foreign policy of abolitionism in international and diplomatic 
negotiations.  
Terminology/Historiography  
As stated, this project will examine responses to Great Britain’s use of a foreign 
policy of abolitionism and an international diplomacy connected to the slave trade. The 
dissertation will assess whether it was a success or not, and explore what limits, if any, 
were placed on this policy by Whitehall. Although any discussion of the slave trade 
requires a detailed discussion of the litany of works examining Britain’s abolition of the 
Atlantic slave trade and emancipation of their slaves, it is necessary to define the foreign 
policy of abolitionism. Borrowing from Robert Kagan’s study, Dangerous Nation, 
detailing America’s development of a “foreign policy of slavery,” Matthew Karp’s 
recent work, This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm of American Foreign 
Policy, argues that throughout the antebellum decades Southern slaveholders “organized 
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U.S. foreign relations around a…foreign policy of slavery.”22 I agree with both their 
arguments, but assert that abolitionists during that period also constructed their own 
foreign policy. Because abolitionism had successfully infiltrated Great Britain’s 
government and ended their slave trade, it was there that abolitionists in power 
constructed a foreign policy of abolitionism.23 Like the fractious promoters of America’s 
foreign policy of slavery, the abolitionists and Whitehall frequently disagreed and 
quarreled over how far Britain’s foreign policy of abolitionism would go. These clashes 
more often than not revolved around the potential threat abolitionism represented to 
Great Britain’s larger foreign policy goals of extending their markets or influence. 
Ultimately, Whitehall placed a limit on its foreign policy of abolitionism because, 
although abolitionism was important, it was never more so than market penetration, 
commercial expansion, and the maintenance of long-established international 
relationships. Yet the leaders of the British government did establish abolitionism as a 
major foreign policy objective, even if it was a secondary goal compared to others, such 
as expanding influence and markets, and maintaining established diplomatic 
relationships.  
Over the last 200 years, methodological approaches and theoretical frameworks 
concerning the study of the transatlantic slave trade have been transformed. Works 
following the abolition of the trade praised the humanitarianism of British efforts.24 They 
                                                 
22 Kagan, Dangerous Nation, 181-223; Karp, This Vast Southern Empire, 7. 
23 Karp, This Vast Southern Empire, 7. 
24 For an example of this interpretation, see Reginald Coupland, The British Anti-Slavery Movement 
(Boston: Lowell Institute, 1933). 
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also illustrated for reformers how British anti-slavery activism demonstrated the 
feasibility of conquering the forces, in the words of David Brion Davis, of “greed, 
tyranny, and the most unambiguous symbol of man’s inhumanity to man.”25 
Nonetheless, historians by the early twentieth-century began to question the idea that 
humanitarian resolve had been the engine powering abolition. Here lay the first shift in 
the study of the Atlantic slave trade.    
Early studies focused primarily on the notion that the British abolished the slave 
trade and emancipated their slaves due to slavery’s diminishing profitability. They 
examined British economics before, during, and after the abolition of the slave trade and 
the emancipation of Britain’s slaves. The first major authors to dispute these earlier 
arguments were Lowell Joseph Ragatz, C. L. R. James, and Eric Williams. Ragatz’s 
1928 study, Fall of the Planter Class in the British West Indies, suggested that a period 
of irreparable economic decline began in 1763, which was a factor and further cause of 
inefficient slave labor, white population loss, chronic indebtedness, soil exhaustion, and 
plantation bankruptcies.26 James’s 1938 monograph, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint 
L'ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution, asserted that the slave trade and the slave 
colonies, particularly the British West Indies, afforded an important portion of the 
markets along with the capital that made British economic expansion possible.27 Yet, 
James argued, by the late eighteenth century the British slave system was waning. Soil 
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exhaustion, competition from the French West Indies, and the interruption of the trade—
beginning with the British North American colonies’ push for independence—further 
decreased the position of the English-speaking Caribbean in the British economy. 
Furthermore, the British industrial sector had developed to the point where it needed 
more markets than the slave colonies could deliver and, in addition, was no longer 
reliant on revenue from the slave system for its capital demands. Britain’s attack on 
forced labor could, James maintained, therefore be seen as the first attack on trade 
barriers that kept the British sugar markets open for British plantations, which in turn 
restricted trade with other countries.  
Eric Williams’ 1944 work, Capitalism and Slavery, became the most influential 
of these works.28 He made three broad points. First, he insisted that European merchant 
capitalism produced the enormously profitable New World plantation system, which was 
itself driven by the Atlantic slave trade. According to Williams, earnings from the slave 
trade or from the overseas slave system as a whole supplied most of the capital that 
financed the British Industrial Revolution. Williams’ second conclusion, like James,’ 
supposed that the American Revolutionary War began a phase of irrevocable economic 
deterioration in the British Caribbean. This in turn stimulated Britain’s pivotal transition 
from mercantilism toward laissez-faire capitalism. Lastly, he argued that by the late 
eighteenth century, Britain’s slavery had become an inefficient labor system, the white 
population had begun to leave plantation colonies, chronic indebtedness ran rampant in 
colonial societies, soil exhaustion was widespread, and plantation bankruptcies occurred 
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often. Accordingly, these fountains of wealth were merely maintained by mercantilist 
duties or appropriations that caused continual overproduction of goods for the protected 
British market. Although Williams recognized that a “brilliant band” of abolitionists 
were successful in directing one of the “great propaganda movements of all time,” he 
postulated that in the broadest terms, slavery was doomed by more impersonal forces: 
the broader transition from mercantile to industrial capitalism and free trade.29 
Moreover, the government’s reasons for supporting an end to the trade were settled by 
the fact that British planters could no longer contend with Cuban and Brazilian sugar in 
foreign markets and that their level of production had to be reduced to the level of 
“home consumption.”30 Williams maintained that sentimental history should not be 
permitted to obfuscate the fundamental truth that “overproduction in 1807 demanded 
abolition; overproduction in 1833 demanded emancipation.”31  
There has been significant research done to validate Williams’ conclusion that 
slave labor proved crucial for the swift European colonization and development of the 
New World. It also appears as though the growth of the slave plantation system from 
fifteenth century Sicily, Madeira, and Sao Tome to nineteenth century Cuba, Brazil, and 
North American provided at least some of the capital required to promote economic 
growth in both Europe and America.32 Therefore, this widely accepted ‘decline thesis’ 
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drove the scholarship of the slave trade and slavery for many years. In the late-1970s and 
the 1980s, scholars began to reevaluate, yet again, the reasons behind the abolition of the 
slave trade and the emancipation of the slaves. Economic historians led the way by 
utilizing highly sophisticated statistical evidence to demonstrate that at the time of 
British abolition, the slave trade and the institution of plantation slavery were 
prosperous. Moreover, they discovered, neither the slave trade nor the plantation system 
as a whole provided the lion’s share of the capital that financed the Industrial 
Revolution.33 Although Williams’ first proposition has been validated to a certain extent, 
his second hypothesis, regarding the end of the British slave trade and slave 
emancipation, triggered the most animated debates. Because Williams’ “decline thesis” 
had gained such wide acceptance by the 1970s a sequence of statistical studies by Roger 
Anstey, Seymour Drescher, and David Eltis reevaluated the economic association 
between antislavery and capitalism.34  
 Anstey’s 1975 work, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition, 1760-1810, 
illustrated that by every economic measure, 1807 was the worst time for Britain to 
abolish its slave trade. At that stage in the Napoleonic Wars, the British Empire needed 
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all the export markets not held in enemy hands to help the British finance the continued 
war effort. His monograph also demonstrated how in the early nineteenth century, the 
British West Indies’ portion of total oceanic trade was larger at that time than it had been 
at any point in the eighteenth century.35  
Seymour Drescher’s 1977 Econocide: British Slavery in the Era of Abolition 
argued that abolition of the slave trade was equivalent to “committing suicide for a 
major part of Britain’s economy.”36 Drescher’s study demolished the commonly held 
assumption that the British slave system had deteriorated in value before Parliament 
abolished the slave trade. Utilizing statistics on overseas trade, Drescher demonstrated 
that the value of British West Indian exports to Great Britain and imports in the West 
Indies from Britain had risen rapidly from the 1780s to the end of the eighteenth century. 
He also illuminated how the British West Indies’ portion of the total British overseas 
trade increased to great heights in the early nineteenth century and did not begin to fall 
until long after Parliament denied the colonies any new deliveries of African labor.  
Following his assessment of the cost-effectiveness of the slave trade, which 
afforded roughly ten percent return on investments, and the rising value of the British 
West Indies, Drescher asserted that the British slave system was becoming more, not 
less, profitable at the onset of the nineteenth century.37 The 1807 Abolition Act was 
instituted at a period when Britain not only had the world’s highest plantation output, but 
also had the ability, as a result of naval power and the wartime acquisitions of Trinidad, 
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Demerara, Berbice, and Essequibo, to virtually dominate the slave trade and obtain the 
preeminent share of the world market’s coffee and sugar crops. Unlike Ragatz’s 
assertion that the slave system was made from “old soil, old habits, old techniques,” 
Drescher insisted that “the British slave system was young…[and] it seemed so to 
contemporaries.”38 As for arguments about soil exhaustion, grievances surfaced as early 
as the 1660s, and soil erosion was never continuous. In the end, areas with plantations, 
similar to other agricultural territories, underwent sequences of soil exhaustion and 
rejuvenation. 
Yet, as David Brion Davis asserts, Drescher’s work lacked a sufficient 
explanation of the difference between an imbalanced economy and economic decline, 
along with sufficient differentiation between profitability and economic expansion from 
the organizational shortfalls and social destitution of the British slave colonies. In the 
majority of these regions, most British and other entrepreneurs fervently pursued, at bare 
minimum, a small fortune upon which they could return home. Due to their economic 
desires, David Brion Davis argues, they gave little thought to schools, churches, urban 
centers, religious and social services, economic diversification, or even the growth of 
food.39 Still, Drescher’s study weakened a fundamental piece of Williams’s thesis. His 
next study, Capitalism and Antislavery: British Mobilization in Comparative 
Perspective, combined with David Eltis’ work, Economic Growth and the Ending of the 
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Transatlantic Slave Trade, chipped more away from William’s arguments.40 
 Eltis’ main argument was that slave labor on the plantations of the New World 
and Indian Ocean reached a level of supreme economic significance during the half-
century between 1816 and 1865 following Britain and the United States’ abolition of 
their transoceanic slave trades. Throughout that period Britain used about twelve million 
pounds in its marginally successful attempt to suppress the international slave traffic by 
patrolling the African coasts, attacking African trading posts, bribing and strong-arming 
other countries into signing anti-slave trade treaties, confiscating alleged slave ships, and 
even directing cruisers to assault vessels in Brazilian waters.41  
 According to Eltis, before the British slave trade ended slavery had become more 
valuable to the Atlantic economy than ever. Between 1785 and 1805, European 
economic growth soared to unprecedented heights, which created demand for consumer 
goods such as sugar, coffee, tobacco, and cotton textiles, all of which could be generated 
inexpensively by slaves. Britain alone saw sugar consumption rise 80 percent during the 
same years, along with cotton imports quadrupling in spite of rising prices. The 
inundated markets of slave-produced goods that Ragatz and Williams discovered were 
only artificial and short-lived. Also, Britain’s burgeoning textile industry would not have 
continued to survive without a continuing supply of cotton, most of which was produced 
by slaves until 1865.42 
 By the onset of the nineteenth century Britain controlled fertile, unfarmed lands 
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in Jamaica and their recently acquired colonies of Trinidad and Demerara. At this time, 
Jamaica alone was shipping five times as much coffee as Cuba and Rio de Janeiro 
combined; even with a wholly inadequate supply of slaves, Demerara emerged as a 
major source of cotton for the British textile market.43 In fact, Britain’s need for U.S. 
cotton would have diminished if British Guiana had been allowed to supply Demerara 
with more slaves.44  
 Eltis also argued that “for Americans as well as for Britain at the onset of 
industrialization, there was a profound incompatibility between economic self-interest 
and antislavery policy.”45 After 1838, British leaders realized with disappointment that 
the newly free black laborers were reluctant to consent to the harsh plantation 
punishments and working environments that had allowed sugar cultivation to become an 
extremely lucrative investment. In an attempt to keep the plantations of British Guiana, 
Trinidad, and Jamaica afloat, after the apprenticeship period ended in 1838, Britain first 
resorted in 1840 to making “contracts” with former slaves. Abolitionists quickly put a 
stop to this maneuver, which forced Britain in 1843 to try to convince the American 
government to engage in a program that transported free black Americans to the British 
West Indies. Once this proposition collapsed, the British ultimately turned to Asian 
immigrants as a remedy for their labor shortages. Although these hundreds of thousands 
of East Indian “coolies” who made their way to Trinidad and British Guiana eventually 
increased production, they were never able to successfully restore the British colonies to 
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their former prosperity and competitive advantage.46  
Along with illustrating the high economic return of the slave trade and slavery, 
the studies of the 1980s and 1990s were attempting to uncover the number of slaves 
transported from Africa throughout the trade’s existence. While this task can never truly 
be completed, researchers were able to construct a very detailed account of the number 
of African slaves shipped from Africa. Herbert S. Klein, David Eltis, Stephen Behrendt, 
and David Richardson compiled thousands of records pertaining to slave trade voyages 
into the Tran-Atlantic Slave Trade CD-ROM, which has subsequently been published 
online.47 
After the compilation of these voyages, other scholars redirected their focus once 
again, this time to study Africa and the relationship the continent had with the slave 
trade. Although his work was written at a time when authors such as Seymour Drescher, 
David Brion Davis, David Eltis, and others were debating the ‘decline thesis,’ along with 
analyzing the number of slaves transported from Africa, Patrick Manning’s Slavery, 
Colonialism and Economic Growth in Dahomey, 1640—1960 shifted focus from the 
Caribbean and Europe to Africa.48 Manning’s monograph investigated the social, 
economic, and political impact of slavery on Dahomey. He asserted that in the 
eighteenth century the “commodity exchange mode of production dominated the 
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economy.”49 Even though the trade in slaves was so pervasive that every level of society 
was drawn into it, people still manufactured their own goods for sale, unloaded them 
into the local markets, and bought a large percentage of the items they used. These 
commodities included food, manufactures, raw materials, and luxuries. Even as slavery 
began to be more integrated into the international market and became a major institution, 
commodity exchange continued to dominate. However, Manning maintained that by the 
nineteenth-century, European expansion into Africa had become so significant that 
capitalism dominated by the end of the century. For him, commodity exchange, even 
though the sale of slaves was at times a major factor, was the linchpin of the Dahomey 
economy, which he insists is why the economy expanded over three centuries, even with 
the mass depopulation and export of tax revenues.  
Joseph Miller’s 1988 work, Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the 
Angolan Slave Trade, 1730-1830, continued the same mode of inquiry as Manning’s 
monograph by focusing on the Angolan trade and its impacts on African society.50 
Miller’s study contends that the slave traffic connected to northern Europe, which had 
the “capacity for material production [that] exceeded its home market’s ability to 
consume,” and west central Africa, where children were “bore at rates that exceeded the 
long-term capacity of …agriculture to feed,” was a result of the eighteenth century need 
to fill labor and supply vacuums created by the expansion of the Atlantic world.51 He 
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also demonstrates how the yearly number of slave embarkations was moderate compared 
to the total population and that they probably had a small numerical impact, but the 
effect on African societies was enormous. The trade altered sex ratios and created more 
rigid social hierarchies, political centralization, and new systems of slavery. It also 
encouraged “materialist individualism” in African societies that had formerly valued 
people above material and financial gain.52 Due to the consolidation of the trade, a 
slaving frontier arose, which saw the eastward drive being dominated by warfare. 
Nevertheless, the frontier’s development was punctuated with bouts of peace, which 
permitted trading networks to consolidate. In the end, these societies were overwhelmed 
by this expansion and were transformed, which caused their elites to become devoted to 
the “production” of slaves and reliant on credit.53 
By the mid-1990s and early 2000s, another major historiographical shift 
occurred. This new method of analysis gave rise to Atlantic World studies. John 
Thornton’s study, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800, 
led the way in bringing several strands of existing scholarship into discussion with one 
another by exploring the role in which Africa and Africans played in the larger 
construction of the Atlantic world.54 Most importantly, he asserted that instead of being 
passive victims, “Africans were active participants in the Atlantic world, both in African 
trade with Europe (including the slave trade) and as slaves in the New World.”55 
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Moreover, the Atlantic trade was not economically crucial for the well-being nor the 
development of Africa because the large majority of goods exchanged were luxury ones; 
instead, Africa possessed a much more diversified and industrial economy, with 
European goods having only a minimal effect on preexisting African industries. His 
work also illustrates that Europeans were not militarily capable of compelling African 
leaders into conducting any type of trade they did not wish to. Therefore, any trade 
Africans were a part of was a product of their own willingness to do so. He argued that 
African slaves’ influence on the Atlantic world was two-fold. First, their labor 
contributed to the growth of the Atlantic economy. Furthermore, Africans’ assimilation 
into the Atlantic world added to the recently formed culture through language, 
aesthetics, and philosophy. Ultimately, neither Africa nor Africans were docile 
bystanders who contributed nothing to the development and expansion of the Atlantic 
world; they were functioning cogs in a much larger apparatus. 
Sylviane Diouf’s collection of essays further expounds on how African 
populations resisted the slave trade, which she divides into three subcategories: 
defensive strategies, protective strategies, and offensive strategies. In most situations, 
defensive strategies involved innovative applications of the environment, such as 
retreating into impregnable locations, or the construction of walls around villages. 
However, Adama Gueye asserts that evasion was a major method of defense. Protective 
strategies were ambiguous, but Diouf argues that redemption was intermittently utilized 
as a means of retrieving ones enslaved family members, but it frequently included the 
swapping of one individual for the freedom of a loved one. While this tradition did not 
  
 
24 
counteract the slave trade, it did, safeguard certain individuals. Lastly, several authors 
explore offensive strategies for combating the trade on both the African coast and the 
Atlantic, such as the acquisition of iron to construct their own weapons for defense 
instead of purchasing guns.56 
Instead of exploring the transatlantic slave trade on a macro-level, authors Eric 
Taylor and Marcus Rediker examined the dimensions of the slave ship. Taylor’s work, If 
We Must Die: Shipboard Insurrections in the Era of the Atlantic Slave Trade, explored 
slave resistance that occurred aboard slave ships. He argued that “shipboard revolts were 
not at all uncommon,” but in all actuality “plagued slave traders every step of the 
way.”57 Numerous factors influenced these rebellions, such as crews’ perceived 
weaknesses through illness or insufficient members, along with slaves’ ability to procure 
weapons. On the one hand, when these insurrections did occur they were most often very 
violent, which revealed the character of the relationship between the sailors and slaves. 
On the other, Taylor maintains that “most rebellions were unsuccessful” in 
accomplishing their goals.58 Although these uprisings often failed, he asserted that they 
were significant because the fear of revolt persisted in the minds of slave ship crews, 
which in turn affected the ways that the trade operated and continued to transpire. 
Moreover, these shipboard rebellions had broader implications, specifically with regard 
to plantation resistance that Taylor contends was “tried and tested…and occasionally 
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perfected, on the ships of the transatlantic slave trade.”59 In the end, for Taylor these 
insurrections were beginning stages of a long violent effort for African captives to 
emphasize their humanity and attack the institution of slavery. 
Rediker’s monograph, The Slave Ship: A Human History, examined slavery from 
“a different vantage, from the decks of a slave ship.”60 In doing this, he demonstrated 
that the slave ship was more than a means of transportation. Instead, it was a floating 
prison, a factory, and a ‘machine of terror,’ utilized to turn rebellious captives into 
terrified slaves. On the one hand, by the time slaves disembarked in the Americas, they 
had been psychologically and physically commodified. On the other, they had also 
developed new identities that focused on community and resistance. He also maintained 
that the eighteenth-century slave ships were effectively powered by European capitalism. 
When the trade transitioned away from monopoly enterprise in the 1770s, slave ships 
became larger and more professionally constructed. But Rediker, like Taylor, argued that 
the slaves aboard those ships did not spend their voyages as docile cargo. Quite the 
reverse. Captives pushed back—despite the difference in ethnic origin and language, 
despite surveillance and oppressive actions employed by their captors. They did this 
through suicide, extensive ideas of kinship and faith, by developing new ways to 
converse, and, most importantly, the will to unify and violently resist. Along with 
examining the lives of the slaves, he also investigated the sailors aboard the slaving 
ships. Typically uneducated and poor, mariners on slave ships were recruited from the 
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‘Guinea Trade’ by dishonesty or coercion, and presenting ethnic assimilations of their 
own, sailors opposed their incessant maltreatment through independent acts of desertion 
or suicide. Surprisingly, from time to time, they allied themselves with other mariners 
and mounted coordinated opposition, such as mutiny. Ultimately, his work illustrated 
how the Middle Passage interweaved and differentiated both class and race, along with 
how capitalism continued to affect both. 
In the later 2000s, scholars began focused studies on African kingdoms and the 
institution of slavery within them. Rebecca Shumway’s The Fante and the Transatlantic 
Slave Trade demonstrated how the Fante leaders manipulated their middlemen position 
between merchant ships arriving from overseas and inland dealers of captives and gold.61 
Her work also asserted that during the eighteenth-century slave trade era, the Fante 
constructed a decentralized political structure—the ‘Coastal Coalition’—that enabled 
them to preserve their independence in response to efforts by their inland neighbors to 
capture their trade routes and coastal ports.62 This study also illuminated the significance 
of cultural history, especially how priests held both religious and judicial authority, thus 
uniting people in a shared community while also exercising substantial influence in the 
molding of Fante politics. In the end, the ‘Coastal Coalition’ a multi-state alliance 
developed both to defend against the expansionist Asante Kingdom and to exploit 
common trade opportunities with Europeans along the coast. The manner in which this 
coalition was constructed (and the related ethno-genesis of Fante peoples) made up a 
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piece of an intricate political and cultural geography that placed coastal peoples at the 
center of the African and transatlantic slave trade. 
Randy Spark’s study, Where the Negroes Are Master: An African Port in the Era 
of the Slave Trade, reexamines the same space as Shumway and attempts to illuminate 
African leaders’ abilities to utilize their positions as the middlemen between Europeans 
and the sources of slaves.63 He maintains that Anomabo became the dominant point in 
the Atlantic world and emphasizes the centrality of the town’s African merchant elites in 
their commercial dealings with visiting British and American traders. He also asserted 
that by the mid-eighteenth century these elites based their political power upon their 
predominance in Atlantic Africa. Furthermore, the Fante-speaking area was a region in 
which blacks and whites fashioned complicated diplomatic and familial affiliations, as 
well as commercial ones, that shaped the overall structure of the slave trade from the late 
seventeenth-century to the early nineteenth-century. It is a result of these eighteenth 
century associations and relationships, Sparks argues, that caused more African slaves to 
be sold and sent from Anomabo than from any other coastal market on what was then 
known as the Gold Coast. 
While Anstey, Drescher, and Eltis disprove Williams’ supposition that the slave 
trade and slavery were in decline when the British abolished the trade and when slavery 
ended in the Empire, they minimize the effect the application of British abolition laws 
had on abolitionism locally and internationally. They also overlook the way in which the 
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British government, British subjects, and other nations navigated the complex notions of 
imperial sovereignty concerning who did or did not have the authority to inspect and 
detain vessels of other nationalities suspected of slaving. Lastly, these studies stop short 
of examining the responses of British citizens and other nations to Britain’s enforcement 
of their abolition laws. 
 The studies in the 1980s of the transatlantic slave trade focused on determining 
whether or not the British abolition of the trade and subsequent emancipation was a 
result of economic reasoning, humanitarianism, or altruism. However, at the same time 
these works and those in the 1990s and 2000s were attempting to uncover the numbers 
involved in the slave trade. It was not until researchers compiled thousands of records 
pertaining to slave trade voyages that scholars began shifting their focus away from the 
British and, more broadly, Europe. British imperial researchers started asking questions 
about Africa, the slave ships, and the enslaved in Africa, on the ships, and in the New 
World. Yet, as these studies shifted their focus to Africa and Africans they continued to 
neglect how crucial to abolitionism the abolition of the slave trade was, along with how 
enforcement of abolition laws were received in Africa. 
Although these authors brought Africa and Africans into the discussion of the 
slave trade and slavery, they, like others, ignored how abolitionism became a major 
element in British foreign policy. More importantly, they overlooked how abolitionists 
in Great Britain and, more specifically, Whitehall developed a foreign policy of 
abolitionism in an attempt to eradicate the international slave trade, which eventually 
had major economic and societal impacts on the African continent. Some scholars have 
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proposed the suppression of the slave trade caused the inadvertent extension of slavery 
into Africa because slaves previously sent across the Atlantic were instead used to 
produce peanuts, coca, cloves, palm oil, and array of other exports rapidly industrializing 
nations increasingly demanded.64 Exploring Britain’s use of this type of foreign policy is 
crucial to understanding how Britain led the way in policing of the slave trade without 
negatively affecting its other national goals or international relationships. Because 
empires were not composed of evenly distributed space, but rather of porous unevenly 
stitched together pieces, “law represented a particularly important factor in the social 
construction of [the] variegated colonial world.”65 As a consequence of legal cultures 
following imperial officials, merchants, sailors, soldiers, captives, and pirates, the British 
government’s actions taken towards the Atlantic slave trade generated debates and 
confrontations over imperial sovereignty, specifically regarding the “right of search.” At 
the same time, Great Britain experienced internal strife because its foreign policy of 
abolitionism could not be universally applied and because the British Empire operated in 
an international system where the institution of slavery still existed. 
Operating in Oceanic Corridors: Eighteenth-Century Laws of the Sea 
Even though Britain adopted a foreign policy of abolitionism, which specifically 
focused on ending the Atlantic slave trade, Great Britain operated within “a global 
maritime culture…of ocean regulatory spheres and…a new (but not peaceful) legal 
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regime of the sea.”66 Since seas could not be possessed, mariners understood them as a 
complex entanglement of jurisdictional corridors. Because “ships and their captains 
moved as delegated legal authorities along intersecting paths, extending corridors of 
control, in turn weakly or strongly associated with jurisdiction,” they helped make “an 
inter-imperial sea space that could not be owned but could be dominated.”67 Slave ships 
floated atop that complex legal matrix, and as such, were subject to interdiction at the 
hands of a Royal Navy now charged with enforcing this foreign policy of abolitionism. 
By the eighteenth century prize courts operated according to a set of shared conventions. 
European seafaring nations operated under the common understandings that captures at 
sea were to be taken before a court under the jurisdiction of the captor. More 
importantly, vessels detained at sea were not seen automatically as the property of the 
detainer—even though it stayed in the custody of the capturer—until it had been 
sentenced in such an assembly, with dissenting parties given an opportunity to present 
their claims against condemnation. These prize courts were commonly presumed to 
function within a framework of traditional norms of the law of nations while also 
respecting provisions outlined in treaties. It was also recognized that sovereigns had the 
right to sanction the capture of enemy ships and thus form an ancillary military force of 
privateers.68 
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 Due to the use of prize courts by the beginning of the eighteenth century, an 
inter-imperial legal Atlantic system existed, but it was not well-organized. Captains and 
their benefactors manipulated the system in a multitude of ways. Crews captured vessels 
not sanctioned under their commissions, circumvented prize procedures, pursued 
sympathetic assemblies with dubious authority, discarded cargoes and ships before 
decisions were determined, sailed with forged or bought commissions, displayed flags 
without proper approval, directed fake sales of ships to alter their nationality, smuggled 
commodities in neutral ports to ‘color’ enemy cargo, along with utilizing a myriad of 
strategies intended to avoid regulations and dodge penalties. All of these actions 
occurred at a time when European countries’ representatives were engaged in diplomatic 
negotiations to end such practices. Yet, those same nations occasionally manipulated the 
same legal system in an effort to sway patterns of enforcement and the outcomes of 
individual cases in their favor. Due to frequent wars between 1753 and 1815, prize 
courts were imbued with a revived political and commercial significance, which in turn 
invited renewed attention to their structure and proceedings. During these tumultuous 
times seizures were seen as acts of war because they were utilized as a way to damage 
enemy finances and commerce.69 
 Before the abolition of the slave trade British prize courts saw an influx of cases 
concerning ships flying neutral flags and trading to and from enemy ports. This was a 
consequence of the disregarding of a principle during the Seven Years’ War known as 
the Rule of War of 1756, which was the notion that during wartime neutrals could not 
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engage “in trade that had not been open to them in time of peace,” which was meant to 
obstruct “belligerents from protecting trade during wartime by handing it over to 
neutrals.”70 As both commerce and conflict expanded in the second half of the 
eighteenth century, the classification and the understanding of the entitlements of 
neutrals and belligerents came under close scrutiny. These inquiries were a result of 
weaker belligerents expecting to reap the benefits of practicing neutral shipping while 
neutrals expected that being granted greater access to this trading would open up a larger 
portion of Atlantic commerce. However, nations such as Britain also sought to preserve 
their emerging hegemony in naval warfare by limiting the scope of neutral shipping.71   
 Apprehensions were a reflection of the irregular and intricate treaty system. 
Several of the bilateral treaties reasserted the principle that neutral ships would be 
shielded if transporting enemy goods, but endorsed the notion that captors might legally 
seize goods. Other treaties recognized exemptions by establishing safeguards for enemy 
goods when transported by co-signing neutral powers. European powers involved in 
Atlantic commerce entered into both types of treaties, driven by estimations about which 
regulation would more distinctly favor commercial and military agendas. During 
individual prize cases, judges in certain instances were charged with interpreting treaty 
provisions. However, these judges had to make a sequence of judgments on a vessel’s 
nationality—of plaintiffs, ships, ship captains, and goods. When cases involved 
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individuals, British prize court judges utilized a blueprint for establishing nationality, 
“privileging information about claimants’ place of residence, family ties, and related 
factors.”72 Nationality continued to be the main determinate in determining the 
conclusion of prize cases concerning cargoes of slaves for decades leading up to the 
Abolition Act of 1807. Flying neutral colors was also a valuable tactic slave traders 
employed when transporting slave cargos. Ultimately, courts continued focusing on 
determining nationality after Britain abolished its trade and developed a foreign policy 
of abolitionism, but Great Britain’s actions, whether on the open ocean or in the halls of 
high politics, threw the previous legal regime of the seas into flux. 
 When the Abolition Act took effect in January 1808, Great Britain began 
policing the Atlantic slave trade, but, more importantly, it embarked on a mission to end 
the global trade altogether. Yet, before Britain could achieve this goal, it had to develop 
a foreign policy of abolitionism to guide Whitehall through the intricacies of 
international affairs. By the late 1830s, the British government adopted a foreign policy 
of abolitionism spawned from the successes and failures of the previous two decades. 
Essentially, Whitehall promoted the abolition of the slave trade in all diplomatic 
negotiations, but with a series of caveats. If the foreign policy of abolitionism threatened 
Britain’s primary foreign policy objectives of extending British influence and markets, 
or, jeopardized its preexisting diplomatic relationships, abolition of the trade would be 
relegated to an auxiliary position. Specifically, the British government ignored those 
abolitionist minded British representatives on the ground who suggested using British 
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capital to end slavery in the Western Hemisphere. The British government, if it was 
necessary, also reprimanded those ministers who abused their positions to directly 
engage in abolitionist activities. Lastly, Whitehall never allowed an abolitionist nor its 
foreign policy of abolitionism to directly attack Great Britain’s prosperous, although at 
times tenuous, relationship with the United States. With that being said, Britain did 
utilize promises of protection, along with its economic and political clout to coerce 
weaker nations into abolishing their slave trade and granting the Royal Navy the right to 
search suspected slaving vessels. However, in an effort to keep the peace with the United 
States, Great Britain applied its foreign policy of abolitionism very differently. In the 
initial years after abolition, conflict arose over incidents of Britain’s navy harassing the 
American merchant-marine. Once the War of 1812 concluded, the United States 
government continued to refuse the Royal Navy the right to search U.S. ships, which 
forced Great Britain to leave American ships alone in an attempt to avoid another war 
and thus threaten the growing demand for U.S. cotton from Britain’s textile industry. 
Therefore, slavers were afforded the opportunity to use the American flag with impunity. 
By the 1830s, Great Britain grew tired of slavers constantly abusing U.S. anti-slaving 
laws and the negligence of American policymakers to enforce those statutes. This 
animosity lead to several international incidents in 1839, which forced both nations to 
the negotiating table. Although Britain’s actions during this period demonstrated that 
Whitehall’s foreign policy of abolitionism had become a higher priority, the bargain 
reached between Great Britain and the United States illustrated once again that British 
influence and, above all, economic ties took precedence over the abolition of the trade. 
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Chapter Outline 
 While Great Britain projected its foreign policy of abolitionism abroad after the 
initial end of its Atlantic slave trade in 1808, the mid-1830s and early 1840s saw Great 
Britain utilize its abolitionist foreign policy more forcefully. Therefore, slaveholding 
nations, after emancipation of the British West Indies in 1833, experienced a gradual 
effort by the British Empire to end the Atlantic slave trade through diplomatic means 
across the mid-nineteenth century. Because this was such a tumultuous period regarding 
international relations, but particularly negotiations dealing with slavery near the United 
States, Great Britain took a more cautious approach to achieve the trade’s abolition.  
Chapter One, “‘A Voice Thundering Across the Atlantic’: British Ambitions and 
Texas Slavery,” investigates how Great Britain used their foreign policy of abolitionism 
to successfully achieve a “right of search” clause in negotiations with the young Texas 
Republic. It also, illustrates the limits placed on abolitionist foreign policy by exploring 
how Whitehall disregarded a proposal made by ardent British abolitionists in Texas’ to 
link official British recognition and loans to the emancipation of the newly independent 
country’s slaves. Throughout the history of the Texas Republic, several Britons saw the 
fledgling republic as a way to circumvent Britain’s reliance on U.S. cotton, a means to 
stop American expansionism, and, more importantly, a bulwark against the spread of 
slavery. These ideas were never officially endorsed by Whitehall because those actions 
would directly affect its diplomatic relationship with the United States. Great Britain’s 
foreign policy of abolitionism did, however, achieve a major victory against the slave 
trade regarding Texas. In 1842, Texas agreed to allow the British Royal Navy to search 
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its merchant-vessels suspected of engaging in the illicit slave trade. This triumph was 
short-lived because in early 1845 the United States Congress endorsed the Brown 
Resolution, which approved of Texas’ annexation, despite Charles Elliot’s successful 
effort to get Mexico to recognize Texas’ independence.  
This chapter also examines the “other slavery” that transpired alongside African 
slavery in the Republic of Texas. Before and during Spanish rule, as part of Mexico, and, 
eventually, as an independent republic, the Indian slave trade and slavery existed in 
Texas. Both institutions were predicated on the enslavement of individuals, which Great 
Britain had created a foreign policy to eradicate. Yet, British officials appeared 
unbothered by this “other slavery” because throughout their correspondence there is no 
mention of ending it. Instead, they focused on ways in which to end the African slave 
trade and slavery, which demonstrates how Whitehall confined its foreign policy of 
abolitionism to just one trade and slavery—the African institution.   
Although the “infamous” David Turnbull’s has been studied by several 
historians, Chapter Two, ‘The Richest Jewel in the Crown of Castile’: Attacks on the 
Illicit Slave Trade in Cuba,” reexamines Turnbull’s tenure as the British Consul and 
Super Intendant of Liberated Africans through a foreign policy lens. This approach 
illustrates how Britain’s foreign policy of abolitionism received official endorsement by 
Whitehall. But that support can also be shown to have quickly evaporated once larger 
international goals or crucial diplomatic ties became jeopardized. In particular, 
Turnbull’s story reveals that abolitionist foreign policy principles remained contingent 
upon stable Anglo-American relations and, ironically enough, the uninterrupted 
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transatlantic flow of slave-grown U.S. cotton.   
Great Britain and the United States ended their involvement in the slave trade in 
January 1808, when each established their own anti-slave-trading laws. However, a 
tenuous relationship developed between the two because Americans frequently 
disregarded U.S. anti-slave-trading laws and other slavers regularly used the American 
flag to avoid British inspection. Therefore, Chapter III, ‘A Spear at Every Nation’: Great 
Britain Achieves an American Treaty Against Slave Trading,” outlines the United 
States’ sporadic attempts at policing the slave trade after its initial abolition.  It focuses 
primarily on the negotiations and debates over the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. Incidents 
involving American slaving vessels and the Royal Navy in 1839 finally brought both 
nations to the negotiating table regarding the slave trade. Ultimately, by this point Great 
Britain had committed to the foreign policy of abolitionism, but as was the case with 
Cuba; support for the foreign policy of abolitionism dissipated when important 
diplomatic connections were endangered or the supply of U.S. cotton threatened. 
Therefore, during the treaty discussions Great Britain made two major concessions—
they officially renounced the practice of impressment and the “right of search.” 
Although Britain’s compromises were made privately, they demonstrated once again that 
the foreign policy of abolitionism could be scaled back when it threatened other 
international goals. At the same time, the United States agreed to place a permanent 
squadron off the coast of Africa to prevent abuses of the American flag by slavers. 
Consequently, when the United States agreed to these terms it illustrated that the 
southern slaveholder’s foreign policy of slavery was also malleable when 
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accommodation protected other and more important diplomatic polices. 
Because each body chapter concludes at successful moments for Great Britain’s 
foreign policy of abolitionism, the conclusion discusses the ramifications of those 
achievements in each nation or colony discussed. Since Cuba remained a colony of 
Spain until the late nineteenth century, Great Britain’s government dealt with Spanish 
and Cuban authorities over the slave trade. Therefore, the foreign policy of abolitionism 
experienced hostility from two fronts. Because Cuban sugar became Spain’s most 
lucrative commodity in the mid-1800s, the government undermined its own anti-slaving 
policies in an effort to not hinder the flow of sugar and capital into Spanish coffers. 
Essentially, the Spanish government nullified its own anti-slave-trading laws, which 
allowed the Cuban slave trade to flourish. Continued abuses of those statutes led to 
Whitehall sending an ardent abolitionist—David Turnbull—to Cuba to shore up those 
offenses. However, Turnbull took the foreign policy of abolitionism to the extreme, 
which forced Great Britain’s leaders to rein in the unruly abolitionist. Turnbull 
disregarded these reprimands and, eventually, went on a rogue mission to free former 
British slaves who had been re-enslaved in Cuba. Those actions led to his imprisonment 
and permanent expulsion from Cuba. Ultimately, when Whitehall stripped Turnbull of 
his Consulship and allowed the Cuban authorities’ to detain him, it demonstrated the 
limits Great Britain’s government placed on the foreign policy of abolitionism.  
The initial abolition of the slave trade by the United States and Great Britain in 1808 
ushered in nearly six decades of tension over enforcing anti-slaving laws and policing 
the trade. Hostilities between both nations centered on the “right of search,” which dated 
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back to the War of 1812. Yet, after it abolished the slave trade the United States lacked 
an official or efficient naval squadron on the African Coast to enforce U.S. anti-slaving 
statutes. Therefore, slavers frequently hoisted American colors to avoid British search, 
which prompted Whitehall to press U.S. officials into allowing the Royal Navy the right 
to search American vessels suspected of slave trading. Because United States 
representatives had a strict belief in preserving freedom of the seas, they constantly 
denied Britain the right. Consequently, some Americans, but mostly the citizens of other 
nations, hid behind forged American papers and the U.S. flag. By 1839, Great Britain’s 
foreign policy of abolitionism had gained significant momentum, which led to the Royal 
Navy detaining several American ships guilty of slaving. Those incidents led to the 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842. Although the treaty created the U.S. African 
Squadron and saw violations decrease, abuses of American anti-slaving laws continued 
until President Abraham Lincoln signed a treaty in 1862 granting the Royal Navy a 
limited “right of search.” Lincoln’s actions finally concluded U.S. involvement in the 
trade, but, more importantly, it was the final achievement that purveyors of Britain’s 
foreign policy of abolitionism required to end the African slave trade. 
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CHAPTER II 
‘A VOICE THUNDERING ACROSS THE ATLANTIC’: BRITISH AMBITIONS 
AND TEXAS SLAVERY 
After almost a decade as an independent republic, Texas continued to experience 
social and economic crises. Prolonged war with the Native Americans increased the 
young republic’s national debt, prompting Texas’ leaders to look to other countries—and 
the United States in particular—for aid in relieving the ever-increasing deficit. However, 
the United States denied the republic’s request for recognition and annexation, which 
forced Texas’ government to look across the Atlantic for aid, specifically to Great 
Britain, which did not sit well with many Texans. In an attempt to address the anxiety of 
ordinary Texans in the fall of 1843, Sam Houston delivered a speech at the Presbyterian 
Church in Huntsville. It was during his speech that Houston discussed allegations, 
leveled by his political opponents, that he was scheming to “sell [his] country to 
England,” which they feared would be a detriment to the future status of slavery in 
Texas. In response to these accusations, Houston asserted that he “question[ed] very 
much…whether England would have us, if she could get us. To my mind it is clear that 
England does not care about the abolition of slavery.” Additionally, he asserted that 
Great Britain had devastated its West Indian colonies by abolishing slavery there and 
“she knows very well that a slave population will develop the resources of a new country 
in one-eighth of the time it would take by free labor.” Ultimately, he argued, because of 
Texas’s excellent quality fertility—particularly as pertained to cotton—and “the 
advantages that England might derive from us in various ways,” the “inducements to her 
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to lend us her aid at this juncture” were strong. Houston dismissed the “opposition of the 
fanatics who clamor for universal abolition of slavery” as inconsequential cant.1 
British attention to Texas was apparent from the Texas Republic’s 1836 
declaration of independence. Indeed, Texan representatives were in open communication 
with British officials throughout the Texas Revolution. While it was not until 1840 that 
Texas’ appeal for recognition gained official approval in Britain, and major steps were 
taken toward the adoption of several treaties, Texas from its initial declaration remained 
attractive to British traders and statesmen. Joseph T. Crawford, the British vice-consul at 
Tampico, exploring the opportunities that the Republic of Texas offered, argued that 
“[s]hould Texas maintain its Independence [from] Mexico an advantageous Barter trade 
can be established with other Countries who will supply manufactures and take Cotton 
and other produce in return.”2 Yet the British government and its agent were not 
cognizant of the internal strife that racked the nascent republic. Before the consul’s 
letter, the provisional government founded in November of 1835 devolved into anarchy. 
The general instability throughout Texas and the toxic issue of slavery caused the new 
republic to fail in its attempts to gain recognition from the United States.3 Furthermore, 
the Mexican government’s refusal to recognize Texas’ independence and the continued 
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threat of reoccupation by Mexican forces kept Texas’ future uncertain. Therefore, the 
ambiguity of Texas’ future combined with the prospect of a lucrative trading partnership 
prompted British officials in or with knowledge of Texas to encourage Whitehall to 
establish a relationship with the fledgling republic.  
Britain utilized its political influence to manipulate the fledgling republic into 
agreeing to demands that were diametrical to the Texans’ aspirations for independence. 
As it had with the United States, Great Britain also took issue with Texas slavery, 
specifically the continued flow of slaves into Texas by sea. Therefore, the slave trade 
took center stage in the discussions over British recognition of Texas. By using treaties 
to steer Texas’s government in the direction British officials deemed appropriate, Britain 
illustrated and utilized its foreign policy of abolitionism, specifically regarding the 
Atlantic slave trade. During the negotiation process the British government successfully 
persuaded Texas to abolish the trade, but it never achieved what abolitionists and several 
Britons in Texas saw as their greatest mission, the abolition of slavery in the Republic of 
Texas, or, more generally, the Western Hemisphere. Several British representatives in 
Texas believed that the abolition of slavery in Texas was achievable through British 
loans to the Republic. Others believed that if Britain pressured Mexico into recognizing 
Texas’ independence, the Texas Republic’s government would agree to abolish slavery. 
Yet, these schemers failed to realize that Whitehall would not allow Great Britain’s 
recently formed foreign policy of abolitionism to jeopardize market penetration, 
commercial expansion, and most importantly, the flow of U.S. cotton to Britain’s textile 
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industry. Ultimately, some British diplomats might have hoped to abolish slavery in the 
new Texas Republic, but entrenched interests prevailed over new ideals.   
Furthermore, British representatives, in their attempts to persuade the British 
government to push Texas’ government to abolish African slavery, failed to address the 
long established “other slavery” in Texas.4 The Indian slave trade and slavery, 
institutions present before Spanish exploration, rested on an intricate system of trade, 
exchange, and captive-taking. Yet, as Britain developed its foreign policy concerning the 
slave trade and took the lead in promoting the global emancipation of enslaved Africans, 
an elaborate trade of enslaved indigenous and white individuals continued and expanded 
in the Texas Republic. Therefore, Great Britain’s foreign policy of abolitionism 
completely ignored other types of bondage. British fixation on the African slave trade 
(and historians’ subsequent focus on that singular issue) allowed the Indian slave trade to 
remain hidden in plain sight. With Britain’s sole focus on black slavery, Indian slavery 
was in some ways allowed to expand at this same moment, creating complications for 
both Texas and any Anglo-Texan alliance. In ways scholars have so far failed to 
appreciate, Native American policies regarding their own slave trade, an Indian “foreign 
policy of slavery,” was a crucial factor in the ultimate failure of Britain’s “foreign policy 
of anti-slavery” in Texas. This resulted in important ramifications for a set of foreign 
relations problems that have been mostly confined to statesmen in Whitehall, Austin, 
and Mexico City. And yet, the councils of Indians—primarily Comanche, Wichita, 
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Kiowa, and Apache—remain crucial to the story of Britain’s international anti-slavery 
politics at the time.  
Britain’s proposals regarding Texas were in many ways bound to clash with its 
pre-existing relations with Mexico and the United States, but the British government 
attempted to circumvent these impediments by encouraging Mexico to recognize Texas. 
Furthermore, Whitehall did not pursue any policies that might threaten their relationship 
with the United States. Britain acquiesced in Texas’ annexation when it appeared that 
rejection might threaten peaceful relations with the United States, which the initial 
historiography of British diplomatic policy demonstrated.5 However, as later diplomatic 
historians illustrated, Britain did not sit idly by and allow the United States to become a 
North American hegemon overnight. Instead, the British government employed a variety 
of methods to thwart American expansionism through diplomacy.6 Furthermore, as other 
scholars assert, Britain did not solely focus on the United States; it had economic ties 
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throughout Latin American and elsewhere.7 Ultimately, all of this scholarship added to 
our understanding of British diplomatic policy, but failed to place adequate emphasis on 
the role the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade and slavery played in Britain’s foreign 
policy. Moreover, these works do not address the lengths to which the British 
government and Britons would go to achieve one or both of these goals. 
 In the same light as their predecessors, recent scholars exploring the complexities 
of slavery in an international context have continued to minimize the important place 
that the abolition of the slave trade and slavery held in British foreign policy.8 While 
these works do not focus on the eradication of these institutions, both play major roles in 
their larger narratives. Furthermore, acknowledging that Great Britain was the first 
nation to embark on a global mission to eliminate the slave trade and slavery is not 
enough. Instead, this study examines the policy initiatives from London, but, more 
importantly, investigates the policy proposals flowing back to the metropole to 
understand the importance placed on abolition in British foreign policy. 
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Although scholars of Native American history have examined the Indian slave 
trade, captives, slavery, and Indian relationships with imperial powers, this work adds to 
our understanding of how Native American groups responded to the abolition of the 
African slave trade and slavery.9 Moreover, we ought to examine whether or not 
European powers took issue with the Indian slave trade and continued enslavement of 
Native peoples in states where they had diplomatic relations during the age of abolition. 
While the Indian slave trade and slavery were similar to the African slave trade and 
slavery, they were by no means the same. However, when the British began their 
mission to eliminate the African institutions did they also want to stop Native American 
systems as well? Recent U.S. foreign relations scholarship has argued that instead of 
marginalizing Indians within the history of U.S. diplomacy, these indigenous polities 
and individuals need to be seen as “historical actors, rather than mere objects of state 
settler aggression.”10 Moreover, we ought to pay closer attention to “how power worked 
on the ground as to diplomatic struggles over formal title.”11 Yet, like Native American 
                                                 
9 Alan Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670-1717 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); James Brooks, Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and 
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Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War, The Lamar Series in Western History (New 
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scholars, foreign relations historians continue to minimize the role that Indians played in 
foreign policy regarding abolitionism.  
Ultimately, Native Americans (and the Comanche in particular) dominated Texas 
through the 1830s and 1840s at least. And it matters that these were the same decades 
when Britain sought to wield some measure of anti-slavery diplomatic muscle through 
its intrigues in Texas. And whether we choose to designate it as a province of Mexico or 
an independent republic, the reality is that the entrenched—rather than presumptive—
power on the ground was Native American. For even though Texas had won its 
independence from Mexico, the reality was, it was on the periphery of the powerful 
confederation of Comancheria and still locked in a low-grade but constant war with 
surrounding Comanches (and their allies). And, indeed, that war, pursued most 
vigorously by Texas president and Indian “exterminationist” Mirabeau Lamar, was itself 
being fought over the issue of slavery: the taking of white captives along the porous 
boundary between Anglo-American settlements and Comancheria. Therefore, 
abolitionist politics are not just an Anglo-Texan or Anglo-American-Texan question, as 
earlier generations of diplomatic historians have suggested. Instead, abolitionism in 
Texas is jointly an Anglo, Texas, African, Indian, and American issue, and recognizing 
this as such changes the contours of the entire story.  
Attempting Recognition: Texas, the United States, and Great Britain 
Once Sam Houston assumed the presidency of the Republic of Texas in October 
1836, he embarked on an aggressive mission to achieve annexation by the United States 
in order to remedy the republic’s enormous economic, racial, political, and military 
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troubles. In order to facilitate this process, Houston appointed Stephen F. Austin to the 
position of Secretary of State, which he hoped would streamline affairs due to Austin’s 
previous diplomatic experience with the United States.12 However, the issue of 
recognition proved difficult to achieve because reports illustrating the disorder that 
plagued the Texas government had already reached Washington, D.C., where the news 
weakened U.S. officials’ resolve to assist the new republic.  
 In response to U.S. rejection, the Houston administration redoubled efforts to 
persuade Americans that Texas could protect itself from Mexico and that annexation was 
the best policy to pursue for the United States. When the Texas diplomat William H. 
Wharton was dispatched to Washington D.C., he was supplied with a set of 
comprehensive documents illustrating why Texas was “fully competent to sustain her 
independence, and fulfill the duties and obligations of an independent power.”13 More 
importantly, he was afforded the power by the Texan government to force U.S. 
legislators to make a decision. The Texans planned to threaten the United States by 
gesturing towards a possible trade agreement with European powers based on “the great 
commercial advantages that will result to their nations from [their] cotton.”14 While the 
idea of King Cotton diplomacy would not be fully conceptualized or utilized until the 
American Civil War, using cotton as a weapon in diplomatic negotiations has a much 
                                                 
12 Stephen F. Austin, William H. Wharton, and Branch T. Archer, sent by the Consultation in late 1835, 
spent months of the revolution working to gather assistance for the Texas army. Eventually, the men 
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Texas Legation, 1836-1845, Kenneth R. Stevens (Forth Worth, Texas: TCU Press, 2012), 3. 
13 Stephen F. Austin to William H. Wharton, November 18, 1836, The Texas Legation, 1836-1845, 
Kenneth R. Stevens (Forth Worth, Texas: TCU Press, 2012), 20. 
14 Stephen F. Austin to William H. Wharton, November 18, 1836, The Texas Legation, 32. 
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longer pedigree and Texas experimented with a nascent form of it in an effort to compel 
U.S. annexation. In the end, if coercion did not have the desired effect, Wharton was to 
follow through on those threats by meeting with representatives of Great Britain and 
France to discuss recognition of Texas and negotiate trade partnerships with the 
republic.15 
 Texas cotton developed into his major bargaining chip in diplomatic negotiations 
with the United States and Europe. The endeavor to obtain recognition continued, and 
from his position in Washington, D.C., Wharton informed Texas leaders that the source 
of American opposition to recognizing or annexing Texas was the issue of slavery. 
While slavery in the United States had been a source of debate since the American 
Revolution, the dispute over balancing political power between slave and free states 
within the U.S. federal system intensified when the Missouri conflict erupted in 1819.16 
Since then, friction between slave and free states had grown more intense from the 1820s 
and early 1830s as various conflicts catapulted the explosive issue of slavery and the 
balance of power between the sections to the forefront of American politics.17 As a 
consequence of Texas declaring itself unequivocally a slave state, the possibility of the 
United States recognizing and annexing the Republic of Texas centered on those 
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disagreements. Ultimately, in an attempt to circumvent an inevitable fight on the issue, 
agents of both the departing Jackson and new Van Buren administrations made it clear to 
Texas delegates that the United States had no intentions for immediate annexation.  
 But growing fear of Great Britain, along with southern political maneuvering, 
facilitated U.S. diplomatic recognition of Texas—which Andrew Jackson, in one of his 
last acts as president, made official in March 1837. Yet, the South’s political influence 
failed to motivate the newly elected Martin Van Burn into action on annexation. 
Therefore, the Telegraph and Texas Register suggested that Texas should turn to the 
“mighty voice thundering across the Atlantic,” Great Britain.18 Consequently, the Texas 
government dispatched Secretary of State James Pinckney Henderson on a special 
mission to Great Britain in June 1837, entirely aware that “widespread Anglophobia in 
the United States meant that any diplomatic or trade agreements that Henderson forged 
in London would go a long way toward forcing the Van Buren administration to act.”19 
However, his other agenda was to secure loans to replenish an empty Texas treasury. It 
was most likely that London would be the place to find those creditors. While this was 
Texas’s first major appeal to Great Britain for recognition and credit, British officials, 
because of British observations regarding the political, racial, economic, and military 
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troubles plaguing Texas in 1837, had already discussed the possibility of establishing a 
relationship with the Republic.20  
At the same time, President Houston understood that the Texas Republic’s future 
depended on its relationship with Native American populations. At first, he attempted to 
provoke a general Indian war to promote U.S. intervention and accelerate annexation, 
but when that plot failed, he embarked on a mission to formalize Indian relations. In 
contrast to most Texan representatives, Houston believed that concessions to the Indian 
nations was the only route to Texas’ peace. Therefore, he signed treaties with the 
Cherokees and Shawnees in fall of 1836.21 Later that year, Houston sent messengers into 
northern Texas, a region better understood as Comancheria, or the Comanche Empire. 
Indeed, Texas itself should be considered a power peripheral to the local Comanche 
hegemon. Knowledgeable of Indian diplomacy, and aware of Comanche predominance, 
Houston assured Comanches of the “three perquisites of peaceful relations: gifts, trade, 
and face-to-face diplomacy.”22 
In early 1838, Houston tried to placate the Comanches through diplomacy, but 
the Texas Congress, overriding the president’s veto, opened all Indian lands to white 
settlement. This unregulated movement caused Texas Comanche relations to devolve 
into violence. Comanches ransacked frontier farms, killing settlers and taking horses, 
mules, and taking captives for the Indian slave trade. Meanwhile, militia units from 
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Texas patrolled the region and indiscriminately killed Comanches. In an effort to 
reestablish peace, President Houston sent commissioners into Comancheria in March 
1838. In May of 1838, Houston also warned that the “Indian lands [were] forbidden 
fruit,” but settlers continued traveling up the Brazos, Colorado, and Guadalupe rivers 
toward Comanche hunting grounds.23 Yet, frightened by the republic’s intense 
enthusiasm and capability of expansion, Comanches diverged from their customary 
notion of permeable borders and insisted that a fixed boundary line guaranteed by treaty 
separate the territories of the two nations. Prohibited by Texas law to cede any lands 
claimed by the republic, representatives avoided the matter and the talks remained 
unsettled. Yet, in May, the Comanches signed a “Treaty of Peace and Amity” in 
Houston.24  
Although President Houston had reestablished peaceful relations with the 
Comanches in the early summer of 1838, other tribes were implicated in an unsuccessful 
rebellion against Texas. While only the most militant warriors of the Cherokees, 
Kickapoos, Shawnees, and Delawares rose in resistance, their actions led to the 
indiscriminate harassment of Native Americans who were not involved in the 
insurrection. Therefore, Houston was unable to bring a genuine peace between 
indigenous inhabitants and the Texas Republic.25 Ultimately, on the ground, Texas’ 
major commitment was to Indian affairs, but in foreign policy, the government of the 
Republic of Texas also focused on obtaining loans from Great Britain. However, Texas’ 
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continued involvement in slavery conflicted with Britain’s foreign policy of slavery, 
specifically Whitehall’s goal of ending the slave trade. But none of these issues can be 
disentangled: Texas had gone into debt waging Indian wars meant, in part, to suppress 
Comanche captive-taking, particularly as it pertained to white women and girls and their 
supposed “sexual slavery” in Comancheria. But, even as they attacked one form of 
slavery on their western flank, Texans worked to shore up the chattel variety of 
enslavement in the east. 
The Empire Across the Atlantic: Britain, Texas, and the Slave Trade Question 
 Even before James Pinckney Henderson arrived in Great Britain in 1837, Joseph 
T. Crawford had already contacted the Texas government regarding trade. However, he 
was “careful to explain to General Houston that [his] visit was wholly one of a Consular 
nature to collect satisfactory information respecting the commerce of the ports of the 
Northward District of Tampico.”26 While in his official correspondences Crawford 
worded his remarks carefully, the Telegraph and Texas Register reported his mission as 
an assignment to “investigate the civil and political condition of the country and report 
to the British government.”27 Although Crawford was in Texas on a fact finding mission, 
he did argue that if Mexico attempted to retake Texas it would have to be a “systematic 
operation” that required the establishment of new forts and an effective military 
occupation of the entire country. For him, a strategy of that magnitude would be 
“impossible for Mexico to undertake or execute” because by that time Texas’ population 
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had grown, along with the Texas confidence. Therefore, he concluded that Texas had 
“conquered or will ultimately conquer her Independence [from] Mexico.”28 
When it came to the United States annexing Texas, Crawford asserted that after 
their initial failures Texans reached the decision that annexation would be 
disadvantageous for the republic. Texas’ soil, he argued, had the capability of producing 
as much, or if not more cotton than the United States. Additionally, if Texas became part 
of the Union, Texas would gain nothing for exchanging its produce for U.S. 
manufactures. Consequently, Texas would “lose the advantage of competition,” while 
reaping “no solid benefit by adding her cottons into the growth of the United States.”29 
Therefore, public opinion had shifted from annexation to the desire for a “separate, free 
and recognized independent government, to trade directly with other nations” in which 
Texas would provide the raw materials in return for manufactures.30 In the end, 
Crawford asserted that because neither the people nor the government of Texas desired 
annexation, it would no longer be pursued.  
By the late 1830s, slavery was essential to the Texas economy. Therefore, the 
Texas Constitution duplicated the rudimentary elements of the U.S. government. 
However, the enumeration of human rights in the constitution did not render the 
revolution a fully humanitarian one. The Texas independence movement was plagued 
with racial conflicts, and the convention approved several proslavery and discriminatory 
amendments, which incorporated a slave code that ensured the chattel status of blacks 
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held in bondage under phony contracts. Under the Texas constitution, the “introduction 
of Slaves, Africans or Negroes [was] forever prohibited and declared to be piracy, except 
those from the United States.”31 It also denied equal rights to free blacks by giving 
citizenship to whites only.32 Yet, nothing appeared in the document about Native 
American slavery or the slave trade  
Even though the institution of slavery was abolished only a few years earlier in 
the British Empire, Crawford argued that the number of slaves in Texas was small and 
“in general they [were] exceedingly well treated.”33 His major problem with Texas at the 
time was the issue of the slave trade. Since Britain abolished the trade in 1807, they had 
taken the lead in policing the Atlantic slave trade, along with pushing other nations to do 
the same. While the Constitution of the Republic of Texas 1836 declared the 
“importation or admission” of slaves from anywhere “excepting from the United States 
of America…piracy,” Crawford maintained that “slaves [had] been imported directly 
into Texas.”34 However, in their defense the Texas leaders had utilized all of their 
“power to detect the perpetrators and bring them to Justice,” but “one or more 
American” vessels continued to carry out “this most detestable traffick” by importing 
slaves on the east side of the Sabine, thereby evading the Texas laws.35 Furthermore, 
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slaves were brought to Texas from Cuba by two American schooners, the Waterwich and 
Emperor, flying the Texas flag. 
Although the illegal trade continued into Texas, Crawford was satisfied with 
President Houston’s promise to eventually stop the trade. Furthermore, he had been 
made aware of Texan’s communications with the United States regarding the issue. The 
U.S. Secretary of War, Joel R. Poinsett, had sent 300 American troops to the Sabine in 
an attempt to help Texas stop the flow of slaves into Texas from the Atlantic. Yet, by 
March 5, 1837, Houston delivered a message to the Texas House of Representatives 
arguing that the Texas Navy was ill equipped, with only two ships in its fleet, to block 
the continued importation of slaves. His solution was to call on Great Britain and the 
United States to join them in preventing the trade into Texas. Because this measure was 
accepted with such enthusiasm, Crawford argued that, before any more slaves were 
imported from the United States, it would not be a difficult task to introduce an initiative 
to have the issue of slavery “expunged” from Texas’s constitution.36 Moreover, the 
adjustment to the constitution would need to come quickly because immigration, 
specifically planters bringing their slaves to Texas from the United States, would 
increase monumentally due to the Panic of 1837.37 If the issue was not remedied as 
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quickly as possible, the slave population in Texas would double. Ultimately, Sam 
Houston to pushed for a joint resolution to appoint an agent to Great Britain.38  
As conversations over Texas continued, communications from Britons in Texas 
further illustrated a Texan desire to implement a treaty between Texas and Britain. The 
British naval Commander Joseph Hamilton maintained that during his stay in Texas he 
was able to converse with several merchants and cotton planters, some of them English, 
who were “interested in the Trade with Great Britain” and “anxious to have a 
Commercial Treaty negotiated [with] Great Britain.”39 Moreover, he was guaranteed by 
some of the most prominent individuals that a treaty would be greeted with the utmost 
enthusiasm even though Texas had recently completed a treaty with France, giving the 
French the most favored nation status.40 More importantly, the cotton planters were 
anxious to begin directly shipping their produce to London instead of the United States 
because at the time they received eight cents per pound of cotton. A treaty such as this 
would be reciprocal; specifically, it would afford Britain with a trade network previously 
dominated by the United States and possibly cause that commerce to dwindle to mere 
insignificance. Consequently, if the British government did not decide to extend a treaty 
                                                 
38 On May 15, 1837 a joint resolution was approved to appointed a representative to Great Britain. The 
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to Texas, British agents argued Britain should, at the very least, appoint an agent to 
Texas in order to protect its rapidly expanding commercial interests there.  
Due to British fears of endangering their diplomatic relationships with the United 
States and Mexico, officials in Britain continued to refuse Texas recognition.41 Colonial 
Secretary Francis Sheridan, meanwhile, argued that if there was the remote chance of 
Great Britain extending recognition the government needed to send a “competent 
person” immediately in order to “examine the Country, make himself acquainted with 
the character and habits of the people and report thereon.”42 Moreover, the individual 
sent to Texas needed to acquire knowledge about the defense and support of British 
emigrants by the republic’s government once they arrived in Texas, along with the 
condition of the land in the country. This information was crucial because the new 
immigrants would most likely adopt staple farming and cattle ranching. In the end, it 
was argued that while most Texans seemed to have been “outcasts from society,” there 
were “individual instances of talent, worth and respectability.”43 
Although the British government’s refusal to recognize Texas’s independence 
remained its official stance on the issue, Sheridan reiterated, “recognition of her 
Independence by Great Britain would be of ultimate advantage to the Mother 
Country.”44 British refusal to recognize Texas was also linked to the fact that Texas was 
a slave holding nation and it continued to allow the importation of slaves. The matter he 
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asserted could be quickly remedied by a “prompt recognition of Texas by Great 
Britain.45 Yet, the slavery question predominated debates. 
The Texas constitution forbade the importation of slaves from anywhere but the 
United States. Introducing them from other countries was deemed “piracy” and 
ostensibly punishable by death, but the Texas government never took action to discover 
and penalize perpetrators. Consequently, individuals ran their cargoes with impunity. 
And because the authorities administered these regulations with such laxity, residents on 
several parts of the coast were openly known as slavers. The continued importation of 
slaves into Texas was a consequence of the growing demand for labor and the 
profitability of selling slaves. One British agent argued that due to this demand, the price 
of slaves in Texas was inflated. Slaves in Texas were known to have commanded $1,500 
to $2,000 a head, while at the same time they were selling at $300 to $400 in Havana.46  
The lucrativeness of slave trading in Texas initiated an intense competition over 
filling the labor needs of Texas between international and U.S. slave holders, especially 
those of Virginia, the Carolinas, Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri and Tennessee. Moreover, 
Sheridan argued that Texan thought regarding British diplomatic recognition was that if 
it were done, “[Texas] would allow England…to make her own terms [possibly] even on 
the slave question.”47 Ultimately, he maintained that if Texans allowed the British to 
dictate the conditions of their recognition, Great Britain could possibly impose the 
“severest restrictions and penalties” on individuals who brought slaves into Texas from 
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the United States, along with appointment of a British official to make sure that these 
penalties were enforced.48   
In an attempt to illustrate the fragility of slavery in Texas, Sheridan proposed a 
number of ways to diminish the importance of African slavery and possibly eradicate it 
completely in the republic, but never mentioned indigenous slavery. One way in which 
he believed they could undermine slavery was for the British government to encourage 
emigration to Texas. In urging immigrants to move to Texas, they would increase the 
amount of available labor in the country, which would decrease the price of labor and 
cause the market price of slaves to fall. This would in turn discourage the slaveholding 
entrepreneur from the United States and indisputably lessen the temptation for captains 
and crews of slaving ships to engage in the trade. In other words, once slavers realized 
that revenue earned from their undertakings would decrease substantially and that a strict 
enforcement of slave trade laws would be in effect, with severe and certain punishment 
for those caught, the slave trade would disappear.49 
 In addition to making slavery less economically feasible, Sheridan asserted that 
in conceding recognition Great Britain might make extinguishing slavery a sine quâ non. 
This condition would be possible because everywhere, with the exclusion of the coastal 
areas, the climate of Texas “does not require the Constitution of the Negro.” In certain 
regions, the weather is severely cold during the winter, which caused slaves to suffer 
greatly. Consequently, one white man will in that same instance easily outwork two 
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slaves. However, in areas where crops such as cotton and sugarcane were produced, 
agents argued that white laborers could not work those plantations. Instead, it should be 
considered that those plantations be “worked for the next five Years by the Coloured 
Population now in Texas under the System of Apprenticeship, as in the West Indies, 
prior to thorough emancipation.”50 Implementing apprenticeship in Texas, a system that 
the British government used after abolishing slavery in the British Empire, seemed easily 
achievable in Texas because Sheridan maintained there were no more than 20,000 slaves 
there.51 
 Recognition needed to be accomplished with all haste, it was maintained, 
because Texans had already engendered a feeling of hostility towards the United States 
for not recognizing them faster than they had. More importantly, this sentiment was 
fading, the population of Texas was rapidly expanding, and success in the Texas 
Revolution continued to inflate Texans’ sense of their own prowess (not to mention their 
contempt for the Mexican and Indian populations), giving them confidence that they 
could remain an independent republic. As a result, Sheridan made it clear that Texas 
could soon become almost as apathetic towards Great Britain as Texans undoubtedly 
were towards the United States. Therefore, in considering the favorable terms that could 
be made, Great Britain should yield an “early recognition.”52 Again, as long as 
encouragement and protection was afforded to emigrants, Britain would gain in a few 
years a full supply of Texas cotton, equivalent to if not higher quality than that acquired 
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from Louisiana and Mississippi. Furthermore, if a favored status was introduced in Great 
Britain regarding Texas’ produce, American planters and laborers “working their nearly 
worn out land in the States would be found cultivating the Virgin Soil of Texas.”53 
Sheridan went so far as to assert that within twenty years “England (if necessary) might 
exclude every Bale of Cotton made in the [United] States.”54 Ultimately, Whitehall 
ignored Sheridan’s proposition.  
Two topics, however, continued to permeate the correspondence sent back and 
forth across the Atlantic concerning Texas: the African slave trade and slavery. By 1835, 
British public interest in the anti-slave trade movement had diminished but in 1840, it 
began to revive. The abolitionist and British barrister Nicholas Doran Maillard sought to 
utilize this revival to the detriment of Texas in an effort to end the slave trade.55 Great 
Britain’s initial efforts at suppressing the trade had garnered little support, but after the 
1830s, Britain signed several treaties with numerous European powers allowing the 
mutual right of search of vessels suspected of being involved in the slave trade. 
However, the United States remained opposed to signing any such treaty. Therefore, 
Texas’s position on the matter was of grave importance because if Texas agreed to such 
a treaty, Great Britain could use the republic as another example of the United States’ 
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lack of commitment to ending the Atlantic slave trade.56 In September 1840, Maillard 
wrote a letter to Viscount Palmerston outlining the continued movement of slaves from 
the southern half of the United States to the Republic of Texas. Palmerston, a politician 
with substantial influence for most of the nineteenth century, had proved himself a 
formidable member of the Whig Party and been begrudgingly appointed Foreign 
Secretary by the Melbourne government.57 Ships, Maillard asserted, that continued to 
operate in this illicit trade were American steamers, such as the Neptune, Colombia, and 
New York.58 These vessels, he argued, were making two voyages a month from the 
United States to Texas, which resulted in an estimated two hundred slaves transported to 
Texas per ship per month. Therefore, “nothing would be deemed more just…than the 
Seizure of the Boats” engaged in these activities, since in the eyes of Great Britain, 
Texas was still part of Mexico and Mexico’s Constitution of 1824 had abolished 
slavery.59 Moreover, even if Texas was considered an independent nation, its legislature 
had deemed the importation of slaves by sea illegal.60 Lastly, the United States, the 
country to which the vessels belonged, previously demonstrated its dislike of the slave 
trade by outlawing the trade and seizing ships on the mere suspicion that they were being 
outfitted for the slave trade. Because the United States had been able to successfully 
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pour supplies and slaves into Texas, it would not be long before the republic was able to 
sustain itself and develop its own resources. Consequently, this progress would allow, 
“Slavery [to be] revived and perpetuated,” along with other institutions that  “[are] 
injurious to our Interests.”61 Ultimately, Maillard did not support recognition because he 
saw Texas as still part of Mexico. More importantly, the foreign policy of abolitionism 
would fail in the republic because Americans continued to pour into Texas with their 
slaves. 
 By April 1841, circumstances in Texas had changed drastically. France had by 
then acknowledged the independence of Texas. Both countries exchanged 
representatives and began to work on a Franco-Texan bill. Eventually, this bill allowed 
for the establishment of a French company authorized to introduce 8,000 French 
immigrants. They were to settle near several forts, around twenty in number. The 
company commissioned each fort for twenty years along the northern and western 
frontier from the Red River to the Rio Grande. If the colonists settled in the approved 
locations, the company would receive 3,000,000 acres of land. Other stipulations 
revolved around mining, trade, and commerce.62 Furthermore, thousands of Anglo-
Americans, English, and Germans, along with their families poured into the Republic of 
Texas. This, coupled with recognition by the United States three years earlier, allowed 
the republic to consolidate its power. Therefore, Texas possessed stable civil, military, 
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and naval departments that were more than adequate to protect Texas from any attempt 
by Mexico to re-conquer the province.  
One piece of the aforementioned agenda was achieved. Lord Palmerston and 
Texas agent James Hamilton were able to hammer out three treaties regarding Great 
Britain and Texas; a treaty of amity and commerce; a second treaty making Great Britain 
the mediator between Texas and Mexico; lastly, a treaty bestowing the mutual right to 
search ships engaged in the African slave trade. The first two pacts, however, would not 
be implemented unless Texas would willingly assist in policing the trade. Because Texas 
representatives had spent several years trying to obtain British recognition, Hamilton 
hastily signed all three in November 1840, although all three had to be ratified by the 
Texas senate and sent back to Britain before they were official. The first two treaties 
were sent to Texas on December 3, 1840, but Hamilton delayed the third until January 4, 
1841 because of his apprehension regarding the slave trade treaty. British representatives 
suspected Hamilton of impeding the delivery of the third treaty in anticipation that if the 
republic approved the first and second treaties, Great Britain would in turn ratify them 
without waiting on the third. This was not the case. The Texas government quickly 
sanctioned the first two treaties and sent them to Hamilton on February 12, 1841. Nine 
days later, a confidential friend of Hamilton, A. T. Burnley, transmitted the slave trade 
treaty to the Texan government too late for endorsement by congress, which had 
adjourned.63  
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James Hook, a commissioner of the Mixed British and Foreign Courts in Sierra 
Leone, in a letter to Palmerston, asserted that because of Texas’s newly established 
position as a commercial power and its immense value to Great Britain, he believed that 
a plan could be devised to completely abolish the slave trade and slavery in Texas. 
Moreover, he argued that accomplishing this “would prove a powerful engine in the 
hands of Abolitionists towards extinguishing that moral pest in the United States.”64 
Although the importation of slaves was forbidden by the Texas constitution, the Texas 
government continued to allow slaves to be permitted into country through the United 
States. While this depleted the number of slaves in the United States, it also prolonged 
the existence of slavery in the new republic. Yet, because of Texans being “most 
desirous of forming a Commercial treaty with Her Majesty Queen Victoria,” they would 
“gladly listen to the most liberal terms, as to commercial intercourse.”65 Therefore, in 
simply forming a commercial treaty with Texas, and in making the final abolition of 
slavery in Texas a sine quâ non of that treaty, the “peculiar institution” in Texas might 
be given a death blow that would also inflict a “Mortal wound” upon slavery in the 
United States.66   
 When Texas first declared its independence, its population was rather small, but 
as the revolution unfolded, the government encouraged planters and slave owners to 
settle in the republic. Yet, once Texas officially achieved its independence from Mexico 
in May of 1836, the situation began to change. The population increased exponentially, 
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along with its political clout. In this respect, Texas surpassed the expectations of its most 
optimistic allies. Because the number of slaves in Texas was low, Hook argued, “it is 
generally believed that her Government would readily entertain any feasible plan by 
which this blighting section of her laws might be for ever expelled from her judicial 
Code.”67 Moreover, several powerful friends of abolition resided in the republic and they 
were predisposed to end slavery if it proved an obstacle to a treaty of commerce with 
Great Britain. These abolitionists also argued that due to the large number of emigrants 
from Europe and the northern states of the United States the “moral tone and influence” 
of these individuals pushed Texas to favor “freedom” rather than bondage.68 This 
happened because some of the slaves in Texas at the time were U.S. slaves rented out by 
their American owners to Texas planters who could have paid less for wage laborers.  
 There were no treaties ratified until 1842, but Hook believed the commercial 
pacts negotiated by Lord Palmerston and his coadjutors in early 1841 illustrated 
substantial proof of the willingness, on behalf of general commerce, of Great Britain to 
combine “Commercial interest and philanthropy.”69 Furthermore, if the British ministers 
would extend their goal of abolishing slavery in Texas to include the entirety of the 
United States, it would solidify their popularity throughout Great Britain and “call forth 
the lasting gratitude of every friend of the human race.”70 In initiating and pushing Texas 
towards complete abolition, Great Britain could end an institution in a place that might 
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possibly become one of the most extensive slave markets in the Americas. Instead, 
Texas could emerge as a “Free and powerful Republic” between Mexico and the United 
States, which eventually “must by example and sympathy” promote a change in the 
southern slave states.71 Moreover, if the provisions for extinguishing slavery in Texas 
were transposed to similar treaties, with Spain and Brazil, slavery would “receive its 
death blow in the New World, and its nefarious pursuit on the Coast of Africa be 
[rendered] fruitless.”72 In other words, this would “effectually close all the great Markets 
for Slaves, and do more towards putting an end to the export Slave trade in Africa than 
any number of Ships” that may be sent for that purpose.73 Yet again, another Briton 
failed to mention the Indian slave trade or slavery still prevalent in Texas. 
 Ultimately, Hook argued that during the early 1840s the general commerce and 
trade of Great Britain required government intervention to secure new markets for their 
manufactures. By that time, Britain’s powerful European opponents and the United 
States were rivaling them in “every Market in the Universe.”74 The governments of 
France and the United States had gained the upper-hand in trade with regards to Texas, 
but eventually British merchants, ship owners, and immigrants would have their persons 
and property in the new republic protected by a representative of the British government. 
In the end, Hook asserted that at that moment the “commercial interests of our Country 
and the sacred cause of [philanthropy] equally join the appeal to Her Majesty’s 
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Government.”75 While in hindsight, this goal was unrealistic for the ways in which it 
overlooked the complex nature of slavery in the United States, Hook’s view of British 
preeminence in the world illustrates how influential Great Britain believed its own 
power to be.  
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Melbourne’s government found itself in a difficult 
situation that did not allow it to focus on the Texas treaties. By the summer of 1841, it 
was clear that a change in government was about to take place because the Melbourne 
administration had been discredited in all directions, which included details of home 
policy and foreign policy concerning its European allies. In spite of several setbacks and 
defeats, Melbourne and his representatives maintained their hold on power, and the 
change did not come until August 30. In the new government, Sir Robert Peel became 
prime minister, and Lord Aberdeen replaced Palmerston as the Foreign Secretary. 
Because the fall of the Melbourne government seemed inevitable to the British public, it 
is not surprising that Hamilton found it impossible in the last few months to obtain from 
Palmerston any responses on Texas business. As soon as the governmental transition 
was complete, he appeared before Aberdeen reinvigorated and with new designs in an 
attempt to present old arguments in a new light and to push additional treaties on the 
British government.  
Hamilton’s goal with these new treaties was to establish close relations between 
Great Britain and Texas. On the one hand, if adopted Great Britain would receive 
preferential treatment in trade with Texas even though the republic had already made a 
                                                 
75 Hook to Palmerston, April 30, 1841, F. O., Texas, Vol. 2, in BDC-RT, 39. 
  
 
70 
deal with France. Great Britain was to pay only half of the import duty imposed on 
comparable items from other nations. Other special privileges were outlined, specifically 
Great Britain’s right to purchase Texas timber without a tax. On the other hand, Texas 
interests were to be backed by a British guarantee of the bonds of the Republic of Texas, 
for which Texas would pledge “her Revenues, Customs, Taxes and the proceeds 
generally of the Sales of her public Lands.”76 Along with the commercial benefits to 
Great Britain and guarantee of a Texan loan, other stipulations of the treaty dictated that 
Texas assume one million pounds of Mexican debt as the price of recognition while 
giving Mexican bondholders preference on land they could acquire in Texas.  
 In outlining the benefits of this agreement, Hamilton reiterated several of the 
arguments hitherto submitted Palmerston, but assigned more importance than previously 
on the risk of Texas being annexed by the United States and the need for hasty action to 
prevent this. He, like other Britons, highlighted Great Britain’s advantage in having 
access to a continuous supply of cotton outside of the United States, and drew on British 
resentfulness of Americans and their fear of a U.S. invasion of Canada.77 Furthermore, 
an independent Texas would be both an ally of Great Britain against the United States 
regarding Canada and an effective barrier against American designs on Mexico. 
Although Hamilton’s arguments were meticulously balanced and constructed to appeal 
to national jealousy, pride, and commercial advantages, he completely avoided 
discussing both African and indigenous slavery. There was no mention that Texas might 
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abolish slavery, but Hamilton had the impudence to assert that that great humanitarian 
objective was obtainable because signing the third treaty guaranteed the British that 
Texas legislators would immediately ratify the slave trade treaty. Perhaps Hamilton 
delayed the third treaty to the United States to obtain approval of his newly proposed 
resolution, for in all his labors Hamilton was concerned with both acquiring financial 
support and recognition.78 
 Finally, in October, Aberdeen responded, declining to address the issue and 
contending that at that time the three previous treaties were all that Great Britain was 
willing to negotiate. While declining any consideration of any new treaty arrangement, 
Aberdeen deemed Hamilton’s plans significant because he did present them to a number 
of his cabinet members. One expert opinion on the matter, Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Henry Goulburn, resolutely paralleled the foreign secretary’s stance on the Texas issue. 
He argued that at that moment the core principles of British foreign policy were to 
maintain amicable relations with the United States and to avoid any appearance to 
interfere with American interests. In his official acts, Aberdeen appeared to follow this 
trajectory and expressed them in his actions when he sent a British representative to the 
United States to negotiate all matters of contention between the two nations including 
Texas, with the desire to preserve good relations. However, most of Goulburn’s response 
to Hamilton’s agenda dealt with its financial feasibility, which he overtly disapproved 
of. Regarding the feelings that might emerge from the United States if Hamilton’s plan 
was ratified, he asserted:  
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If this [trade preference] can be done what will be the feeling of the United States 
at being excluded from the supply of a Country peopled mostly by her own 
subjects and governed by a constitution framed on the model of that of the U.S. 
Will it not engender a feeling of animosity towards us and strengthen that party 
in America who are laboring to exclude our manufactures from the markets of 
the United States who are now without a doubt our best customers. And will not 
this feeling be aggravated by the idea put forth by General Hamilton that Texas is 
to furnish us all the Cotton and Tobacco that Great Britain can require.79 
 
With a history of cautious negotiations by his predecessors, it is not surprising that after 
Aberdeen’s ascension to Foreign Secretary no radical changes took place in foreign 
policy.  
Moreover, if Goulburn’s attitude was archetypical of the ministry and of 
Aberdeen, their official action was to be determined by restraint and deliberation, unlike 
that of British agents on the ground, who desired immediate action. Former Secretary 
Palmerston tried to recognize Texas when the ratification of treaties was completed, and 
for the time being Aberdeen was comfortable continuing on the same course. In addition, 
at that time there were other pressing matters that he needed to address and he was still 
unfamiliar with the Texas issue. Lastly, there was still no indication that Texas leaders 
planned to recommence annexation talks with the United States. Therefore, there was no 
need to push through a measure to thwart American annexation.80 
Soon after Hamilton’s agreements were rejected, Aberdeen received numerous 
letters from William Kennedy illustrating his thorough knowledge of Texas affairs, 
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along with offering his services to the foreign secretary to promote British interests.81 
Kennedy was admired by Texans, was treated well by them, and was extremely 
impressed by the Republic of Texas. Because of his sojourn, he published in 1841 a two-
volume study on the history and future of the country. His investigation regarding 
annexation focused on statecraft and argued for the foundation of “national power and 
commercial advantages.”82  For Kennedy, who began working as an agent for the British 
government in 1841 and continued to deal with Texas until annexation to the United 
States. Great Britain’s current prospect was twofold: to extend relations and to curb 
American expansion to the southwest. Moreover, he argued that the antislavery 
sentiment in the United States was not the only hindrance to Texas annexation, but that 
the “high-tariff faction in the North opposed it, and that Texas herself would necessarily 
have to adopt free-trade principles.”83 Ultimately, Texas might become, in the sphere of 
Great Britain, a weapon to weaken the defensive policy of the United States.  
 Because Kennedy had written a study and had already been brought to 
Palmerston’s attention by Hamilton, he offered his skills to Aberdeen. He first proposed 
that the British government pay for his expenses in Texas while he attempted to get the 
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slave trade treaty ratified.84 Kennedy believed that his popularity in Texas was so great 
that he would have no problems in achieving this. After receiving no reply, he wrote 
again on October 20, outlining the most recent intelligence from Texas, that Sam 
Houston would most likely be elected president again and that the British needed to send 
an agent to Texas to contact the new administrators of the Texan government. He also 
asserted that Britain needed to be diligent because “a new revolution [had] broken out in 
Mexico—military associations for the purpose of overthrowing British rule and 
influence in North America have been formed, from Maine to Missouri.”85 Also, by this 
time the “planters of Cuba are growing impatient of British interference in the Slave 
Trade.”86 He was also absolutely certain that if the British government did not install or 
support an independent government in the “South-Western, and North-Western frontiers 
of the Union, a very few years [would] suffice to place the whole of the territory they 
covet under the Sovereignty of the United States.”87 If this were to happen the maritime 
and commercial supremacy of Great Britain would be at risk. Even with this flamboyant 
prediction of a lurking threat to British hegemony, Aberdeen still did not respond, 
resulting in another letter from Kennedy. On November 6, he addressed the slavery 
question, where he predicted that it would not be difficult to secure the abolition of 
slavery in Texas because it was in the republic’s interest to “link herself closely with 
England” and he could aid in that because of his reputation.88 Finally, on November 8, 
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Aberdeen interviewed Kennedy, and inside a few days he was granted some type of 
commission to go to Texas, where he was to gather information for the British 
government.  
Kennedy left Britain in November of 1841. Throughout his second journey to 
Texas, he wrote several letters detailing his travels. Yet, before he reached his 
destination an administration change occurred in Texas; Houston had superseded Lamar 
as president, and Anson Jones was made Secretary of State. Kennedy’s first letter from 
Texas, simply outlined the overall financial depression prevailing throughout the United 
States, and argued the recession was favorable to Texas because of the increased 
immigration there. He also asserted that the notion of a “successful invasion of [Texas] 
by Mexico [seemed] wholly impracticable” and continued to illustrate the need to 
promptly secure a friendship with Texas to stop any possibility of annexation.89 At the 
end of January 1842, Kennedy reported from Austin that the congress was in session, 
and that as a result of his popularity he was invited to the “bar of the Senate and 
Chamber of Representatives.”90 Again, he proclaimed that the delay over the slave trade 
treaty was caused by Hamilton, but he “urged the immediate ratification of the Treaty” 
where it passed on January 22.91 
While the exact nature of Kennedy’s mission is not evident, the slave trade treaty 
was eventually ratified during his residence in Texas on June 28, 1842.92 However, it is 
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apparent that his appointment was a result of his popularity and the personal influence he 
had over the Texas legislature, which he used to manipulate them into ratifying the treaty 
although no mention of Native American slavery or the slave trade appeared. While 
Kennedy’s semi-official tour of the republic influenced the British government, no 
official diplomatic representative from Great Britain had gone to Texas. However, by 
mid-1842 the time for an official envoy had arrived. Ten days before the collapse of the 
Melbourne government, Captain Charles Elliot was assigned to act as the charge 
d’affaires of Texas on August 20, 1841. Aberdeen confirmed his appointment, but his 
departure was delayed until Texas had ratified the treaties. 
Attacks on Texas Slavery: Elliot Arrives in Texas 
Several months after Elliot’s appointment, Sam Houston once again ascended to 
the presidency of Texas, on December 13, 1841. In his first annual address to congress, 
Houston outlined his policies to remedy the disastrous initiatives of his predecessor, 
Mirabeau B. Lamar. After becoming President of Texas, Lamar took an aggressive 
approach towards the Native Americans of Texas, who continued to be absent from any 
British discussion of abolitionism. After a foiled plan for insurrection implicated the 
Cherokees of East Texas, the president sent troops to occupy land claimed by them. 
Ultimately, the Texans occupation of Cherokee land led to defeat of the Cherokees and 
tragic murder of Chief Bowl at the Battle of Neches, which forced the remaining 
Cherokees into Indian Territory of the United States.93  
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Concerning the Comanches, who continued in the late 1830s to raid along Texas’ 
western frontier, the Lamar administration launched a less successful genocidal 
campaign. Texas regulars mounted punitive expeditions into Comancheria, often 
indiscriminately killing men, women, and children. However, they could not stop the 
raiding and the Comanches retaliated by plundering deep into Texas where they 
destroyed farms, killed cattle, seized captives, murdered settlers, and disfigured their 
bodies. After a smallpox epidemic swept Comancheria the Comanches sued for peace 
and sent representatives to San Antonio in January 1840. Yet, this olive branch of peace 
failed—after a misunderstanding over captive exchange erupted into violence—leading 
to the Council House Massacre. Retaliation for the events that transpired in San Antonio 
came in August of 1840, when Potsanaquahip (Buffalo Hump) led a large force into the 
Guadalupe Valley where they killed, plundered, and burned their way to the towns of 
Victoria and Linnville. Yet, the Texas Rangers and their Indian auxiliaries soon thwarted 
their efforts. In the end, the winter of 1840 saw the majority of Comanches retreating to 
the North, leaving thousands of square miles of land open to Texas settlers.94 
Ultimately, President Lamar’s aggressive campaign against the indigenous 
inhabitants not only devastated those populations, but also put immense pressure on the 
Texas Republic’s finances and added tremendously to the debt he inherited from 
Houston. His three-year crusade had cost countless lives, drained Texas’ coffers, and 
ruined its credit. During his administration, the republic’s debt rose from $2 million to 
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$7 million, and the purchasing power of Texas paper money fell to fifteen cents on the 
United States dollar.95 Consequently, when the experienced Elliot reached his post, 
Texas had become a series of “man-made deserts” and was still reeling from the 
disastrous presidency of Lamar, which offered the charge d’affaires, in his mind, the 
opportunity to influence the direction the Texas Republic took regarding slavery.96 
Lamar’s war against what he saw as Comanche-enslavers, in other words, in weakening 
Texas and placing it in dire financial straits, had in fact opened a diplomatic door for 
Britons crusading against individuals who they saw as the “real” barbarians: those 
dealing in African flesh. In strange ways, British anti-slavery in the Southwest 
borderlands depended upon an aggressively expansive Comancheria that was itself 
dependent upon slave labor and captivity as a means of production and population 
growth. Elliot was aware of the dysfunctional world Comanche-Texan war and 
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million pounds of worth of opium. British anger and Elliot’s attack on the Chinese war-junks triggered the 
“Opium War” which resulted in disaster for China. The treaty which ended the war was arranged by Elliot, 
but was later renounced by both Great Britain and China, resulting in Elliot’s dismissal from his post. 
While Elliot’s actions in China did not officially disgrace him, they did discredit him. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that he was quickly sent to Texas to fill his earlier appointment. Adams, British Interest and 
Activities in Texas, 106-108. 
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diplomacy had made, and saw in it an opportunity for Britain to press its case against 
black servitude. Texas, so often highlighted in our studies of slavery’s expansion, was, 
during the 1830s and early 1840s, actually a curious crossroad for multiple wars against 
bound labor.97 Specifically White pursued its foreign policy of abolitionism in Texas in 
an effort to end the African slave trade, but, ironically, throughout his mission to end this 
trade, a completely independent trade of enslaved individuals flourished further inland.  
Upon his arrival to Texas in August 1842, Elliot was instructed by Aberdeen to 
“watch closely all the proceedings of the Texian Govt., not with any hostile view, but 
simply with the object…to form a just estimate of the power and character of the Texian 
Govt.”98 Elliot quickly took actions in Texas that were conciliatory or exploratory. In 
Elliot’s first meeting with Texas officials, President Houston and the acting Secretary of 
State informed him that Texas was ready to sign an armistice with Mexico. In response 
to Elliot’s initial report, Aberdeen conveyed his “satisfaction” with Houston’s position 
and statements, and promised the “firm determination of Her Majesty’s Government to 
employ their best exertions to put a stop to the fruitless and desultory War which still 
exists between Mexico and Texas.”99 For several months after reaching Texas, Elliot 
was in ill health, and demonstrated no real activity. He simply reported on incidents that 
occurred in the republic, but made two important assertions about Mexico’s continued 
involvement in Texas. First, he insisted that any Mexican attempt to invade Texas would 
fail. Second, he claimed that there was no prospect of Mexico reestablishing its authority 
                                                 
97 DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts, xv. 
98 Aberdeen to Elliot, July 1, 1842, F. O., Texas, Vol. 4, in BDC-RT, 78. 
99 Aberdeen to Elliot, October 3, 1842, F. O., Texas, Vol. 4, in BDC-RT, 111. 
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in Texas.100 Ultimately, during these early months, Elliot’s health problems limited his 
ability to fully examine Texas’s viability as an independent nation and therefore there 
was never any mention of annexation to the United States. 
 By November of 1842 Elliot’s health had improved significantly, but more 
importantly, his time in Texas had allowed him establish contacts, observe Texas’s 
political climate on the ground, and formulate a grand scheme for the republic. He 
envisioned Great Britain assisting Texas, the latter becoming a strong and independent 
nation-state. However, his blueprint included unpopular and unrealistic plans regarding 
slavery in Texas. Therefore, Elliot wrote his detailed outline for Texas slavery to Henry 
Unwin Addington, Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs and longtime 
confidant of Aberdeen, in order to remove the Foreign Secretary from any scrutiny 
associated with his plans. On November 15, 1842, Elliot expressed that a corroding evil 
and obstacle kept Texas from achieving greatness—the institution of slavery. The plot 
that he outlined focused specifically on the abolition of slavery, and this goal combined 
with philanthropic measures would produce advantages for British commerce. In this 
letter, Elliot stated explicitly what his plan was: “My scheme supposes another 
Convention in this Country. Slavery to be abolished, the entire abolition of political 
disabilities upon the people of Colour, perfectly free trade to be declared to be a 
fundamental principle.”101 Furthermore, Elliot argued that the abolition of slavery would 
prompt “Foreign Merchants, foreign Capital, and foreign enterprise and principles [to 
                                                 
100 Elliot to Aberdeen, October 17, 1842, F. O., Texas, Vol. 4, in BDC-RT, 111. 
101 Elliot to Addington, November 15, 1842, F. O., Texas, Vol. 4, in BDC-RT, 128. 
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make] their way into those great and rich regions by peaceful means,” which would 
eventually balance the power of the United States on the continent.102 Additionally, the 
northeastern United States would embrace the fact that abolishing slavery in Texas 
would limit the power of the South and West, which would allow a boundary to form, 
“beyond which Slavery could not advance.”103 On the one hand, Elliot acknowledged the 
difficultly of achieving abolition in Texas because the slaveholding legislature spoke 
frequently on the lengths in which it would go to preserve the institution and the 
lawfulness of slavery, which was sanctioned by the Bible. On the other hand, he asserted 
that the Texian’s “circumstances make them a timid and needy people [who are] ready 
enough to compound reasonably for a monied consideration.”104 The abolition of slavery 
in Texas rested on Great Britain’s ability to provide the republic with a loan to 
“compensate the present Slave Holders.”105 Throughout the concluding portions of his 
letter, Elliot continuously argued that the abolition of slavery in Texas would benefit 
Britain commercially. However, philanthropic reasoning still reigned supreme for Elliot, 
rather than economic benefit to the British Empire. For example, he asserted that while 
slavery was “bad” for the enslaved, “it is ten times worse to the enslaver, and to the 
Country in which it obtains.”106 Moreover, it was a “rot at the heart of society, debasing 
the Master Classes more and more, robbing prosperity of all sense of security.”107 
                                                 
102 Elliot to Addington, November 15, 1842, F. O., Texas, Vol. 4, in BDC-RT, 128. 
103 Elliot to Addington, November 15, 1842, F. O., Texas, Vol. 4, in BDC-RT, 128. 
104 Elliot to Addington, November 15, 1842, F. O., Texas, Vol. 4, in BDC-RT, 129. 
105 Elliot to Addington, November 15, 1842, F. O., Texas, Vol. 4, in BDC-RT, 129. 
106 Elliot to Addington, November 15, 1842, F. O., Texas, Vol. 4, in BDC-RT, 129. 
107 Elliot to Addington, November 15, 1842, F. O., Texas, Vol. 4, in BDC-RT, 129. 
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Ultimately, Elliot had both a moral and economic reason for ending the African slave 
trade and slavery, and yet neither figured into the indigenous slave trade and slavery.  
 Elliot’s scheme for Texas involved obtaining commercial advantages for Great 
Britain that would establish Texas as a powerful and independent state. Yet, like other 
British travelers to Texas, Elliot’s plans were fantastical because Texas slaveholders and 
some others looked forward to annexation to the United States, were opposed to 
abolishing slavery, guaranteeing free trade, and extending the franchise to blacks. While 
all of this seems fanciful imagining, it deserves serious consideration because Elliot 
sincerely believed that his ideas could be achieved by the use of money. However, in the 
conclusion of his letter, Elliot admitted this was his private plan and that officially and 
publicly he would continue the policies of the British government. Even though Great 
Britain abhorred the institution it would not interfere in the institutions of other countries 
but regarding the slave trade, Great Britain could “expect a faithful fulfillment of the 
Slavery treaty” from Texas.108  
 While Elliot’s suggestion for British operations in Texas to secure the abolition 
of slavery were grandiose like other British travelers, it was the first time an official 
British representative expressed this sentiment. Although there is no evidence to suggest 
that Elliot presented this plan to the president of the Texas republic, it is possible, due to 
his close relations with the president, that he had discussed his plan at length with 
Houston before proposing it to the British government. Therefore, Elliot’s plan, Texas’s 
closeness to British diplomats, and the possibility of British intervention could be the 
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tool Houston utilized to frighten the United States into action. In a subsequent letter on 
November 16, Elliot included a letter, dated November 5, from Houston, which 
requested that Elliot act as an agent of Texas in securing peace with Mexico.109 Elliot 
replied to the president that he would happily act in that capacity, but must await 
permission from London. In a letter dated December 11, Elliot reported to Aberdeen that 
“[Houston] had a belief that my visit to Mexico would be productive of advantage to this 
Country, and further the purposes of Her Majesty’s Government.”110 A few days later 
Elliot wrote that the “people of Texas are grasping for peace, and the best bidder…to 
secure the close of this contest upon the basis of [its] consenting place Itself in a position 
of real Independence.”111 Furthermore, rumors of annexation in Texas were troubling 
him, and he felt that delay in the execution of his plan would be fatal. Yet, Elliot 
continued to argue that he could not “help thinking that money lent to put an end to 
Slavery in a South West direction in America,” which would give a “place and a voice to 
the Coloured races.”112 Moreover, the loan would “render…profitable returns as money 
spent for fortresses and Military works on the Northern frontier of the United States.”113 
Ultimately, Texas would be “effectually separated from the United States of the Union,” 
and a “liberal Commercial policy [would eventually] detach it from the N. E. States 
infected by a spirit of Commercial hostility to Great Britain.”114 
                                                 
109 Houston to Elliot, November 5, 1842, enclosed in letter from Elliot to Aberdeen, November 16, 1842, 
F. O., Texas, Vol. 4, in BDC-RT, 130-1. 
110 Elliot to Aberdeen, December 11, 1842, F. O., Texas, Vol. 4, in BDC-RT, 137. 
111 Elliot to Addington, December 16, 1842, F. O., Texas, Vol. 4, in BDC-RT, 143. 
112 Elliot to Addington, December 16, 1842, F. O., Texas, Vol. 4, in BDC-RT, 144. 
113 Elliot to Addington, December 16, 1842, F. O., Texas, Vol. 4, in BDC-RT, 144. 
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 None of Elliot’s communications to Addington ever received an official response 
from Aberdeen. However, William Kennedy throughout the summer of 1842 had urged 
Aberdeen to send him to Texas in an official capacity. In his requests for an 
appointment, Kennedy made no suggestions of a political nature. By July, he was 
appointed consul at Galveston, but his formal appointment was not conferred until 
September 29.115 Although Kennedy received a position in Texas his actions were 
severely limited by the British government. Specifically, he was warned not to involve 
himself in the “difficulties with the Ruling Authorities of Texas.”116 Furthermore, he was 
to leave all matters of diplomacy and policy to Elliot, along with “implicitly [obeying] 
any directions” given to him.117  
 For Texas, the end of 1842 saw Elliot on the ground, promoting Texas’s future, 
his vigorous campaign encouraging British action to endorse Texan independence, and, 
most importantly, the hopeful implementation of his plan in Texas. By this time, 
Kennedy had not arrived in Texas and British policy regarding the republic had not 
changed.118 However, that year witnessed a markedly modified position on the part of 
the British Minster to Mexico, Sir Richard Pakenham, whose communications from his 
post suggested an utter indifference to the drive toward Texan independence.119 In 
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Texas, Elliot had befriended Houston, and his letters sent directly to Aberdeen had 
obtained the confidence of the minister. Apprehension regarding the possible annexation 
to the United States was expressed from Elliot alone. He saw the probability of such 
action, and advocated it as a motive for British activity. Yet Aberdeen never reacted to 
Elliot’s anxiety because he felt he had control of the situation. Aberdeen, distant from 
events on the ground in Texas, had no concern about American annexation, or at least he 
believed that there was no need for alarm and no fear of urgent danger from the United 
States. 
In the end, British agents were able to determine the desires of Texans and their 
government after their failed attempt to achieve annexation to the United States, which 
revolved around credit and trade. Because the Republic of Texas desired markets for 
their cotton and loans to deal with their mounting debt, the country’s leaders were 
willing to concede to some of the British government’s demands, specifically when it 
came to the slave trade. While there was no official support to abolish slavery in the 
Texas Republic some British representatives maintained the grandiose belief that they 
could eventually convince Texas leaders to abandon the institution of slavery. 
Furthermore, the abolition of slavery in Texas would become a catalyst to extinguish 
slavery in the Americas. Yet, none of this would be possible unless the Texas officials 
ratified all three of the British treaties at once. Therefore, in forcing the Republic of 
Texas to ratify the slave trade treaty, Britain demonstrated its resolve to end the trade 
and utilize its political clout to achieve this.   
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It also illustrates how abolitionism—specifically the abolition of the slave 
trade—had become a major foreign policy objective of Great Britain. But at the same 
time, Whitehall’s refusal to use Texas and the possible emancipation of the Republic’s 
slaves as a weapon, which British agents proposed, to hinder American expansionism 
and permanently end slavery in the Western Hemisphere suggests that while Great 
Britain’s foreign policy of abolitionism was important, it was not deemed as crucial as 
market penetration or commercial expansion. Moreover, the continued promotion of the 
abolition of African slavery and the slave trade in Texas demonstrates that the British 
agents were not concerned with other institutions of slavery, such the Native American 
slave trade and slavery. Ultimately, the abolition of the African slave trade became 
irrevocably linked to British foreign policy. But even after the Empire’s liberation of its 
slaves and global mission to end the enslavement of individuals, Whitehall was careful 
not to allow the nation’s ambitions to threaten its larger goals, even if it meant not 
pursuing universal emancipation for African or Indian slaves. It was American power in 
the Southwest, postbellum, which ultimately curtailed the Indian slave trade. And yet, 
the longer history of the many slaveries and antislaveries, which met on the ground in 
Texas, suggests that we cannot comprehend that end result without a more complicated 
picture of Indian diplomacy (and the Indian slave trade as a form of diplomacy). It was a 
crucial factor—perhaps the crucial factor for powerful actors like Mirabeau Lamar—in 
discussions too often rendered as disputes Anglo-Texan, Anglo-American, or domestic 
in their origin.
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CHAPTER III 
‘THE RICHEST JEWEL IN THE CROWN OF CASTILE’: ATTACKS ON THE 
ILLICIT SLAVE TRADE IN CUBA 
“No! A thousand times no!” This was the poignant response of the slaveholder 
Marques de Santiago y San Felipe to Britain’s 1841 attempt at expanding the authority 
of the Cuban Court of Mixed Commission. The proposal, which would allow the 
commissioners to investigate and emancipate slaves imported illegally into Cuba, looked 
to Spain like an infringement upon her sovereignty.1 The Royal Patriotic Society—a 
group of Creole intellectuals advocating for economic and social advancement on the 
island—argued that this type of “violent abolition” was in the “highest degree unjust.”2 
Furthermore, they reasoned, the “prosperity of the island, [and] the cultivation of the 
soil, depends exactly on the maintenance of Slavery.”3 Another response argued that 
freeing the “savage Africans” would not “only be injurious to them, since they are 
unable to enjoy it, [but also that] the property and even the lives, of half a million 
                                                 
1 Report of the Marques de Santiago y San Felipe, on the Convention proposed to Spain by Great Britain. 
On the convention by the British to the Spanish Government regarding the Slave Trade, enclosed in 
Turnbull to Aberdeen, November 25, 1841, in Great Britain. Class B. Correspondence with Spain, 
Portugal, Brazil, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the Argentine Confederation, Relative to the Slave Trade. 
From January 1 to December 31 1841 Inclusive (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1842), 410. [Here 
after referred to as Class B-1841.] 
2 Report of the Royal Patriotic Society, addressed to His Excellency their President, on the Connection 
proposed by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, for the fulfillment of the Treaties of the Abolition 
of the Slave Trade, agreed to at the sittings of the 26th and 28th October, 1841, enclosed in Turnbull to 
Aberdeen, November 25, 1841, in Great Britain. Class B-1841, 415. 
3 Report of the Royal Patriotic Society, addressed to His Excellency their President, on the Connection 
proposed by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, for the fulfillment of the Treaties of the Abolition 
of the Slave Trade, agreed to at the sittings of the 26th and 28th October, 1841, enclosed in Turnbull to 
Aberdeen, November 25, 1841, in Great Britain. Class B-1841, 413. 
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civilized beings [would] be condemned to perish.”4 Lastly, upon being freed, they would 
“immediately fall back into a savage state.”5 
During the first three decades of the nineteenth century, Cuba’s sugar and coffee 
industries had taken off. Since the expansion and enormous growth of the sugar and 
coffee export economies relied completely on the African slave trade and slavery, any 
challenge to the institution met serious opposition from both Cuban and Spanish 
interests. Yet, at the same time that Cuba experienced its sugar boom, a dramatic 
philosophical shift swept across the modern world. Abolitionism began to take root on 
both sides of the Atlantic, and this political movement represented history’s first mass 
movement to end the slave trade and slavery. This campaign eventually led to Cuba’s 
slave system being threatened in two major ways throughout the nineteenth-century. 
Although once leading the world in the selling of slaves from Africa to the Americas in 
the eighteenth century, Great Britain (along with the United States), after a sequence of 
arduous parliamentary battles, outlawed the trans-Atlantic slave trade in 1808.6 The 
                                                 
4 Report of the Licentiate Don Bernardo Maria Navarro, residing in Matanzas, on the Draft of the 
Convention regarding Slave Trade, proposed by the British government, enclosed in Turnbull to 
Aberdeen, November 25, 1841, in Great Britain. Class B-1841, 402. 
5 Report of the Licentiate Don Bernardo Maria Navarro, residing in Matanzas, on the Draft of the 
Convention regarding Slave Trade, proposed by the British government, enclosed in Turnbull to 
Aberdeen, November 25, 1841, in Great Britain. Class B-1841, 406. 
6 To further understand the roots of abolitionism and the pressures that eventually led to the abolition of 
the slave trade and slavery, see Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British 
Abolitionism (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American 
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(Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1975); Seymour Drescher, Econocide: British Slavery in the 
Era of Abolition, second ed. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010); Seymour 
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British-U.S. abolition of the trade illustrated to Cubans and Spanish officials that the 
Cuban slave trade could end as well. Finally, in 1833, Britain abolished slavery 
throughout their entire empire. This move demonstrated to slaveholders in Cuba that 
abolitionism had spread and gained significant momentum. Abolitionists were further 
encouraged to spread their message throughout the Atlantic basin.   
In response to Britain’s foreign policy of abolitionism, Spain signed the Treaty of 
Madrid in 1817, which promised to end its own colonial slave trade by 1820. However, 
official corruption and the prospect of monetary gain complicated diplomacy. Slave 
ships eluded British patrols in the Atlantic and Caribbean. Moreover, Cuba’s hundreds 
of waterways allowed smugglers to reach their destinations undetected. Ultimately, 
Cuba’s sugar production increased monumentally, averaging an annual rate of increase 
of almost five percent between 1820 and 1850, which led to the importation of nearly 
half-million slaves in the decades following the 1820 deadline.7 Such a flagrant violation 
of the 1817 Treaty of Madrid ushered in a prolonged conflict with the British 
government.8 
While Britain’s Emancipation Bill of 1833 did not end slavery abruptly, it 
indicated that slavery had reached its final stages in the British West Indies. At the same 
                                                                                                                                                
Drescher, Capitalism and Antislavery: British Mobilization in Comparative Perspective (New York, 
1987).  
7 David Eltis, Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), 191, 245. 
8 The best sources that outline the complexities of the diplomacy surrounding the 1817 Anglo-Spanish 
anti-slave trade agreement, see Arthur F. Corwin, Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba, 1817-1886 
(Latin American Monographs, No. 9) (Austin, Texas: Institute of Latin American Studies / UT Press, 
1967), 17-34; David R. Murray, Odious Commerce: Britain, Spain, and the Abolition of the Cuban Slave 
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time, it also emboldened abolitionists at home to move against slaveholders throughout 
the Atlantic basin. In 1839 Joseph Sturge, a Quaker businessman, established the British 
and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society to promote abolitionism. The following year, Sturge 
and the Society organized the World Antislavery Convention in London to outline a 
global policy. By coordinating a trans-Atlantic network of activists to circulate vital 
information on slave systems in almost every slaveholding region in the Americas, the 
Society hoped to produce a surge of moral condemnation. At the Convention was a 
forty-six-year-old Scot and rising star among abolitionists—David Turnbull. Due to his 
earlier connections with abolitionists abroad and his growing reputation as an ardent 
abolitionist, Turnbull gained admittance to the inner circles of the British and Foreign 
Anti-Slavery Society. The son of a Glasgow merchant, he was determined, sullen, and 
more often than not cynical, but before dying in 1851, his early abolitionist actions in 
Cuba had helped propel abolitionism to the forefront of Cuban and British trans-Atlantic 
diplomacy.9 
Turnbull’s relentless attacks on Cuba’s slave system have garnered him much 
attention in the historiography of Cuban slavery. His actions are often associated with 
the violence of the Escalera—or ladder—conspiracy.10 Debates abound about the degree 
of Turnbull’s involvement in slave revolts that led to La Escalera. Some scholars argue 
that Turnbull was the linchpin in the string of slave conspiracies that occurred in Cuba 
                                                 
9 Robert L. Paquette, Sugar Is Made with Blood: The Conspiracy of La Escalera and the Conflict between 
Empires Over Slavery in Cuba (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), 132. 
10 After the failed slave revolt, suspected slaves were strapped to a ladder for interrogation. 
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between 1841 and 1844.11 Others argue that La Escalera and other schemes were mere 
fabrications by colonial leaders, used as pretexts to punish both dissident slaves and anti-
slavery activists.12 Other more nuanced interpretations have emerged recently, asserting 
that “while the conspiracy might have been exaggerated for the purposes of repression it 
seems very unlikely that the charges were a pure fabrication.”13 It seems most likely that 
the La Escalera plot did exist, “not as one conspiracy but several distinct yet overlapping 
conspiracies.”14 It is also abundantly clear Turnbull did promote a revolutionary 
movement in Cuba, although “confined to the free blacks by the time [he left Cuba in 
1842].” The Escalera conspiracy initiated “the end of a decade in which a few British 
abolitionist had posed the most serious challenge to Cuba’s plantocracy since the 
independence of Spain’s mainland colonies.”15 Although these scholars illustrate how 
influential Turnbull was as an abolitionist and his direct connection to Cuban slaves’ 
attempts to achieve their freedom through revolt, they neglect the important role 
Turnbull played in the larger conflict between Britain’s foreign policy of abolitionism 
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and diplomatic objectives. Nor have they recognized Turnbull’s conduct in Cuba and the 
responses of Whitehall to those actions, which shed light on the limits Great Britain’s 
political leaders placed the foreign policy of abolitionism. Those arguments have 
focused on grassroots movements, governmental action, or economics independent of 
one another. By utilizing all three at once, it becomes clear that it is impossible to 
pinpoint the exact inspiration for Great Britain’s foreign policy of abolitionism at home 
and abroad. The complicated combination of seemingly contradictory motives to 
embrace a foreign policy of abolitionism is easily discernable by investigating actions 
taken by Britons throughout the Atlantic world, along with Whitehall’s behavior 
regarding British citizens’ conduct respecting the abolition of the slave trade.  
Cuba is a perfect example of how conflicted Great Britain’s leaders were when it 
came to promoting a foreign policy of abolitionism versus advocating for other 
international aspirations. Initially Foreign Secretary Palmerston took an aggressive 
approach to Spanish abuses of Anglo-Spanish slave trading treaties. Specifically, he sent 
David Turnbull, an ardent abolitionist, to Cuba to address those offenses in 1840. At the 
same time, other Britons abroad and at home engaged in commerce that had direct or 
indirect links to the slave trade and slavery in Cuba, even though the British Empire had 
taken the lead in policing the trade and ending its own colonial slavery. Yet, in the face 
of Spanish, Cuban, and British pressure, Palmerston—when Turnbull’s actions began to 
threaten both British influence and commerce, thereby tempting Cuba to seek protection 
from the United States—chastised his subordinate’s behavior. Palmerston, however, 
refused to go so far as to recall the troublesome abolitionist because the Foreign 
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Secretary did support ending the slave trade. Even after Lord Aberdeen replaced 
Palmerston, he sustained his predecessor’s refusal to remove Turnbull, although the new 
Foreign Secretary did reprimand him. It took an alliance of British merchants in Cuba 
and London arguing that Turnbull’s actions were hindering British commercial interest 
to convince Aberdeen to separate the positions of the Consul and Superintendent of 
Liberated Africans. Because this position had been created to oversee the treatment of 
emancipados, the maneuver sharply curtailed Turnbull’s power and thus his capacity to 
meddle in the affairs of Cuban slaveholders.  
But the loss of his consulship, along with earlier scolding, failed to convince 
Turnbull to relax his attacks on Cuba’s slave system. Personal circumstances forced 
Turnbull to leave the island, but the actions taken by the Foreign Office and his 
countrymen illustrate the limits Great Britain placed on its foreign policy of 
abolitionism. Specifically, Turnbull’s case demonstrates that if abolitionism disrupted 
larger more important foreign policy objectives, such as expanding British markets or 
threatening inter-imperial relationships with Spain or the United States, those impulses 
were restrained. However, those penalties tended to be minor because government 
officials did not want their constituents to think ending the slave trade had become trivial 
to the British Empire. Because of this concern, Whitehall attempted to maintain a careful 
balance between promoting the foreign policy of abolitionism and expanding British 
international influence and commerce publically. Because Britain’s foreign policy of 
abolitionism inspired particular British agents more than it motivated policymakers in 
London, a delicate balance emerged between activists’ pressure on the periphery of the 
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empire and those more conservative figures residing in the metropole. Therefore, when 
abolitionists abroad, such as Turnbull (who wanted the empire to live up to its 
abolitionist principles) came into conflict with Great Britain’s material interests in slave-
dominated industries and markets, officials in Whitehall privately, rather than publicly, 
responded so as to restore the supremacy of commercial prerogatives. Ultimately, in the 
majority of the cases the foreign policy of abolitionism took a secondary position, while 
international ties and commerce took the lead.  
Cuban Sugar 
After the Haitian Revolution erupted in 1791, changes to the world economy 
came rather quickly, specifically in the sugar and coffee markets. Before the outbreak of 
violence, French Saint Domingue was the world’s leading producer and exporter of 
sugar and coffee. Yet, after the successful conclusion of the rebellion—the only 
triumphant slave revolution in the Western hemisphere, and one which led to Haitian 
independence in 1804—Haiti’s sugar and coffee-producing infrastructure collapsed. The 
disintegration of Haitian production, both during and after the revolution, caused sugar 
and coffee prices to skyrocket.16 However, as the cost of these colonial products steadily 
rose, another Caribbean island rose to take the place of Haiti—Cuba.  
Several factors allowed Cuba to become the leading producer and exporter of 
sugar. As sugar and coffee production gained momentum in Cuba, older lands, formerly 
used for tobacco cultivation, began to switch to more lucrative commodities. Meanwhile, 
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previously uncultivated lands in the east and southeast regions opened up. A spurt of 
planter migration from Saint Domingue, mostly of French origin and fleeing the violence 
of the revolution, brought planting techniques for sugar and coffee, along with large 
numbers of slaves to Cuba. Both the successful American Revolution and the disruption 
of international commerce produced by the Napoleonic Wars, ending in 1815, allowed 
the island’s entrepreneurs to seek and successfully penetrate previously closed markets 
for Cuban products. Although the Latin American independence movements, beginning 
in 1810 and lasting until 1825, took a heavy toll on the Spanish Empire, only Cuba and 
Puerto Rico remained Spanish colonies. In 1833, the British abolished slavery in their 
West Indian colonies, resulting in declining sugar cultivation in the British Empire, 
especially Jamaica. Therefore, fresh markets, especially Britain and North America, 
further stimulated the rise of the sugar and coffee industries, but, more importantly, the 
need for more slaves and the expansion of slavery.17 
Although coffee planting and cultivation expanded, sugar emerged as Cuba’s 
leading source of revenue.18 As Cuba’s export economy continued to focus on sugar, 
technological innovations arrived on the island which made the industry more efficient, 
productive, and profitable. In 1834, with British capital and against Great Britain’s 
abolitionist goals, Cuba began constructing a railway system, which by the 1840s had 
become the most sophisticated network in Latin America, designed exclusively to serve 
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the sugar economy.19 Eventually, lines connected the fields to the mills, and, finally, 
mills to port cities.20 Planters also imported the newest modern equipment to speed up 
the process of making sugar. Steam engines powered the large cane-grinding machines, 
while vacuum evaporators quickly converted the cane juice into crystalized sugar ready 
for export.21 While Cuba experienced a technological renaissance, the sugar boom on the 
island also coincided with managerial innovations in the structure and practice of slave 
labor. Dubbed the “second slavery,” this development illustrated the difference between 
earlier colonial slavery and the expansion of slavery in the nineteenth century.22 
Specifically, nineteenth-century slavery revolved around old and “new commodities, 
produced in unprecedented quantities, in regions formerly marginal to the Atlantic 
economy, in reconfigured polities.”23 In addition, Anthony Kaye maintains that the 
“second slavery” utilized time-motion studies and torture techniques designed to 
maximize labor outputs on the part of the enslaved.24 Therefore, new technological 
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advancements and labor techniques led to much more labor-intensive lives for slaves 
because they were pushed to produce more commodities. This second slavery made 
revolt even more likely given the vastly more punishing circumstances under which 
slaves now lived and labored.25 Therefore, Turnbull arrived on an island where enslaved 
peoples were more prone to rebel and even more open to abolitionist agitation because 
of the increasingly difficult lives they were leading. 
 As the sugar revolution enveloped Cuba, a distinct Cuban national identity 
emerged among elites just as it had throughout other colonies in the Western 
hemisphere. While the Spanish colonial system was absolutist, Cuban-born elites had a 
substantial degree of both economic and political power on the island.26 Yet, as the 
society and economy of Cuba drastically transformed, Spanish officials streamed into 
the colony where they implemented and enforced efficient taxation policies. 
Simultaneously, the powerful Spanish merchant class gained control of the import/export 
trade and the credit system that sugar planters used to finance their operations. As a 
consequence, influential segments of Cuban society, along with the Spanish merchant 
class and political officials were connected to one another through business or personal 
relationships associated with sugar and coffee and, by proxy, slaves and slave trading. 
Because of these relationships, there was little to no antislavery sentiment among the 
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Cuban-born, Spanish administrative class, or intellectual elite during the early nineteenth 
century.27 Therefore, almost every abolitionist on the island of Cuba was an enslaved 
person. Thus, David Turnbull’s task was to systematize the implicit abolitionism of 
enslaved peoples by using his position as British Consul to force the issue of anti-slavery 
upon Spanish and Cuba officials. 
David Turnbull and the Cuban Slave Trade 
Very little is known of the abolitionist David Turnbull’s youth, but he began his 
career as a correspondent for the London Times.28 While in Paris, he acquainted himself 
with a group of cosmopolitan liberal intellectuals that included French abolitionists. In 
Spain, he reported over the liberal struggle against the Carlists and commended the 
efforts of George Villiers, Earl of Clarendon, to negotiate a more efficient anti-slave-
trade treaty. Turnbull left the Times in 1837 for a three-year tour of the Caribbean in 
search of evidence for what, for him, had already developed into truth—the preeminence 
of free labor over bound labor.29  
 Turnbull resided in Cuba until early 1839, traveling about and collecting 
information for a book he soon published. On his journey back to Paris, Turnbull 
stopped briefly in New York, where he met with Arthur Tappan, James G. Birney, and 
other members of the American Anti-Slavery Society during their March executive 
committee meeting. By February of 1840, he had finished his study, Travels in the West: 
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Cuba; with Notices of Porto Rico and the Slave Trade, which outlined his strategy to end 
Cuba’s contraband slave trade.30 After its publication, Turnbull went to London where 
he hoped to launch his audacious proposal to end the illicit trade.31  
 Turnbull’s work, Travels in the West, initiated an animated discussion in the 
British press between government officials and prominent citizens, at a juncture when 
“egalitarian elements of evangelical Protestantism had merged with the economics of the 
Manchester School into a coherent ideology.”32 By this time, Britain’s business leaders 
and politicians had redefined humanitarianism so as to make it compatible with 
capitalism and the continued projection of British power. Turnbull represented this new 
moral economy because he considered slavery immoral and called the slave trade in 
1840 “the greatest practical evil that ever afflicted mankind.”33 His intimate knowledge 
of Cuba’s slave system afforded him the opportunity to end its slave trade by revealing 
the lengths individuals went to in order to elude international agreements.  
 As Turnbull and other abolitionists quickly realized, attempts to suppress Cuba’s 
illicit trade were more superficial than tangible. The 1817 Treaty of Madrid outlawed the 
slave trade “on any part of the Coast of Africa, [and] to the North of the Equator,” and 
authorized the navies of Britain and Spain to “visit such Merchant Vessels of the 2 
Nations as may be suspected, upon reasonable grounds, of having Slaves on board, 
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acquired by an illicit Traffic.”34 Moreover, slavers and their slaves were to be 
impounded, where Courts of Mixed Commissions, established at Sierra Leone and 
Havana, determined the fate of the seized vessels. Both Spain and Great Britain 
appointed one commissary judge and one commissioner of arbitration for each tribunal. 
However, if the judges disagreed, they were to draw lots to determine one arbitrator to 
cast the deciding ballot. If a ship and its crew were found guilty, the contraband slaves 
were relinquished to the government in whose territory the decision was made—
conceivably, to prepare them for freedom.35 
 Frequent evasion of the treaty occurred due to loopholes and lack of enforcement 
by Spanish and Cuban officials. Not all nations allowed Britain to stop and verify the 
nationality of vessels. This gave Spain’s ships involved in the Cuban trade incentive to 
switch their flags to prevent detainment. Furthermore, seizure required slaves to be 
aboard. Consequently, outgoing vessels obviously outfitted for slaving sailed safely 
away. The chief limitation to the treaty rested with bribable Spanish officials. Corrupt 
Captains-General of Cuba and their subordinates accepted money for contraband slaves 
brought to the island. Therefore, officials hoping to supplement their meager salaries 
either overlooked or halfheartedly investigated the importation of slaves. More 
importantly, when cases did reach the Court of Mixed Commissions, Spanish members 
often ignored them.36 In a letter to one of his slave-trading captains, Spanish merchant 
Pedro Diago boasted that with “all the captures made by the English of Spanish vessels 
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[and adjudicated in Havana] there is not known a single instance of anyone having been 
punished; for all of them, owing to the assistance of friends, have succeeded in getting 
off.”37  
 In the cases where the vessel and crew were condemned, the captured slaves, 
called emancipados, were to collect wages, receive religious training, and be prepared 
for freedom in return for a term of service of about five years, which could be prolonged 
by no more than three years. Instead, most fell victim to Cuban labor needs and 
prejudices that often turned into a lifetime of bondage. Moreover, Spanish officials and 
white Cubans regarded these men and women, “neither slave nor free, as a nuisance, as 
an expense to maintain, and even as a threat to the social order.”38 Cuba’s white 
population also did not want to see the population of free people of color grow, and 
“news of their  [the emancipados’] condition will surely give rise to reflection [and] 
contrasts, whose sad results would not be very difficult to predict.”39 
 An intricate system of earmarking emancipados as “donations” to “distinguished 
and honorable” citizens and prominent religious and educational institutions began under 
Captain-General Vives tenure.40 In 1833, an agreement between the Spanish and British 
allowed for the transportation of emancipados to Trinidad from Cuba at the expense of 
the Spanish. Although a few hundred slaves made the journey, the practice ended 
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quickly due to rising slave prices resulting from the 1833 cholera outbreak in Cuba and 
the arrival of Miguel Tacon in 1834 as Captain-General. The ending of this arrangement 
ushered in a systematic and lucrative business of purchasing labor by plantation owners. 
For example, the Count de Casa Barrieto, on November 18, 1834, wrote asking Tacon 
for twenty-five slaves “at the price Your Excellency has set.”41 Moreover, Spanish 
officials actively neglected or forgot the location and terms of service for emancipados. 
Using a “dead” emancipado, complete with a burial certificate citing the identity of a 
truly dead slave, became a very popular way to enslave an individual for life.42 And yet, 
Spanish authorities in 1841 still (disingenuously) argued that 12,000 emancipados 
gained their freedom between 1820 and 1835.43 
In 1835, the former minister to Spain, Lord Clarendon, successfully convinced 
Spain to grant new concessions to the policing of the slave trade. The regency of Maria 
Cristina, installed in Madrid with British support, consented to an “equipment clause,” 
which permitted the seizure of ships equipped for the trade, such as additional supplies, 
shackles, and hatches with gratings.44 The new treaty, entitled the Clarendon 
Convention, reassigned authority over the emancipados to administrators of the 
government whose cruisers made the capture—effectively, from Spanish to British 
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jurisdiction.45 By 1840, Great Britain’s executors of its foreign policy of abolition had 
signed similar search accords with every prominent maritime power excluding the 
United States. Consequently, slave traders resorted to using the United States registry 
and flag. Moreover, numerous traders obtained American made clippers, mainly 
constructed for slaving, to evade British squadrons and thwart searches.46 Ultimately, 
Cuban slave traders imported over 120,000 slaves illegally between the Clarendon 
Treaty (1835) and the World Anti-Slavery Convention (1840).47 
Due to the continued evasion of the Anglo-Spanish Treaties Cuban officials and 
illicit smugglers, Turnbull in early 1840 proposed Whitehall increase the authority of the 
Court of Mixed Commission by allowing it to examine slaves already in Cuba. Because 
Great Britain could not free contraband slaves once on Cuban soil, Turnbull insisted that 
the court be allowed to issue a summons, requiring masters to appear before the court to 
demonstrate that their slaves were acquired before the earlier Anglo-Spanish accords. 
Unique social characteristics and physical markings, such as scars and tattoos, made 
bozales—newly imported Africans—tough to conceal regardless of what ploy 
slaveholders used. Moreover, the court would urge slaves to initiate procedures for 
themselves. Although Turnbull knew his plan was unlikely to be accepted in Spain or 
easily realized in Cuba, the objective was to strengthen the Court of Mixed 
Commission—however constrained in effectiveness by its Spanish members—to 
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increase fear among Cuba’s planters about the potential loss of slave property. For 
Turnbull, the “first degree of liberation will stagger the men who embark their capital in 
the slave-trade, and the property being made insecure the objects of the traffic will 
speedily become unsaleable.”48 Knowing that the slave population failed to naturally 
reproduce because of both the low fertility and high mortality rates among the Cuban 
slaves, Turnbull posited that in 1840 the majority of slaves in Cuba had to have entered 
in the twenty years after the Treaty of Madrid.49 
 In an attempt to strike at the root of slavery, the British government throughout 
the 1830s and early 1840s, controlled by the Whigs, had embarked on both an aggressive 
and costly policy to suppress the slave trade. Aware of their actions, Turnbull, in early 
1840, upon arriving in London attempted to meet with Foreign Secretary Palmerston. 
Although not granted an audience with Palmerston, the Foreign Secretary offered 
encouragement in his minute on Turnbull’s letter, but argued that he feared Turnbull’s 
plan “would be difficult of execution.”50 Yet, Palmerston’s support encouraged Turnbull 
to press both himself and his proposition on the Foreign Office. In early March 1840, 
because he knew several key individuals in Whitehall and the British public who were 
abolitionists supported his ideas, Turnbull published an article in the Morning Chronicle 
detailing his proposal, followed by another article in the London Times a few days later. 
After their publication, Turnbull sent a letter to Lord Leveson, aide to Palmerston in the 
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Foreign Office, in another attempt to gain an introduction.51 After consenting to receive 
more details on the matter, Palmerston received a lengthy brief containing a summary of 
Turnbull’s views. In this mandate, Turnbull argued that it was about “making the 
purchaser and possessor of an African slave” apprehensive about the “unlawful 
acquisition that he is to be deterred from paying the price.”52 Ultimately, without 
notifying Turnbull of his success, Palmerston had Lord Leveson draft an accord, based 
on Turnbull’s proposition, to present to the Spanish government. While Foreign 
Secretary knew the Spanish would never agree to the memorandum, Palmerston 
presented his view of the propose to the Foreign Office, which stated:  
It is not very likely that we shall persuade the Spanish Government to accede; but 
if it refuses, the very making of the Proposal will do good—If the Spanish 
Government consents, such a Convention will do much good; but it would be 
quite visionary to suppose as Mr Turnbull does that by investing 2 or 3 Mixed 
Commission with Power to decree the Liberation of Bozal negroes brought 
before them we could extinguish the Slave-Trade and lay our cruizers up in 
ordinary—If he could also enact and enforce that every Cargo of Bozal Negroes 
imported into Spanish Islands or into Brazil should be forthwith brought before 
the Mixed Commission and set free his Plan would be Effectual; but it is evident 
at a glance that not one negro in a Thousand would be brought up. This Plan can 
only be considered as Subsidiary—nevertheless if carried into Execution it would 
be useful both in Principle and in Practice.53 
 
The head of the slave trade division in the Foreign Office, James Bandinel, knew 
Britain’s foreign policy of abolition could not extend into Cuba because bringing slaves 
and their masters to the Court of Mixed Commission in Havana directly violated Spanish 
sovereignty. This type of action required both the Spanish government’s and Cuban 
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authorities’ consent, which would never happen. Although Palmerston was fully aware 
of this, he and Bandinel agreed it pertinent to have the principle of the proposed 
convention recognized by Spain and Brazil.54  
 Others reiterated Palmerston’s misgivings as well. MacGregor Laird, a specialist 
on Africa, reviewed Turnbull’s study in the Westminster Review. He argued that in all 
likelihood no one in Cuba could be convinced to confirm that slaves were illegally 
imported. Without such testimony no Spanish judge would acknowledge the fact that 
illegal importation did occur. Laird further explained that if carried out, Turnbull’s plan 
“would shake to its foundation, if not destroy, the whole social fabric in Cuba. The very 
attempt would be sufficient to create a complete social revolution in society.”55 
Mirroring both Palmerston and Laird, the Morning Chronicle asserted: “We are far from 
thinking that it will be as readily conceded by the Spaniards as [Turnbull] seems to 
conceive, or as easily carried into execution if conceded.”56 Even with skepticism from 
both inside and outside the British Foreign Office, Palmerston penned a message to the 
British Minister in Madrid, which included a draft treaty based on Turnbull’s plan and 
guidelines to present it to the Spanish government.57  
 Still unaware of the British government’s actions regarding his scheme, Turnbull 
continued to circulate his ideas in public. His agenda’s appearance in several newspapers 
propelled Turnbull to notoriety among abolitionist groups, such as the British and 
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Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, who offered him an invitation to elaborate on his plan. 
Since his proposal emphasized a diplomatic and legal approach to ending the trade rather 
than a military one, prominent (and pacifistic) members of the British abolitionist society 
preferred his tactics. In the preface of his work, Turnbull suggested his ideas could “lead 
to an easy, cheap and almost immediate solution” to the illicit trade.58 In the spring of 
1840, the abolitionists were preparing for their forthcoming anti-slavery convention. 
Coming as it did when British abolitionists had grown frustrated with the long, 
expensive, and ineffective campaign to stop the slave trade, Turnbull’s was attractive for 
that reason. More importantly, it also appealed to a frugal Victorian public no longer 
completely dedicated to bearing the enormous financial burden of ending the slave trade 
and slavery.59 
 In April 1840 Turnbull wrote Leveson once more, arguing that:  
The West India body, the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, the African 
Colonization Society, and several other public bodies, some actuated by 
philanthropic, some perhaps by interested motives, have expressed themselves 
with remarkable unanimity in favor of the practicability of the plan. The subject 
has also occupied a large share of the attention of the press. Almost every 
existing journal has treated of it more or less minutely: not one of them, so far as 
I am aware, has withheld its approbation; and I venture thereupon to assume that 
the public voice has been declared in its favor.60  
 
In that same month, The Monthly Review, another prominent London periodical 
published an excerpt from Travels in the West and anticipated that his “disclosures and 
proposals…must force themselves upon the attention of the people of Great Britain, 
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upon her senators, and rulers.”61 In addition to this article, the June opening of the World 
Anti-Slavery Convention neared, where Turnbull played an important role in the 
proceedings. Due to his previous residence in Paris and acquaintance with French 
abolitionists, including Francois-Andre Isambert, Secretary of the French Anti-Slavery 
Society, Turnbull became the obvious choice to introduce the French delegation to those 
attending. While attending the convention, Turnbull continued to promote his plan, but 
also began to campaign to be the candidate to implement it in Cuba.62 
 By the summer of 1840, Turnbull’s plan had the full support of the Anti-Slavery 
Society and the British government. At this time, both the British Consulate in Havana 
and Superintendent of Liberated Africans positions had become vacant. Due to these 
vacancies, Turnbull brazenly recommended in several letters to the Foreign Office, that 
the Havana Consulate merge with other offices and that this new position be elevated to 
the status of Consulate General. He also suggested that several vice-consulates be 
located in ports actively engaged in the slave trade, and that he himself be the first 
person to occupy this newly constituted office.63 
Although Palmerston was not a crusader for universal abolition and based his 
foreign policy on military and geopolitical calculations, abolitionist principles had taken 
root in Britain, and he was cognizant of the political power organized abolitionist groups 
wielded. In the 1830s, their members ridiculed him for not supporting immediate 
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abolition in the British West Indies.64 Palmerston may have deemed the nomination of 
Turnbull—because of his status as an abolitionist celebrity and prominence at the World 
Anti-Slavery Convention—a firm proclamation to the Spanish and smart domestic 
politics. Following Turnbull’s offer to fill the Consulate General position, a high-ranking 
delegation from the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society met with Palmerston.65 In 
August 1840, Palmerston appointed Turnbull to the combined positions of British 
Consul to Cuba and Superintendent of Liberated Africans, which demonstrated that 
Britain’s foreign policy of abolitionism had taken a more direct approach to quell the 
rampant abuses of the Anglo-Spanish treaties by sending an ardent abolitionist like 
David Turnbull to Cuba. After receiving his new appointment, Turnbull promised the 
members of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society that he would “always be 
ready to promote the great objects to which they devote themselves by all the means in 
[his] power.”66  
The Zealot Arrives: Turnbull in Cuba 
 By 1840, Cuba had socially splintered, prospered in the sugar industry, 
accumulated massive numbers of slaves, and was sought-after by expansionist schemers 
in both Britain and the United States. Therefore, the colony could not afford to have an 
affirmed abolitionist appointed to a central diplomatic post and thus positioned to sow 
discord among the island’s slaves. When Turnbull arrived in November to assume his 
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post, a coalition of Cuban merchants, titled planters, and peninsular officials planned to 
impede his duties and would, on several occasions, threaten his life. At the same time 
rumors of an Anglo-Spanish treaty to emancipate Cuba’s slaves circulated. 
Consequently, his presence and the fear of emancipation increased Cuban anxieties over 
the future of their slave property and the possibility of a slave-revolt.67 
 In Cuba, the Captain-General Pedro Tellez de Giron, who at the time collected 
profits from the slave trade, refused to grant Turnbull his exequatur—a written 
acknowledgement of his position by the host country. He advised the metropole that 
Turnbull’s presence jeopardized colonial stability and demanded his removal.68 
Representatives from government assemblies, such as the Junta de Fomento, which 
lobbied for planter and merchant interests, reiterated the Captain-General Giron’s 
concerns with extensive testimonials imploring the Spanish leadership to curtail any 
attack on Cuba’s labor system, whether by Turnbull or anyone else. Again, if the 
government did nothing Cuba’s prosperity and white population would perish.69 Despite 
these warnings and misgivings, Turnbull and his aide, Francis Ross Cocking, assumed 
their positions of consul and vice-consul because the Maria Cristina regime was indebted 
to Britain both financially and politically. The Spanish government sympathized with the 
Captain-General, but had to concede the exequatur and order him to enforce the Treaty 
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of 1835 while it continued to try to persuade Palmerston to replace the energetic 
abolitionist Turnbull.70  
 Turnbull’s appointment crowned a series of indignities Cubans had suffered at 
the hands of the British. By this time, the Romney, full of free African soldiers from 
Britain’s West Indian regiments, had been anchored in Havana harbor to fulfill 
stipulations of the Treaty of 1835. Specifically, its major task was to take on newly 
released emancipados. However, when the soldiers went ashore violence broke out after 
white Cubans accused the soldiers of attempting to instigate a slave insurrection.71 
Moreover, rumors of officially sanctioned abolition meetings taking place in Jamaica, 
where zealous Methodists and Anabaptists frequently predicted the overthrow of 
slaveholders, continued to petrify Cuba’s populace.72 As a part of a more active foreign 
policy of abolitionism, in late 1840 Cuba’s West African slave bazaar on the Gallinas 
River was destroyed when Commander Joseph Denman of the British Navy attacked it. 
The destruction of the African slave trading market resulted in the loss of thousands of 
dollars in merchandise and liberated slaves.73 Lastly, R. R. Madden, Turnbull’s 
predecessor as Superintendent of Liberated Africans, traveled to the United States to 
give his testimony establishing that the slaves aboard the infamous vessel Amistad had 
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been abducted from Africa.74 Therefore, the ship and crew had violated Spanish anti-
slave trade treaties. By 1841, the United States Supreme Court, in opposition to Spain’s 
demand that the mutineers be returned to Cuba, freed those slaves. Ultimately, actions 
taken by other British officials coincided with Turnbull’s arrival in November 1840 and 
led to an outbreak of Anglophobia in Cuba.  
 Cases of Anglophobia had occurred before, but not with such zeal as seen in the 
1840s.  In 1838, James Thompson, an evangelical missionary from the London Bible 
Society, was arrested by the order of Captain-General Miguel Tacon, for preaching that 
slavery was inhumane.75 In the 1840s being British or suspected of being British 
automatically garnered scorn from Cubans. James Joyce, a British traveler in Cuba, after 
arguing with several Catalans over British policy, ended up in jail accused of boasting 
about British intentions to free the slaves and conquer Cuba. Patrick Doherty, a British 
railway engineer, who inadvertently caused a train collision on the island, was jailed for 
sabotage.76 The South Carolina doctor J. G. Wurdemann, recuperating in Cuba, 
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illustrated how he and a colleague failed to get the Lieutenant-Governor to amend their 
passports so that they could travel to Matanzas. The Lieutenant-Governor granted the 
change only after a Creole friend intervened. In a conversation after the incident, 
Wurdemann’s friend stated that the Lieutenant-Governor “thought you were 
Englishmen” and he “did not half like your movements.”77 Ultimately, being British in 
Cuba—even looking British—became something of a crime unto itself because that 
linked to abolitionism.  
 Once Turnbull arrived to Cuba, he quickly provoked most local whites with his 
continued attacks on the island’s slave system. However, he did convert some to his 
cause. In 1843, Jose del Castillo, a slaveholder, confessed to the British and Foreign 
Anti-Slavery Society that Turnbull had convinced him of the evils of slavery.78 These 
successes were uncommon because he vigorously pursued his goal of ending the 
importation of slaves to the colony. While not always reliable, he inherited Madden’s 
extensive intelligence network of slaves, free blacks, liberal Creoles, and informants. 
Therefore, Turnbull learned the location of illegal slave landings, violations of 
emancipado’s rights, and the whereabouts of laborers kidnapped from the British Empire 
to work Cuba’s sugar plantations, which he utilized to press Whitehall for the need for a 
more invigorated foreign policy of abolitionism. Although he quickly met staunch 
resistance from Cuban officials, Turnbull initially had some success. In the month of his 
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arrival, Turnbull negotiated the release of six British subjects enslaved on the island. For 
their safety, he had a British vessel take them to Nassau.79 His predecessor to the 
Consulate, Charles Tolme, presented Turnbull with another case involving Juan 
Fontanales, a young man abducted from Sierra Leone and enslaved in Cuba. After 
successfully securing the man’s freedom, Turnbull also attempted to gain repayment of 
back wages from Fontanales’ former owners.80 But ultimately, achievements such as 
these were rare because the Captain-General on most occasions resisted or ignored 
Turnbull’s complaints.  
 Although Turnbull took on several anti-slavery legal cases during his tenure as 
Consul in Cuba, two stand out because they directly assaulted Cuba’s slave system. 
Turnbull pursued each with an unwavering passion. One case involved the re-
enslavement of an emancipado after his release from a slave ship. The other pertained to 
a British subject kidnapped from Jamaica and enslaved in Cuba. These cases aroused 
such antipathy from Cuban and Spanish officials that they continuously petitioned the 
Foreign Office to remove Turnbull.  
In December 1840, Turnbull received information from an informant regarding 
an emancipado named Gavino from the African nation of Lucumi. After the British 
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vessel Speedwell rescued him, the Court of Mixed Commission in Havana granted 
Gavino his freedom and placed him in the custody of Dona Luisa Aper de la Paz for 
religious instruction. However, Gavino learned how to carry water instead. After five 
years of service, Dona Luisa Aper de la Paz and her descendants repaid a fee to Spanish 
officials extending Gavino’s compulsory service contract for three subsequent terms.81 
Gavino’s circumstance presented Turnbull with a test case and the opportunity to “place 
the iniquity of the whole system in a clear and striking light before the world.”82 Armed 
with “undeniable written legal evidence that Gavino really belonged to the class of 
English emancipados” and the understanding that his master would not challenge the 
case, Turnbull applied for Gavino’s release and payment of back wages.83 Turnbull 
hoped the Captain-General agreed to free Gavino because a favorable judgment 
recognized Turnbull’s authority to police such matters in Cuba. However, the Captain-
General quickly rebuffed Turnbull’s presumptions, stating that he did “not recognize in 
[Turnbull] the power to listen to complaints of this nature, and still less that of taking the 
name of the negro in question, and of making representations in consequence, whether as 
British Consul or as Superintendent of Liberated Africans.”84 
 As a slaveholding colony living in fear of revolt, it is not surprising that the 
Cuban regime responded with near hysteria and complete resolve to halt any attack on 
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slavery. The Captain-General knew that Turnbull’s support for people of color further 
agitated a society already experiencing acute internal fissures. The Gavino case had 
“very serious bearing on the political administration of the affairs” of Cuba, the Captain-
General cautioned Turnbull, “because it supposes that you are qualified to listen to 
complaints and to offer protection to the people of color, and to support their 
pretensions. Such a state of things might loosen the ties of subordination and 
obedience.”85 Ultimately, this affair could have catastrophic consequences for Cuba—
rebellion. Consequently, the Captain-General threatened to revoke Turnbull’s passport if 
he intervened in similar cases. Unwilling to accept criticism for what he considered his 
just crusade, Turnbull passionately retorted:  
Since the period when your Excellency thought fit, under the influence of unwise 
and dangerous councils, to refuse to receive me in the rank and station to which I 
have been raised by the favor of my Sovereign…I have been daily assailed with 
the darkest threats of deportation and murder…But your Excellency will permit 
me to suggest that if I am visited with deportation, the voice of exile will be 
heard in every corner of Europe; that if I become the victim of assassination, 
while residing under the immediate protection of your Excellency, the blood of 
the first martyr which this fair Island shall have given to the cause of freedom 
will cry aloud for vengeance, and will serve to nourish and invigorate that 
glorious tree of liberty which first planted under the British banner…is destined 
to spread…until its shadow encircles the earth throughout the whole extent of the 
broad girdle of the Tropics.86 
 
Responses such as this characterize Turnbull’s reactions to impediments and attacks on 
his legal authority to address the cases of emancipados or slaves brought to Cuba after 
1820, even though they further alienated him from Cubans. Although his efforts failed in 
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the Gavino case, Turnbull continued to pursue cases with the same zeal even though 
Whitehall did not respond to the attacks on his authority. The lack of support coming 
from Great Britain after this incident, demonstrated that Turnbull’s commitment to the 
foreign policy of abolitionism had outstripped Great Britain’s dedication to the policy.  
 While engaged in the Gavino case, Turnbull also took on the case of Henry 
Shirley, a British citizen abducted from Montego Bay, Jamaica in 1830. The Cuban 
slaver Antonio le Desma enslaved Shirley and five of his companions in Cuba, which 
directly violated the rights of British citizens. After changing his name to William 
Henry, Shirley ended up in Santa Cruz working in a small shop. Somehow, a decade 
later, Shirley managed to smuggle a message to an aunt in Kingston, which told of his 
location and the conditions he experienced.87 She then informed Jamaica’s Governor 
Metcalfe, who, in turn, transmitted the information to Charles Tolme. By the time word 
of Shirley’s abduction reached Cuba, Turnbull had replaced Tome as Consul and taken 
personal charge of the case. Yet, after hearing of Turnbull’s plan to free Shirley through 
a case in Court of Mixed Commission, Le Desma secretly took him to Puerto Principe.88 
The proceedings would have halted there, but Turnbull, using physical evidence and 
persistence, compelled the Captain-General to act. The subsequent Spanish investigation 
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informed Turnbull “no such person existed in the province of Santiago de Cuba” and 
that Shirley had died in Puerto Principe.89 
 This charade did not fool Turnbull, but forced him to employ new tactics. 
Because Metcalfe had discovered witnesses to the kidnapping, Turnbull demanded that 
Cuban authorities arrest Le Desma and send him to Jamaica. Upon his arrival, Le Desma 
would face his accusers, possibly merit punishment, and, most importantly, provide 
information regarding where Shirley was being held.90 Naturally, the Captain-General 
refused to give up Le Desma. Specifically, he claimed that Spanish law prohibited the 
accused and accuser from confronting one another, and that Turnbull had no power to 
interfere in Spanish matters.91 Due to constant Cuban evasion, Turnbull lost patience and 
petitioned Governor Metcalfe to send the British West Indian squadron to convince the 
Captain-General to comply with Turnbull’s requests.92 Although Metcalfe denied this 
request, stating he did not “possess any authority…[to use] coercion,” Turnbull never 
faltered in his pursuit to obtain Shirley’s freedom.93 Once again, Turnbull’s dedicated 
pursuit of the foreign policy of slavery experienced a major setback by his own 
government. In the end, decisions on both Gavino and Shirley had to wait until a new 
Captain-General arrived in Cuba.  
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 Even with limited successes, Turnbull’s disregard of Cuban orders and his 
unrelenting assaults on the slave system cast serious doubt on Palmerston’s decision to 
appointed an ardent abolitionist as Consul. No matter how much Palmerston wanted to 
end the slave trade and slavery in Cuba, he had to compromise and cooperate with Spain 
if he planned to expand British influence there. Palmerston also did not want Cuba to fall 
into an increasingly expansionistic United States’ sphere of influence. Britain’s and 
Spain’s governments feared Turnbull’s continued agitation might encourage Cuba’s 
Creole population to pursue independence with the aid of their northern neighbors. Anti-
slavery activities could not be countenanced by Palmerston if they only managed to push 
allies or potential allies into the arms of Great Britain’s regional rival—the United 
States. 94  
 In response to Cuban complaints, Palmerston in 1841 defended Turnbull, 
asserting that Spain’s failure to enforce the Treaty of 1835 had compelled him to send a 
zealot to Cuba.95 He even argued that Spain had no right to demand Turnbull’s 
dismissal. Instead, the British government possessed the right to have the Cuban officials 
removed, going “from the Governor downward…because all of them notoriously and 
avowedly protect the Slave Traders, in violation of the Treaty engagements of the 
Spanish Crown.”96 Moreover, he argued, Turnbull’s abolitionist agenda paralleled that of 
all British citizens. With no actual evidence outlining Turnbull’s crimes, Palmerston 
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refused to remove him. Yet, unbeknownst to either the Spanish government or the 
British public, Palmerston did reprimand Turnbull. He commanded Turnbull to exclude 
“sneer and irony” from his communiqués and to show proper respect in his business with 
both Spanish and British representatives.97 Even though Palmerston’s admonition 
occurred privately, it demonstrates his apprehension that Turnbull’s challenges to Cuban 
slavery harmed Britain’s relationship with Spain and the colony. More importantly, it 
illustrates that the Foreign Office placed a limit on how far it would allow anti-slavery 
activities to go, especially if those actions threatened larger foreign policy goals such as 
British commercial ties, the expansion of British influence, and limiting the United 
States’ global influence.  Not only did Turnbull’s actions impact Cuban society in 
unparalleled ways, but they also alienated him from British merchants and his own 
colleagues, including the British commissioners on the Havana Court of Mixed 
Commissions.  
 In 1833, Charles Tolme was assigned to be the British Consul to Cuba. He had 
been appointed to the position because he was not a slave trade commissioner, but a 
merchant. However, by the late 1830s Britain’s commercial interests began to clash with 
British humanitarian goals, especially the campaign to end the slave trade. From almost 
the outset of his term in office, Tolme was beleaguered by rumors and allegations of his 
involvement in the slave trade. Although his participation was never proved, Tolme’s 
300£ yearly salary did not cover living in Havana, which forced him to augment his 
income by trading. Consequently, Tolme’s trading ventures made him guilty by 
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association.98 In 1839, due to complaints about Tolme and to prevent further tarnishing 
British humanitarian objectives, a Foreign Office memorandum appeared, 
recommending that future Havana appointees were “forbidden from engaging in trade 
and commerce.”99 The following year, with the recommendation of Turnbull, the Anti-
Slavery Convention passed a similar resolution. Palmerston agreed with both the Foreign 
Office and Anti-Slavery Convention’s suggestions and adopted it as official policy.100 
Ultimately, British consuls sent to Havana were forbidden to have any commercial ties 
to prevent them from engaging, directly or indirectly, in the slave trade. This move made 
Cuba paradoxically opposed to Britain’s policies throughout Latin America. During this 
time period Great Britain’s major goal was expanding commercial interests, but in Cuba 
they were subordinated to the often-opposed foreign policy of abolitionism’s goal of 
suppressing the slave trade.101     
 Once in Cuba, Turnbull reiterated the new policy to the British commissioners, 
James Kennedy and Campbell J. Dalrymple, because of their reputations. Kennedy, the 
British judge, although opposed to owning slaves, admitted to renting them in Cuba.102 
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Yet, the most egregious case involved the clerk of the Court of Mixed Commission. This 
individual had bought and sold slaves, along with punishing his emancipado servants in 
the same “manner of the Country.”103 Even with the court’s murky history, Turnbull 
retained the belief that “when a treaty or contract had…been violated, it was the 
undeniable right of the party aggrieved to choose its own agents, and to select its own 
mode of bringing the infraction under the notice of the other contracting party.”104 
Therefore, it was Turnbull’s right and duty to continually inform and challenge Cuban 
officials over violations of the slave trade. To his disappointment, the Captain-General 
did not share the same view, which prompted Turnbull to repeatedly prod Kennedy and 
Dalrymple to take a more active role in protesting treaty abuses and performing 
investigations. However, both men shared the Spanish opinion that the court possessed 
no clear legal right to engage in investigations.105 Because of the commissioners’ and 
Turnbull’s conflicting views, he and his aide, Francis Cocking, openly chastised and 
promoted criticism of the two men. Cocking, in a letter to the British and Foreign Anti-
Slavery Society, remarked sarcastically that “the one lives about 2 leagues in the country 
where his whole time is occupied in the study of Ornithology, and the other, poor man, is 
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too simple to do good, and too innocent to do harm.”106 An official from the United 
States argued that Kennedy appeared to have “a personal feeling on the subject of 
slavery,” but he did not promote it. Creoles labeled them as “priests who preach the 
morality they do not practice.”107 Although his investigations of the Court of Mixed 
Commission ended the scandalous practices of British officials, Turnbull’s abrasiveness, 
continued interventions, and unsubtle impugning of their honor, aroused resentment 
from his colleagues. However, it was not until Palmerston enacted the policy of 
separating British officials in Cuba from the realm of commerce, a policy championed 
by Turnbull, that their dislike of him turned hostile.108 Ultimately, Turnbull’s criticism of 
his counterparts on the island created enemies who eventually attacked him, but also 
ended the possibility of effective cooperation against a common foe—the slave trade. 
Enemies All Around: A New Captain-General and Radicalized Cubans 
 In early 1841, abolitionist prospects saw some progress in Cuba. Anglophile 
General Baldomero Espartero overthrew Maria Cristina’s government in Spain, which 
brought changes throughout the Spanish Empire.109 In Cuba, the coup led to the removal 
of Captain-General Pedro Tellez de Giron. Geronimo Valdes, another Anglophile, a 
veteran of the Spanish-American revolutions, and former provincial governor, replaced 
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Giron.110 Valdes brought experience and dedication to Cuba, but, more importantly, he 
had orders to enforce the Treaty of 1835. Once in Cuba, Valdes promptly began his 
mission to bring the colony into line with the long-ignored treaty. First, he met with the 
major slave traders and gave them six months to stop their illicit trading. He also made it 
illegal to register foreign-made vessels under the Spanish flag, which slavers regularly 
used to evade searches. Valdes then closed Havana’s barracoons—holding depots for 
contraband slaves—which had been bartering in flesh in the middle of the city for years. 
Lastly, he ordered the entire slaveholding community, prominent institutions, and 
individuals, to submit reports assessing the impact which emancipating slaves imported 
after 1820 would have on Cuba.111  
 Due to Valdes’ initial actions, Turnbull and other abolitionists were optimistic.112 
However, Turnbull quickly lost his enthusiasm because of rumors that Valdes earned a 
portion of slave-trading profits from both the Martinez and Mazorra firms. Moreover, 
the closing of the barracoons was a façade. Turnbull’s sources asserted that Valdes 
instructed the slave traders to remove contraband slaves from the view of the public and 
hide them in either planter- or merchant-owned buildings spread throughout Havana. 
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Although Turnbull could not corroborate any of the charges, his relentless prodding 
forced Kennedy and Dalrymple to investigate them. In the end, both men found 
Turnbull’s accusations to be unsubstantiated.113  
 Even with his reservations about Valdes, Turnbull tested the Captain-General’s 
commitment to end the slave trade in other ways. While continually besieging Valdes 
with complaints about the unabated slave trade and relentlessly pursing cases to free 
wrongfully enslaved individuals, Turnbull recommenced his mission to gain freedom for 
Gavino and Henry Shirley. Turnbull hoped to obtain the right for British officials to 
investigate cases regarding the illegal importation of slaves to the island. The results 
would prove mixed. Even after Valdes, attempted to claim, once again, that Shirley had 
died, Turnbull unrelentingly petitioned the Cuban authorities to release Shirley and 
prosecute Le Desma for his crimes.114 Eventually the new Captain-General, because of 
Turnbull’s persistence, had the Governor of Puerto Principe send Shirley to Havana to 
have him submit an official declaration of his citizenship.115 Eventually, the Cuban 
authorities freed Shirley after assessing his testimony.116  
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Gavino’s case did not end with freedom; Valdes took the same legal approach the 
Captain-General before him did. According to Valdes, the Treaty of 1835 failed to 
outline the person, rank, or quality of the representative, which would be assigned the 
duty of overseer. Turnbull responded with a royal decree of 1826 that permitted anyone 
the right to condemn abuses of Spain’s anti-slave trade agreements. Valdes quickly 
retorted that Turnbull had no “power to watch over the fulfillment of the treaties” and 
that by law only Mixed Commission members had that authority.117 Moreover, because 
Turnbull was a foreign representative, he could not act as the public accuser in any legal 
procedures, even if Spanish law acknowledged the right to denounce treaty violations. In 
a later letter, Valdes added that he had “never denied…to one high contracting party the 
right” to have their treaties fulfilled “by the means pointed out by the laws of nations.”118 
Furthermore, the Captain-General of Cuba had “no other superior but her Majesty’s 
Government…and so long as that Government does not authorize me to recognize those 
or other faculties in you, I neither could nor ought to recognize them without failing in 
the most sacred of my duties.”119 
 Turnbull failed to appreciate that no Captain-General, no matter what their 
political leanings, would voluntarily grant a foreign representative, especially an 
abolitionist, the investigatory power Turnbull wanted. Moreover, Cuba’s Creoles, 
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including those against the slave trade, would never approve of a procedure that 
challenged their ownership of property. All of Turnbull’s British colleagues and critics 
had illustrated this to him. A government, unless suicidal, must secure and protect the 
property rights of its citizens. Yet, the democratic revolutions and interconnectedness of 
international economics encroached, challenged, and in some cases destroyed the 
relationship between the metropole and peripheries, further complicating the 
international order. The growing population of Creoles, free blacks, and slaves in Cuba, 
created a separate identity from the Spanish Empire, which led to increased tensions 
between the colony and the metropole. These obstacles were further exacerbated by 
Turnbull’s attacks on Cuba’s slave system, which by this point had become the bedrock 
of Cuban prosperity and the principal source of wealth filling Spain’s coffers.   
 In an effort to weaken Turnbull’s arguments for a more direct foreign policy of 
abolitionism, Valdes complied with his orders to determine Cuban attitudes on 
expanding the powers of the Anglo-Spanish treaty. Although the sampling was limited, 
he reported that the individuals polled were “noted for their prosperity and social 
position.”120 In an effort to appear unbiased, Valdes did ask a few “whose opinions 
approximate to those of prejudiced foreigners interested in abolition either from pure 
fanaticism or with other designs which they cloak under veils of humanity or 
philanthropy.”121 After hearing of the proposed inquiry, Turnbull protested that the 
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“evidence to be transmitted to Madrid will consist of…notorious individuals who have 
made themselves rich by their slave trade adventures.”122 Naturally, the reports were 
overwhelmingly against expanding the authority of the Court of Mixed Commission.123 
In his request for the reports, Valdes outlined three themes: Spanish judicial sovereignty, 
economic prosperity, and Cuba’s national dignity.124 Mirroring his earlier responses to 
Turnbull, Valdes chose two objections, from the numerous letters he received, to 
paraphrase Cuba’s case. First, giving more judicial power to the British commissioners 
was intolerable and it would lead to the ruin of Cuba. Second, there was no Spanish law 
to justify such a maneuver and to give a foreign court expanded authority with no right 
of appeal would make a mockery of Spanish justice. Furthermore, as several of the 
reports emphasized, no provision existed in the Anglo-Spanish slave trade treaties that 
allowed the expansion of powers.125   
 Valdes was not beholden to the slave trade, but he knew that if the British 
commissioners obtained more authority through the foreign policy of abolitionism, 
“Spain might as well forfeit Cuba to Britain.”126 Therefore, he reinforced the planters’ 
objections with his own. He addressed the growth of the white population and the 
possibility that free white labor could replace slavery. Valdes asserted that Cuban 
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agriculture could not and should not be left to white labor by echoing the common 
argument regarding the draining effect tropical climates had on whites. Furthermore, to 
see “a white man bent under the weight of fieldwork at the side of slaves clashes with 
established ideas in this country.”127 Valdes knew Spain had to preserve slavery in Cuba 
to maintain control over the colony. He emphasized that the loyalty of Cubans stemmed 
neither from “the singular virtue of its [white] natives nor their favorable disposition 
toward the interests of the mother country.”128 The Spanish military presence in the 
colony placated white Cuban’s fear of a slave revolt. This in turn kept colonists 
obedient. More importantly, prominent Creoles “constantly clamor for the promotion of 
the white population because they know that if the day comes when it is superabundant, 
they would be able to say without risk an everlasting good-bye to Spain.”129 Valdes 
recommended a government program endorsing natural reproduction for slaves because 
British interference in Cuban affairs would not end if the illicit slave trade continued. 
Looking to their northern neighbors, Cuban plantations had to remedy sexual 
imbalances, support marriages, alleviate the burden on pregnant slaves, develop hygiene 
and supervision for newborn slaves, and “finally, to adopt rules that seem best able to 
reduce mortality.”130  
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 Valdes concluded his report with five principles that the Cuban government 
needed. First, Spain needed to choose new Captains-General very carefully. The stakes 
had risen to new heights in Cuba because “a more vital question is discussed, which is 
that of the eternal separation from the rest of the Monarchy.”131 Second, all power in 
Cuba needed to reside with the Captain-General. Third, individual interests should 
expand the white population in Cuba. Fourth, the populations needed to be balanced “not 
precisely in number, but by strength and importance, procuring the increase…by all the 
means within the capacity of the Government and not in opposition to the strict 
observance of the letter of the treaties.”132 Lastly, Spain must follow the Laws of the 
Indies—a seventeenth century legal code produced by Spain for its overseas 
possessions—in order to circumvent “dangerous innovations” and to have a more 
proficient imperial government.133 
 In the early 1840s, Cuba and Spain relied on one another’s support, both 
politically and financially. By this time, Cuba had become the “pride, hope and joy of 
Spain. It is cherished as the only fraction left of the world which once owned Spain as 
mistress. Cuba is the place whence revenue comes and whither every bankrupt Spaniard 
goes in order to rob ad libitum.”134 Sugar had made Cuba the “bright jewel” of the 
“crown of Castile,” causing consecutive Spanish governments to rely on the island to 
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pay their loans, money which, even though it was diametrically opposed to British 
foreign policy of abolitionism, mostly came from Great Britain.135 On various occasions, 
rumors made their way to Britain, alleging that Spain might sell Cuba or place a lien on 
the island to repay Spanish debts. The outbreak of war with the United States, and 
possibly France, hindered Britain from owning Cuba even if it was Palmerston’s end 
goal. However, the flow of credit empowered Britain to increase its unwanted influence 
on the island. Therefore, Valdes had to navigate between the paradoxical demands of 
two essential parties for the regime: Cuba’s plantocracy united against immediate 
abolition and a liberal British government that seemed to most Cubans and outside 
observers determined to impose it. Even though the Espartero regime, trying not to anger 
Great Britain and Palmerston, refused to invoke Article 7 of the Treaty of 1835, Valdes 
wanted the Spanish government to use it. This article stipulated that the “two high 
contracting parties” could change at their “pleasure the place of residence of the court 
held within its own dominions.”136 Valdes hoped that if the court moved from the 
politically turbulent Cuba, the Romney, and, conceivably, Turnbull would follow. The 
Court of Mixed Commission’s relocation did not occur, but the Spanish government’s 
strategy of using public opinion had its desired effect because it provided ample 
evidence to substantiate their rejection of Britain’s proposal expand the court’s authority. 
When Valdes polled Cubans he carefully selected a small group of peninsular and creole 
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opinions because he wanted to illustrate the unanimity displayed by Cubans regarding 
Britain’s proposal to force emancipation on them. Although the responses were 
meticulously selected, the Spanish government, an autocratic and closed society, took a 
considerable risk by allowing elites to openly debate the pros and cons of Turnbull’s 
plan and therefore Britain’s foreign policy of abolitionism. By the 1840s, the Cuban 
planters were conscious of their slave society’s weaknesses, along with the hazards of 
replenishing their slave populations with the Atlantic slave trade. While the majority of 
the reports presented to the Captain-General highlighted the necessity of abolishing the 
slave trade and stimulating European immigration, the seriousness of their proposals are 
questionable because the slave trade persisted. Therefore, Cuba would continue to be 
plagued by British abolitionism. Ultimately, the island’s slave trading interests amplified 
their campaign to discredit and expel Turnbull from Cuba.  
In an effort to turn white Cubans against Turnbull and Great Britain, the slave 
traders escalated their verbal war against abolitionism in Spain and Cuba. The vigilance 
of the slave trading interests was also entrenched in the metropole. Mariano Torrento, a 
proslavery member of the Spanish Parliament (and on the payroll of the slave traders) 
asserted that Turnbull’s presence was “an unfavorable omen, an inseparable obstacle to 
the tranquility of the country, and a banner under the shadow” of those against slavery, 
who wanted their plan to triumph.137 Therefore, numerous Spanish ministers kept 
diplomatic channels open with Whitehall in an attempt to expel Turnbull, whom they 
considered an agitator attempting to weaken Spain’s foothold in Cuba. In early 1841, the 
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Spanish government gave minister Antonio Gonzalez plenipotentiary powers and sent 
him to London to negotiate Turnbull’s removal. The appointment of Gonzalez and a glut 
of letters demanding Turnbull’s removal presented in London and Madrid overwhelmed 
the British minster in Madrid, Arthur Aston.138 In February 1841, he wrote Palmerston, 
stating: “Anything that endangers the prosperity of Cuba becomes a vital question to 
Spain, as the Government depends entirely, at present, upon the revenues of that Island 
for the means of meeting the pressing exigencies of the State.”139 At the same time, the 
Spanish government figured Cuba’s taxes to 11,000,000 reales. Yet, the dispatches 
complaining about Turnbull convinced the Spanish Minister of Finance not to discount 
their bills, which threatened the stability of the government because the money was 
intended to pay the Spanish army.140 At the end of March 1841, Gaspar Betancourt 
Cisneros, an influential Creole planter from Puerto Principe and advocate of ending the 
slave trade, wrote of his conversation with several individuals where one suggested that 
in Cuba “one hundred thousand men have sworn to assassinate every living Englishmen 
the moment England obtains a blank check in the business of our slavery.”141 The Cuban 
businessman Francisco Jimeno argued that propaganda spread “among the masses 
[pointed to] the self-interest of the English [as] the only motive” for their so-called 
philanthropy.142 He claimed, in other words, that Britain wanted to destroy Cuba “in 
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order to have the monopoly of the cultivation of [sugar] cane in the Indies” and that 
Turnbull was their agent to achieve this goal.143 Although Jimeno saw these accusations 
as “ridiculous,” any “idea contrary to slavery was seditious and the word abolitionist the 
greatest of crimes.”144 Ultimately, both the Cuban authorities and Spanish government 
needed Turnbull removed before he caused irreparable damage to Great Britain’s 
diplomatic relationship with Spain. 
 Luckily for the Cubans and Spanish, Turnbull’s actions had completely isolated 
him by the beginning of summer of 1841. British members of the Mixed Commission, 
infuriated by Turnbull’s imputations of misconduct, had sided with British businessmen 
in Cuba, Spanish administrators, and the slave-trading interest. They began a concerted 
and full-frontal attack on Turnbull, and persisted in their open denunciation of him to 
Valdes, Palmerston, visiting dignitaries, and nearly anyone else who would listen. More 
importantly, both Valdes and the commissioners continued to reject particular cases 
brought to the court by Turnbull, at the same time spreading rumors of his imminent 
removal.145 In May 1841, Turnbull wrote to a feeble Thomas Clarkson, a founding father 
of abolitionism, complaining of his impotence in the face of “the rancorous hostility with 
which all my efforts are counteracted by the gentlemen of the Mixed Commission and 
more especially by the English members of the Court.”146  
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 Finally, in July 1841, the Spanish government thought it had discovered definite 
proof of Turnbull’s subversive agenda. A letter written from Havana on May 1, 1841, 
and printed in the July issue of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Reporter, the voice 
of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, indicated that “abolitionist principles” 
had begun “to take root in [Havana,] and at Matanzas.”147 The article then went on to 
state that “every servant of her Majesty appointed to hold a commission in [Cuba] 
should be an abolitionist,” and that this was the “opinion, and the particular wish, of all 
the abolitionists of [Havana], who, although few in number, are influential in means.”148 
Not surprisingly, the Spanish government assumed that Turnbull had written it. While 
the letter undoubtedly articulated Turnbull’s own opinions, in all likelihood his protégé, 
Francis Ross Cocking, had written the letter because Cocking had become the 
newspaper’s correspondent in Cuba.149 Spanish officials, however, used this letter and 
others printed in the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Reporter as evidence of an 
abolitionist “Cuban conspiracy” led by Turnbull. Furthermore, the Cubans and the 
Spanish saw this correspondence as proof that a slave revolt had been “primed in both 
cities and needed only a match to set the island alight.”150 Even though Cocking’s letter 
was vague, his British readers could see it as progress for the abolitionist movement and 
that anyone sent to Cuba needed to possess a missionary zeal for abolitionism. It was 
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also imperative that people at home knew of anti-slavery’s progress in Cuba. Throughout 
their tenure in Cuba, both Turnbull and Cocking exaggerated their accounts and 
successes in the colony, because they saw themselves as missionaries for the cause of 
abolition. Therefore, they were overjoyed when a case was successful, but since victory 
was a rarity, both men tended to inflate their accomplishments to keep up morale and to 
retain support from Britain.151  
  Three days after the article appeared, the Spanish Ambassador received a copy 
of it in London to show Palmerston.152 After the bombardment of letters advocating for 
Turnbull’s removal, Palmerston wrote him, stating that  “unless you change your course 
of conduct towards those with whom you have intercourse, and leave off getting into 
needless Quarrels with every Body with whom you have to deal,” his presence in Cuba 
would no longer benefit Britain or the help end the slave trade.153 Yet, the new evidence 
did not persuade Palmerston to recall the troublesome abolitionist.154 Simultaneously, 
Madrid sent dispatches instructing the Captain-Generals of Cuba and Puerto Rico to 
immediately find and expel from the islands the person or persons encouraging the slave 
population to revolt. Each communiqué warned against admitting any foreign consul 
                                                 
151 Murray, Odious Commerce, 153. 
152 Florez to Palmerston, August 4, 1841, in Great Britain. Class B-1841, 110-11. Florez to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, August 14, 1841; Florez to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 30, 1841, cited in 
Murray, Odious Commerce, 153. 
153 Palmerston to Turnbull, August 5, 1841, F. O. 84/358. 
154 Palmerston to Florez, August 17, 1841, in Great Britain. Class B-1841, 142-46; Florez to the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, September 30, 1841; Florez to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 21, 1841, 
Murray, Odious Commerce, 153. 
  
 
137 
without a comprehensive background check.155 Ultimately, Spain could not afford 
another Turnbull fiasco. 
 By the end of summer in 1841, anxieties had reached their climax in Cuba. 
Fortunately for Spain, Turnbull’s reputation plummeted even further when the 
abolitionists fractured over Palmerston’s support for free trade in sugar. That issue 
ultimately caused the Whig government to collapse, ushering the Tories into power. 
Lord Aberdeen then replaced Palmerston as Foreign Secretary. Because of the change in 
government, at the end of July, Captain-General Valdes compiled a list of Turnbull’s 
most heinous offences, which he was sure would persuade the new British government 
to take action.156 Aberdeen had less patience or tolerance for Turnbull’s behavior, and 
the Spanish government could now realistically hope to effect Turnbull’s removal.157 
But while he was more conciliatory toward Spain than his predecessor, Aberdeen, like 
Palmerston, refused to recall Turnbull without explicit proof of his wrongdoings.158 
There was still no concrete evidence that Turnbull was abusing his power or threatening 
British commercial interests on the island. Therefore, Britain’s foreign policy of 
abolitionism survived and Turnbull, as both Consul and Superintendent of Liberated 
Africans, remained engaged upon his crusade in Cuba. Cuban officials, meanwhile, 
continued to scramble for any evidence that might prompt his removal.  
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Half a Victory: Turnbull’s Removal as Consul 
 In such a charged atmosphere, minor incidents took on exaggerated significance. 
After Turnbull first arrived in Cuba, a shipment of British tableware appeared in the 
harbor etched with depictions of slaves dancing around the flag of liberty. Cocking 
reported that the “excitement caused” on the island had been “so great, that it is believed 
the Custom House will cause every crate of English Earthen Ware, which may exist in 
the place, or may arrive here after, to be opened and examined.”159 Minor incidents such 
as this, coupled with apprehensive planters, added to the already turbulent climate and 
inspired rumors of protests and plans for the assassination of Turnbull. Cuban slave 
interests saw Turnbull’s proposal for emancipation as a potential disaster. Therefore, he 
became the object upon which all the fears fabricated by the slave system became fixed. 
The image of Turnbull at the center of all issues related to the slave trade, slavery, 
emancipados, free peoples of color, or Creole agitation, fostered the belief that 
abolitionist-inspired conspiracies were widespread. Ultimately, a slave insurrection in 
the fall of 1841 and Turnbull’s investigations into abuses of the Treaty of 1835 further 
bolstered the conviction. 
 After nearly a year of Turnbull being in Cuba, a violent uprising of about forty 
slaves occurred in October 1841 during the construction of a home for one of Cuba’s 
wealthiest planters, Domingo Aldama. Valdes described the slaves involved as members 
of the Lucumi secret society, who were “militant and insubordinate by nature.”160 
                                                 
159 Cocking to Tredgold, May 1, 1841, British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society Papers, G77. 
160 Valdes to First Secretary of State, October 9, 1841, cited in Paquette, Sugar Is Made with Blood, 151. 
  
 
139 
Because of their mistreatment and unfulfilled demands for monetary compensation, the 
slaves refused to work and disobeyed any commands, including those of Aldama. 
Consequently, Valdes sent troops. The soldiers soon opened fire, resulting in the deaths 
of ten slaves and the wounding of several others.161 In response to these actions, Valdes 
asserted “this action has been in the final analysis extremely useful in this capital, where 
the voices of emancipation spread by some agent of the British abolitionists, encouraged 
in the blacks their irresistible propensity to rise up and to throw off the yoke.”162 
Moreover, Valdes thought Havana should use arms, a familiar occurrence in the 
countryside, not only to reestablish authority, but also to reassure white residents of their 
safety. At the same time, Valdes reminded General Espartero that for him to preserve 
public tranquility, he needed to “eject from this country the British Consul Mr. David 
Turnbull.”163 In December, after the Aldama incident, Gaspar Betancourt Cisneros 
described the situation from Puerto Principe as “so bad…that one cannot even speak 
rationally, because he is labeled a rebel—or an abolitionist, which is now worse than a 
rebel.”164 After receiving an anonymous letter warning of an assassin being paid to kill 
him, Turnbull even admitted “if a negro insurrection should unhappily arise, I am 
deliberately of the opinion that I cannot hope to escape the unreasoning impulse of the 
fury of that wretched portion of the community which desires the perpetuation of the 
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Slave Trade.”165 Yet, neither the domestic politics or death threats slowed Turnbull; he 
remained on the offensive by investigating new cases, which in turn continued to feed 
the fears of Cuban planters and Spanish officials that subversive activities persisted. 
 In an effort to directly apply Great Britain’s foreign policy of abolitionism in 
Cuba, Turnbull left Havana in late November, accompanied by a compatriot Goff. Their 
destination was a coffee plantation in the Cardenas region, and their mission was to 
investigate allegations that an expatriate named Forbes had kidnapped about 120 former 
Bahamian slaves and shipped them to Cuba after the 1833 Emancipation Bill passed.  
Although Forbes had recently died, their earlier emancipation afforded them the rights of 
British citizenship because they had been born within the empire’s borders. Before 
reaching their destination, Turnbull and Goff stayed in the Hotel de Comercio in 
Matanzas, where according to earlier reports, two or three of Forbe’s former slaves 
worked. After his arrival, Turnbull had the black workers come to his room where he 
asked them various questions about their treatment and birthplace. One witness 
described the incident, stating several people “watched the Consul and on becoming 
suspicious of his conduct immediately informed the Governor.”166 The governor of 
Matanzas, Antonio Garcia Ona, sent representatives to the scene to assess the situation. 
Once there, the agents mistakenly identified Goff as a British military officer and 
sequestered his passport. Turnbull failed to produce one, which resulted in his forced 
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removal to Havana. The governor diligently collected several accounts of the episode, 
which he then forwarded to the Captain-General. Because of this evidence—especially 
the fact that Turnbull had interviewed people of color privately—Valdes ordered the 
district official to look out for abolitionists or foreigners disseminating revolutionary 
propaganda to the slaves.167 Never dissuaded from his mission, Turnbull took on another 
case while returning to Havana. James Thomson, a Bahamian abducted and sold into 
Cuban slavery, sought the aid of Turnbull after hearing of the British consul’s exploits 
on Havana’s docks. Due to several requests for information by Bahamian officials, a 
witness to the abduction surfaced. Turnbull promptly brought the eyewitness to Cuba for 
inspection by Spanish authorities. Throughout December 1841 and January 1842, 
Turnbull and Spanish authorities argued over the nature of Thomson’s citizenship and 
release into British custody.168 Nevertheless, a legal adviser to the Captain-General 
informed Turnbull, after hearing the testimony, that “three witnesses was necessary to 
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overcome the presumption against a black man’s liberty.”169 Yet again, Turnbull’s 
actions in Matanzas and his persistence in the John Thomson case prompted another 
attempt by Spanish officials to limit or end the influence of Britain’s foreign policy of 
abolitionism by removing him.170 
 By January 1842, British resistance to Great Britain’s foreign policy of 
abolitionism had developed in Cuba, Turnbull’s predecessor, Charles Tolme, and his 
British merchant friends formed an alliance to exact vengeance against Turnbull. They 
argued that because the consul’s commitment to protect British commerce had become a 
secondary agenda, and his continued agitation regarding the Cuban slave system affected 
business interests, Turnbull needed to be bridled. Therefore, the London merchants and 
ship-owners that traded with Cuba combined forces with the British merchants in 
Havana to petition Aberdeen to rein in the unruly consul. Ingeniously, they did not 
request that Turnbull be removed completely. Instead, they framed their argument to 
illustrate that because the position of Superintendent of Liberated Africans, the 
embodiment of the foreign policy of abolitionism, and Consul were combined British 
interests in Cuba suffered. Consequently, they needed to be separated, which allowed 
Turnbull, as Superintendent of Liberated Africans, pursue the foreign policy of 
abolitionism and to quarrel as much as he wanted over slave trade matters without 
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obstructing the growth of British commerce.171 When taken together, these petitions, 
Turnbull’s repeated objections to Spain’s policies regarding slavers, his confrontations 
with British capitalists on their links to Cuban slave-trading firms, and Spanish officials’ 
constant demands to remove him, caused Aberdeen great concern.172 On February 12, 
1842, Aberdeen informed Spain’s minister in London that Britain had no intention “at 
present to press upon the government of Spain the question of a convention, for the 
purpose of examining generally into the condition of negroes in Cuba.”173 In an effort to 
reach a conciliatory agreement over the slave trade, Aberdeen rejected Palmerston’s 
aggressive policy towards Spain. Therefore, this was also a tacit denunciation of 
Turnbull’s abolitionist scheme and the foreign policy of abolitionism. On the same day 
that Aberdeen informed the Spanish minister of Britain’s new policy, he wrote Turnbull 
of his decision to separate the two offices. However, Aberdeen authorized Turnbull to 
remain as the Superintendent of Liberated Africans.174 After losing his position as 
Consul, Turnbull wrote Joseph Sturge asserting the “reasons assigned for this 
separation” were “that information has reached Lord Aberdeen that British interests in 
Cuba have suffered in consequences; and that my conduct as Consul has not been 
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marked by the necessary degree of ‘Moderation and Discretion.’”175 Arthur Aston, 
Britain’s minister in Madrid, described to Antonio Gonzalez that the protection of both 
the British merchants and public interests prompted the decision to revoke Turnbull’s 
consulship. Ultimately, the petitions offered Aberdeen a way to chastise Turnbull for 
hindering the development of British commerce and show the Spanish that Britain had 
no intention to end Cuban slavery. At the same time, the Foreign Office, in not stripping 
Turnbull of all his powers, would not appear to be soft on slave trade treaty violations. 
Consequently, the conflict between humanitarianism and commerce in British foreign 
policy, which had, in part, allowed Turnbull to become consul, resurfaced to defeat him 
as well. 
Attempting Martyrdom: Superintendent of Liberated Africans Turnbull  
Aberdeen decided to allow Turnbull to remain as Superintendent of Liberated 
Africans but revoke his consulship. This decision effectively isolated him, but the 
Spanish saw this maneuver as only half a victory because Turnbull was still in Cuba. 
The apprehensive Cubans knew that for them to rest easy, Turnbull had to leave the 
island (and preferably the region) altogether. His loss of the consulship, the protection 
the posting offered, and the ability to officially contact the Captain-General, coupled 
with the persistent threat of assassination, prompted Turnbull to heed the advice of his 
friends and move aboard the Romney in Havana harbor.176 However, his relocation to the 
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Romney did not diminish his popularity among slaves because Turnbull stayed in contact 
with these individuals through both his black servant Bernis and assistant Francis Ross 
Cocking.177 More importantly, Turnbull’s move did not impede his crusade to end the 
slave trade or mitigate disdain for him harbored by the Cubans and Spanish.  
Because Turnbull remained on the island, the plantocracy’s image and attitudes 
toward him as an enemy further solidified. In March 1843 Jose Antonio Saco, the first 
Creole in Cuba to condemn the slave trade, recalled “To be called a negrophil there is far 
worse than being labeled a revolutionary; the latter at least implies the support of a party 
but the former incites the hatred of every European.”178 Before Saco’s later remarks, the 
Captain-General had already labeled Turnbull both. Valdes argued that Turnbull’s plans 
did not solely revolve around the liberation of Africans; he also “works with Europeans, 
seducing them with thoughts of independence.”179 Although stripped of his Consulship, 
Valdes continued to petition for Turnbull’s removal in correspondences to the Spanish 
Ambassador in London. By this time, Spain’s representatives in Britain had curtailed 
their demands to Aberdeen because he had essentially clipped Turnbull’s wings by 
removing his consulship. However, his continued presence on the island, even if on the 
Romney, further convinced Cubans that Turnbull was the instigator of a global plot to 
abolish slavery in Cuba. At the very least, Valdes surmised, Turnbull was arranging his 
return to Great Britain as a “martyr to the abolitionist cause, but probably his 
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revolutionary ambitions remained uppermost in his mind.”180 If any abolitionist could 
bring disaster to Cuba, the Captain-General pictured Turnbull as the “most likely and the 
most fearsome.” Although Valdes believed Turnbull to be the one who would bring 
calamity to Cuba, the Captain-General knew he was not alone. Valdes saw abolitionists 
everywhere and thought the captain of the Romney was colluding with Turnbull.181 
Consequently, the Spanish Ministry of Marine and Colonies instructed the Captain-
General to prepare Cuba’s coasts in order to repel revolutionary agents from Jamaica and 
Haiti.182  
In June, the seasoned diplomat Joseph Tucker Crawford arrived to replace 
Turnbull as Consul.183 Sine he needed briefing on the situation in Cuba, Crawford met 
with Turnbull after assuming his new position. Wasting no time, Turnbull asked 
Crawford to use his authority as consul to get Turnbull’s passport, which he needed to 
legally travel to Cardenas for a renewed offensive on the Forbes estate. Crawford, while 
opposed to slavery, was not an ideologue or ardent abolitionist who would pursue the 
foreign policy of abolitionism in the same manner Turnbull had, which might explain 
why Aberdeen sent him to Cuba.184 Crawford refused because he questioned Turnbull’s 
motives. Over the course of two months, Turnbull and Crawford exchanged several 
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letters over the subject of the passport.185 Turnbull’s persistence finally paid off, when 
Crawford unenthusiastically requested it from Valdes. Unsurprisingly, Valdes denied the 
appeal stating that Turnbull had no authority to search the Forbes plantation.186 
After this setback, his wife Elinor, whom he had married sixteen years before, 
achieved what two Captain-Generals and countless other Spanish officials could not—
she convinced David Turnbull to leave Cuba. Constant worry about the safety of her 
husband combined with two unhealthy months aboard a ship had seriously affected her 
wellbeing. After informing Crawford of the situation, Turnbull received his passport and 
left Cuba for Nassau on August 15, 1842.187 Finally, the Spanish government and slave 
traders could resume their deception of “the English government and continue the 
contraband slave trade.”188 Crawford and the British businessmen in Cuba were also glad 
to see Turnbull go. In October 1842, Crawford accused his predecessor Joseph Bidwell, 
a member of the Foreign Office, of “playing philanthropy” in Nassau.189 Moreover, there 
was “no bearing the man’s nonsense,” and he hoped that “shewing up his infamous 
deception and the falseness of his character…will satisfy you.190 Lastly, it was “wise…to 
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remove him from office and put a stop to his figuring in any way as connected with Her 
Majesty’s government.”191 
After signing anti-slaving treaties with Great Britain in 1817 and 1835, the 
Spanish government and Cuban authorities allowed the slave trade to continue. Since 
Great Britain’s leaders had dedicated themselves to abolishing the Atlantic slave trade 
through a foreign policy of abolitionism, Whitehall, in accordance with that foreign 
policy, sent an ardent abolitionist to Cuba—David Turnbull.  His goal was to end the 
constant abuses of the Anglo-Spanish anti-slave trade treaty. Yet, after Turnbull’s arrival 
it became abundantly clear that his activities and objectives on the island represented a 
greater threat to the political, economic, and diplomatic interests of Cubans, Spain, and 
Great Britain, dependent as all those interests were upon the stability of slavery in Cuba. 
The Cuban plantocracy feared losing their human property, and, more importantly, the 
eruption of a slave revolution like the one in Saint Domingue. Turnbull’s efforts to 
expand the authority of the Court of Mixed Commission and his investigations into 
illegally imported slaves fostered both the fear of a possible slave insurrection and the 
idea of a British conspiracy to abolish slavery in Cuba. Therefore, Turnbull quickly 
made himself and Britain an enemy of Cuban slave interests. Those very same actions 
also pitted Turnbull against the entire Spanish Empire. By the end of the Napoleonic 
Wars, Spain had incurred massive debts. Not surprisingly, Great Britain was Spain’s 
largest creditor. Yet, in the wake of the Haitian Revolution in 1804, Cuba soon became 
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the world’s largest producer of sugar. This meant that the Spanish government 
desperately needed the income from sugar to appease creditors. They consequently 
approved the continued importation of slaves despite the Anglo-Spanish treaties, which 
neither Turnbull nor Britain’s foreign policy of abolitionism could tolerate nor 
compromise with. So, Turnbull never ceased in his harassment and criticism of the 
Spanish government’s halfhearted enforcement of the Anglo-Spanish accords that slave 
trading interests constantly ignored.  
Because the Spanish ministers in Europe never successfully convinced the 
British to remove Turnbull and, more importantly, because of an ever-growing fear that 
the Spanish government might capitulate to Britain’s demands, an intra-imperial conflict 
between white Cubans and both the colonial administration and metropole emerged. 
This dispute centered on the notion that if the slaveholding United States annexed Cuba, 
the island would be insulated from abolitionist attacks emanating from Great Britain. Of 
course, the Spanish government did not want to lose one of its few remaining colonies, 
especially, “one of the richest and most important jewels of the Crown of Castile.”192 In 
attempting to apply a British foreign policy of abolitionism more universally, Turnbull 
also made enemies of his countrymen, colleagues, merchants, and ship-owners because 
he accused them of participating in the slave trade, either directly or indirectly by 
employing slaves and emancipados for work. These accusations had a tremendous 
impact on British commerce. More importantly, Turnbull’s devout commitment to the 
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foreign policy of abolitionism endangered Great Britain’s larger diplomatic objective—
maintaining Spanish rule in Cuba. From the beginning, Turnbull’s presence in the 
colony inflated Cubans’ insecurities over their human property. Those anxieties, 
combined with both British and Spanish fears of losing Cuba to the United States and 
Turnbull’s hindrance of British commerce and foreign policy goals, caused Turnbull to 
lose his consulship and his place in Cuba. If Turnbull had demonstrated anything, it had 
been a reckless perseverance in pursuit of ending the slave trade. But as soon as Great 
Britain’s foreign policy of abolitionism came into conflict with Great Britain’s imperial 
relationships, Whitehall curtailed it immediately.
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CHAPTER IV 
‘A SPEAR AT EVERY NATION’: GREAT BRITAIN ACHIEVES AN 
AMERICAN TREATY AGAINST SLAVE TRADING 
 In 1841 the Quintuple Treaty between Great Britain, France, Austria, and Russia, 
which declared the slave trade piracy and granted a reciprocal “right of search” for each 
signing party’s vessels, came under the scrutiny of American representatives. In a 
response to the accord, the United States minister in Paris, Lewis Cass, asserted that 
“English statesmen” with their “excess of philanthropy,” would “tilt a spear at every 
nation, and light up the flames of a general war, in order to accomplish [Great Britain’s] 
own charitable views in its own exclusive way.”1 Moreover, he noted, the “treaty for the 
suppression of the slave trade was intended to act upon the United States by its moral 
force.”2 Cass further argued that French and British “cooperation” to end “that traffic 
was already secured by the treaties of 1831 and 1833,” and “Russia, Prussia, and 
Austria, [he supposed never] had, or ever will have a vessel engaged in that commerce.”3 
Several months later, Cass reiterated arguments such as these after the United States 
signed the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, which created the U.S. African Squadron. In 
October 1842, he wrote Secretary of State Daniel Webster asserting, “I do not see [any] 
change in the slightest degree [regarding] the pre-existing right claimed by Great Britain 
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to arrest and search our vessels.”4 More importantly, if an unaccompanied British cruiser 
met a vessel flying the American flag, it was quite “indispensable and justifiable” that 
the Royal Navy ascertain its nationality because of the treaty.5 Lastly, Cass believed that 
several provisions of the treaty were “dishonorable” because the new agreement 
committed a U.S. squadron to the coast of Africa even though the United States had 
“kept one there for years.”6  
 In January 1808, the governments of both the United States and Britain officially 
decreed participation in the Atlantic slave trade to be illegal for their citizens. Although 
each nation had added anti-slave-trading statutes to their legal codes, evasion of those 
laws saw the slave trade expand for decades after their implementation. Consequently, 
by the end of the 1830s, Great Britain used its foreign policy of abolitionism to establish 
anti-slave-trade treaties with all of the major maritime powers except one—the United 
States. This exception was pivotal because it made the entire treaty system largely 
ineffectual. An illicit trade continued under the protection of the American flag. 
However, the punishment of death if caught participating in the trade meant that very 
few slaves ended up in the United States. On rare occasions, slavers used American 
vessels, but more often the practice of carrying a set of American papers and flag 
complicated Anglo-American diplomacy. Papers such as these could be purchased 
throughout the Caribbean, and, smart slavers made sure they had them before setting 
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sail. Although this was illegal, and any slave ship caught flying an American flag faced 
seizure by the U.S. Navy, very few United States naval vessels patrolled the areas where 
the trade took place. Consequently, alternating between flags and sets of papers, the 
slave trade continued until an Anglo-American treaty acknowledged the problem and 
offered a way to address slavers’ abuses of the American colors.  
Having fought the War of 1812 largely over freedom of the seas, it was unlikely 
that the American government would consent to any limitations on its expanding 
merchant marine. Despite vague promises made in the Treaty of Ghent to enforce anti-
slave-trading laws, the United States had always upheld and defended the right of 
merchant vessels to proceed from port to port unmolested. However, Britain did not 
interpret this notion in the same manner. Instead, Great Britain operated under the 
assumption that complete freedom of the seas allowed piracy and slavers to operate 
alongside legitimate traders. Therefore, interfering with suspicious vessels was 
warranted, which caused Great Britain and the United States to come into conflict. 
 In 1839, tensions dating back to the slave trade’s initial abolition by both Great 
Britain and the United States came to a head, forcing both nations to the negotiating 
table. The result was the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. Although it took several 
international incidents to compel both nations to jointly address the slave trade, the 
compromises that emerged demonstrated a shift in Great Britain and the United States’ 
stance on both policing the Atlantic slave trade and international law more generally. 
More importantly, the treaty illustrates that Great Britain’s foreign policy of abolitionism 
succeeded because the United States agreed to respond to abuses of its flag. The “right 
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of search,” Great Britain’s practice of boarding vessels to search for slaves, became the 
focus of heated discussions after the publication of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. Yet, 
it was the content of closed-door treaty negotiations demonstrates how the foreign policy 
of abolitionism had transformed Anglo-American diplomacy. Throughout these 
dialogues, neither the British nor the American representatives approached the subject of 
the “right of search.” Their avoidance illustrates the volatility of the issue, but it also 
allowed the delegates to prepare for the inevitable protests to the treaty.  
In the end, both countries privately agreed to one another’s treaty stipulations, 
which allowed them to save face publicly regarding their authority. On the one hand, the 
United States agreed to place a permanent squadron off the coast of Africa to enforce its 
anti-slave-trading-laws. On the other hand, Great Britain tacitly agreed that impressment, 
as had been practiced by the Royal Navy, was now a dead letter. Great Britain also 
agreed that the long contested “right of search” would not enter into international law. 
Lastly, the incidents that occurred before the passage of the treaty and Whitehall’s 
responses to those occurrences, revealed Great Britain’s new approach to the lack of 
enforcement of American anti-slaving laws and U.S. refusal to aid in the suppression of 
the slave trade. Ultimately, examining the debates, discussions, and compromises 
regarding the slave trade, especially the differing distinctions of the “right of search,” 
during the Webster-Ashburton Treaty negotiations demonstrates Great Britain’s 
successful use of its foreign policy of abolitionism. It also illustrates that by the 1840s 
the abolitionist movement had designated ending the Atlantic slave trade as a major 
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foreign policy objective for Great Britain, even if it meant finally challenging the most 
powerful nation in the Western hemisphere—the United States.  
By the 1840s, both the United States and Britain had clearly established their 
positions regarding the slave trade and slave property in their foreign policy, but this had 
not always been the case. American diplomatic concerns over both institutions guided 
negotiations at the end of the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812.7 The successful 
slave rebellion in French Saint Domingue, resulting in the independent black nation of 
Haiti, also influenced U.S. policy regarding the slave trade and slavery both at home and 
abroad.8 Due to Haiti’s close proximity to the expanding American slave population, 
U.S. politicians’ and slaveholder fears of a similar insurrection caused the United States 
to develop a more global perspective regarding slavery.9 Still, American foreign policy 
from 1790 to 1820 did not necessarily revolve around the issue of slavery. But neither 
was it far from center stage. The 1820s, however, saw a drastic change in American 
leader’s views towards global slavery, especially with the “rise of aggressive white 
supremacist rhetoric in national politics,” eventually coalescing in the Jacksonian 
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Democratic Party.10 Due to this new coalition’s willingness to utilize U.S. power in 
defense of hemispheric slavery, the emergence of Jacksonian Democrats ushered in a 
period of aggressive foreign policy focused on slavery in ways unlike the Jeffersonians 
before them.11 Yet, even after the establishment of the Monroe Doctrine and this new 
political force, American slaveholders remained satisfied with the balance of power in 
the Atlantic world. Although Britain held the majority of the power in the region, the 
United States, with reservations, accepted this because Great Britain had become 
America’s leading investor and trading partner.12 Expansion into the American 
Southwest, along with the United States’ growing dependence on slave labor, relied 
essentially on the British textile industry—two-thirds of all U.S. exports went to Britain 
by 1830.13 Therefore, U.S. representatives pursued policies that softened trade 
restrictions in an effort to expand commercial ties with Britain. But this commitment 
rested solely on Great Britain’s continued use of slaves in the its empire, which ended 
with British abolitionism’s greatest achievement—the Abolition Act of 1833.14  
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After decades of public pressure and parliamentary debates, a political revolution 
swept over Great Britain, resulting in the abolition of slavery in the British West Indies. 
Whitehall’s decision to free thousands of slaves in the British Caribbean fundamentally 
transformed the order of things in the Western Hemisphere because the most powerful 
nation began mobilizing its considerable economic, diplomatic, and military resources 
against slavery. Great Britain’s initial steps centered on the complete abolition of the 
slave trade, which required the establishment of an effective transatlantic police force 
and treaties with other nations that allowed this force to achieve its goal.15 In an effort to 
accomplish these objectives Great Britain utilized its foreign policy of abolitionism to 
coerce other nations to support Great Britain’s abolitionist agenda.  
Although the Abolition Act of 1833 did not immediately free Britain’s 800,000 
slaves—they remained “apprentices” bound to their masters for a period of four to six 
years—the international political ramifications of British emancipation were 
monumental, especially for American slaveholders.16 By the time Great Britain 
abolished slavery, slaveholding elites had consolidated their political power in the 
United States government—between the end of the American Revolution and 1833 all 
the presidents but one owned slaves. The development of the Second Party System in the 
1830s, where the Democrats and Whigs vied for votes in both the North and South, 
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caused anti-slavery rhetoric to disappear from national political debates.17 Nonetheless, 
Great Britain had set an abolitionist precedent that shaped American domestic and 
foreign policy for years to come. This time period saw the South strengthen its defense 
of slavery, along with stifling any type of anti-slavery discussions in Congress through 
procedural regulations—the so-called Gag Rule.18 Even more important, as Matthew 
Karp argues, during the antebellum decades the southern leaders at the helm of U.S. 
foreign policy attempted to “advance the international cause of slavery,” which caused a 
“foreign policy of slavery” to develop focused on protecting the institution abroad.19  
Ultimately, this foreign policy objective put the most powerful slaveholding society in 
the Western Hemisphere, the United States, and the “vast empire on which the sun never 
set,” Great Britain, on a collision course over slavery. The first battle waged in this war 
was fought over the slave trade, specifically Great Britain’s use of its foreign policy of 
abolitionism to end the trade.20  
 
 
                                                 
17 Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln (New York: W. W. Norton, 
2005), 218-53; Robert Pierce Forbes, The Missouri Compromise and Its Aftermath: Slavery and the 
Meaning of America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Haynes, Unfinished 
Revolution, 118-22; Donald Ratcliffe, “The Decline of Antislavery Politics, 1815-1840,” in John Craig 
Hammond and Matthew Mason, eds., Contesting Slavery: The Politics of Bondage and Freedom in the 
New Nation (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011), 175-206. 
18 Edward Bartlett Rugemer, The Problem of Emancipation: The Caribbean Roots of the American Civil 
War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2008), 145-290; Edward Bartlett Rugemer, “The 
Southern Response to British Abolitionism: The Maturation of Proslavery Apologetics,” Journal of 
Southern History 70, no. 2 (May 2004): 221-48. 
19 Karp, Vast Southern Empire, 2, 7. 
20 Richard Huzzey, Freedom Burning: Antislavery and Empire in Victorian Britain (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2012), 40-74; David Brion Davis, Challenging the Boundaries of Slavery 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 61-94; Seymour Dresher, The Mighty Experiment: 
Free Labor versus Slavery in British Emancipation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 144-78. 
  
 
159 
Early American Suppression and Brief Anglo-American Cooperation, 1819-1822 
 In early 1820, the American frigate Cyane, under Captain Edward Trenchard, 
escorting the brig Elizabeth, the latter transporting eighty-eight former slaves, arrived on 
Sherbro Island, southeast of Freetown, Sierra Leone. In accordance with the 
Congressional Act of 1819, requiring that slaves captured off the U.S. coast be returned 
to Africa, this voyage initiated the law’s provision for the “safe-keeping, support, and 
removal beyond the limits of the United States, of all such negroes, mulattoes, or persons 
of color,” along with the appointment of an agent in Africa to facilitate the resettlement 
of the freedmen.21 This initial convoy, with the aid of the United States government and 
the American Colonization Society, led to the eventual founding of Liberia. Just as 
importantly, the presence of the Cyane inaugurated the U.S. navy’s patrol of the coast of 
Africa, known later as the Africa Squadron.  
Upon their arrival, the group’s leader, Reverend Samuel Baker, tasked Captain 
Trenchard with a survey of the coast and its various headlands, but also an inquiry into 
“whether the natives would be willing to dispose of a tract of land” for the new 
community.22 This assignment bore unexpected fruit. Trenchard had authorization to 
detain American slavers and send confiscated slaves to the new settlement, and, shortly 
after his departure, the Cyane captured nine vessels off the Gallinas River in eastern 
Sierra Leone. Five of the ships were from the United States, but had hoisted Spanish 
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colors; the other four were of unknown origins.23 The Endymion, Science, Esperanza, 
and Plattsburg became prize vessels and were sent to New York, but Trenchard had the 
other five ships destroyed and the slaves sent to Sierra Leone.24 Although the Cyane had 
successfully captured nine ships and freed the slaves onboard, a report from the frigate 
asserted that while the vessels “are evidently owned by Americans, they are completely 
covered by Spanish papers [so] that it is impossible to condemn them.”25 Moreover, the 
official inquest noted that the “slave trade is carried on to a very great extent [and that 
no] less than three hundred vessels on the coast [were] engaged in that traffic, each 
having two or three sets of papers.”26  
After dealing with the seized slavers, the Cyane continued its mission and arrived 
at Cape Mesurado, east of Sherbro, in late-April 1820. After negotiating a land 
agreement with local leaders, Trenchard returned to Sherbro. During his return voyage, 
Trenchard stopped in the Cape Verde Islands where the John Adams and Hornet joined 
him. It was during their return that they seized two more slaving vessels. By May, it was 
apparent that more action was required; the U.S. Congress passed its most strenuous 
national statute against the slave trade. The Act of 1820, although put in place to protect 
American commerce and provide provisions for punishing the crime of piracy, had two 
specific sections addressing the slave trade. Both sections stipulated that any American 
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citizen engaged in the African slave trade “shall be adjudged a pirate; and on conviction 
thereof before the circuit court of the United States for the district wherein he shall be 
brought or found, shall suffer death.”27 The same language also applied to non-
Americans onboard slavers either owned or commissioned by Americans.28 Yet, neither 
reports from Africa nor the Act of 1820 convinced Secretary of State John Quincy 
Adams of the necessity for any further measures to suppress the slave trade or make any 
arrangements to aid Great Britain with policing the trade.29  
 The anti-slaving treaty of 1820 also empowered the President to employ armed 
cruisers, as he saw fit, to seize American slaving vessels. President Monroe soon did. 
Several ships were dispatched to the African coast, where the newly commissioned 
vessels took part in a rare act of Anglo-American cooperation. Because the United States 
finally had ships patrolling the African coast, Whitehall ordered the Royal Navy to 
“cooperate” with their new allies in the suppression campaign.30 While the “American 
Government [had] refused to enter into any more intimate concert” with Great Britain 
for the policing of the slave trade, British vessels were to “give such general 
assistance…towards the attainment of this common object, as was consistent with 
existing Treaties and Rights of both Nations, and with the friendly relations and perfect 
                                                 
27 An Act to continue in force ‘An act to protect the commerce of the United States, and punish the crime of 
piracy,’ and also to make further provision for punishing the crime of piracy, May 15, 1820, 16th 
Congress, 1st session, Annals of Congress, pt. 36: 2624. 
28 An Act to continue in force ‘An act to protect the commerce of the United States, and punish the crime of 
piracy,’ and also to make further provision for punishing the crime of piracy, May 15, 1820, 16th 
Congress, 1st session, Annals of Congress, pt. 36: 2624-5. 
29 John Quincy Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Comprising Portions of his Diary from 1795 to 
1848, vol. 5, ed. Charles Francis Adams (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co., 1875), 182-84. 
30 Planta to Borrow, May 12, 1821, enclosed in Barrow to Commodore George R. Collier, May 24, 1821, 
in British and Foreign State Papers, 1821-1822 (London: James Ridgway and Sons, 1851), 220. [Here 
after referred to as BFSTP.] 
  
 
162 
Amity subsisting between them.”31 This cooperation led to the USS John Adams and 
Royal Navy’s Snapper seizing the Exchange off Rio Pongas in West Africa. Although 
the United States’ presence on the African coast was limited and joint Anglo-American 
operations ended quickly, reports from vessels illustrated that progress had been 
achieved. In April 1822, a brief prepared by a special committee in the U.S. House of 
Representatives asserted that “the American flag, which heretofore covered so large a 
portion of the slave trade, has wholly disappeared from the coast of Africa.”32 Yet the 
slave trade still “increased annually, under the flags of other nations,” and it was 
doubtful “whether those American merchants, [and] the American capital and seamen 
which heretofore aided in this traffic, have abandoned it altogether, or have sought 
shelter under the flags of other nations.”33 As a result, the next two decades saw 
amplified pressure to implement a more formalized and systematic unit for the express 
purpose of suppressing the slave trade. 
Increased Activities: U.S. Anti-Slave Trade Suppression, 1822-1839 
 In the early 1820s, besides supporting the early settlement of Liberia, U.S. naval 
efforts against the slave trade, although during this period did more to preserve slavery 
and the slave trade in Cuba than eradicate it, revolved around the anti-piracy campaign 
conducted in the West Indies and Florida, which was in full swing by 1823.34 At the 
same time, American observers on the African coast claimed the slave trade had 
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declined. Lieutenant Matthew Calbraith Perry wrote that “he had heard of no American 
slavers on that part of the coast.”35 The U.S. Secretary of the Navy reiterated this 
sentiment in a December 1823 report stating: “During the time that Captain Spence and 
Lieutenant Perry were cruising, they neither saw nor heard of any vessel under the 
American flag engaged in the slave trade.”36 Moreover, if “citizens of the United States 
are still employed in that traffic, they seem to have been driven to conceal themselves 
under flags of other nations.”37 President Monroe, discussing the success of the 
American cruisers in his annual message to Congress, further expounded on this notion, 
stating that “not one [vessel] has been discovered, and there is good reason to believe 
that our flag is now seldom, if at all, disgraced by that traffic.”38 Although American 
representatives and leaders asserted that use of the American flag by slavers had 
decreased, the reality was that slave traders began using Spanish colors because the U.S. 
Navy could only stop American flagged vessels. This state of affairs was confirmed by 
American naval commander reports.39 Therefore, American slavers avoided notice and 
capture by simply hoisting other nations’ flags. Yet, between 1825 and 1835, slave 
trading declined, at least near Liberia. Later, W.E.B. Dubois acknowledged the 
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reduction, but spoke of the government’s “negligence” because there was “never…more 
than two vessels on the African coast, and most of the time [the United States] did not 
have one.”40 
 By the 1830s, American vessels continued the erratic pattern of visiting the 
African coast for anti-slaving purposes. In February 1831, the Java anchored in 
Monrovia where it stayed for six days. The Boxer arrived in April 1832, followed by the 
Porpoise in February 1833. The John Adams and Potomac appeared in December 1833. 
Finally, in the summer of 1835, the Ontario and Erie reached Africa, with instructions to 
patrol particular areas of the coast including Cape Palmas, the Island of St. Thomas in 
the Bight of Benin, and Bassa Cove. Yet, no American-flagged ships appeared in 
African waters in 1829, 1830, 1834, or 1838.41 Such haphazard enforcement allowed the 
slave trade to continue. The period from 1836 through early 1837, were a highpoint in 
the American naval presence off Africa: four U.S. naval vessels visited the coast, 
including the Dolphin, Peacock, Enterprise, and Potomac. But another lull immediately 
followed; it would not be until 1840 before the American navy reappeared off the coast 
of Africa.42 
 Spurred by increased prices of enslaved individuals and insufficient enforcement 
of U.S. anti-slaving laws, and despite Britain’s continued policing of the trade on the 
African coast, the last years of the 1830s saw the slave trade revitalized. This occurred 
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largely due to demand driven by Cuba’s canefields. The Cuban Court of Mixed 
Commission re-counted the appearance of 240 illegal slavers between 1836 through 
1839, fifty-eight of which flew the American flag. In 1839, the Sierra Leone Court of 
Mixed Commission reported the condemnation of more than sixty slavers that came 
before them, which resulted in the freeing of 3,283 slaves. All but three of these ships 
were detained on the African coast, and eleven were American ships. The report also 
noted that none of the ships were “admitted to prosecution,” because the United States 
had not “conceded to our cruisers the right of visiting, searching and detaining her 
vessels for any purposes whatsoever.”43 The account also illustrated how “three of the 
vessels condemned during the past year…continued under the protection of the 
American papers,” which cleared “out from the island of Cuba, until the very moment 
when they took on board the cargo of slaves which formed the ground of their 
condemnation.”44 
Even though the slave trade expanded during the 1830s, Lord Palmerston’s 
endeavors to affix the “right of search” stipulation to accords added France, Haiti, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina, Mexico, and Texas to the list of countries 
subject to British detention on the high seas.45 The Spanish flag provided protection, but 
in 1835 a new resolution promulgated in Madrid sanctioned the capture of slavers 
outfitted for transporting captive Africans. In 1839, meanwhile, the Portuguese also 
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ceased to aid and abet slave traders. Therefore, by the close of the decade the United 
States stood as the last major maritime power that opposed the “right of search” and its 
use against slavers. However, 1839 became a critical juncture in evolving American 
attitudes regarding exemption from the “right of search,” leading to the U.S. 
government’s reconsideration of its stance on the international effort to end the slave 
trade.46  
 Because the United States failed to enforce its own anti-slaving laws Britain took 
it upon themselves to do so. This, in turn, forced the slave trade to the forefront of 
American politics. In June of 1839, the HMS Buzzard seized two Baltimore-built 
slavers, the Eagle and Clara, flying the American flag off the coast of Lagos. Like other 
slavers, each vessel carried fabricated papers, which prompted the British cruiser to 
escort them (and their slave cargoes) into New York harbor. Yet the subsequent cases 
deemed them Spanish property, resulting in their release. Then the HMS Harlequin 
apprehended the slaver Wyoming. Lastly, the British cruiser Dolphin seized the Butterfly 
and Baltimore-built Catherine, both of which carried Spanish and British logbooks. The 
Catherine had approached the West African coast flying American colors. After capture, 
a prize crew took the vessel to the New York courts, which condemned it, along with the 
Butterfly and Wyoming. The summer of 1839 also saw the beginning of the infamous 
Amistad case. Immediately, the Spanish government demanded the ship’s return, along 
with its slave cargo. However, the case landed in the American court system. Eventually, 
the Supreme Court freed the Africans, but the case had become a public spectacle, 
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illustrating the atrocities of the slave trade and underscoring American resistance to 
collaborating in enforcing slave trade laws.  
In an effort to extend its foreign policy of abolitionism, the British Foreign 
Office provided evidence to the U.S. federal courts implicating the Catherine’s original 
owners, whose names remained on the vessel registry, and demonstrating their failure to 
sell the ship in Havana. This information prompted the arrest of several slave-ship 
owners, along with the confiscation of two schooners built for slave trading. Although 
these cases failed, Great Britain, because of continued American abuses of anti-salving 
laws, demonstrated that their empire had taken a harder stance against the United States 
regarding the slave trade than before. Specifically, they were now enforcing American 
laws and arresting American citizens because the United States had not effectively done 
it.47 
 After the events of 1839, it became necessary for the United States to establish a 
mechanism to enforce anti-slave-trading laws because Britain continued to embarrass the 
U.S. government—due to the absence of a U.S. force on the African coast—by detaining 
American vessels and citizens participating in the slave trade.48 Therefore, President Van 
Buren ordered “a competent” naval force be situated on the African coast. The Dolphin 
and Grampus were sent to West Africa in early 1840, where they stayed for several 
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months. They returned to the United States, but reappeared off the African coast in 1841. 
Both ships patrolled there constantly, even though they only apprehended one slaving 
vessel, the Sara Anne. Their capture of the ship was the first slaver apprehended by an 
American naval vessel in African waters in nearly twenty years. Along with extended 
cruising missions, the commander of the Grampus, Lieutenant John S. Paine, had 
instructions from the U.S. government to maintain “friendly” relations with the British. 
These orders inspired Paine to enter into a joint cruising agreement between the United 
States and Britain, where each party consented to investigate and detain suspected 
vessels until the other’s return. This accord became, at least virtually, a reciprocal “right 
of search.” Although his actions were not officially sanctioned and the United States 
government quickly renounced the pact, Paine’s agreement set the stage for the creation 
of the Africa Squadron. Paine’s actions also demonstrated that even though both British 
and U.S. seamen had orders and treaties to follow, once they were on the open ocean a 
majority of their decisions came from either personal discretion or inclination, not 
necessarily their nation’s anti-slave-trading policies.   
 In the end, the evidence illustrating the flourishing slave trade, coupled with the 
incidents of 1839, caused an abrupt reaction by the United States: for the first time it sent 
two naval vessels to simultaneously patrol the West Coast of Africa. Although this move 
was a symbolic gesture, such reinvigorated British diplomatic efforts forced the United 
States—revealed as ineffective at administering its own anti-slavery laws—to come to 
the negotiating table. America’s incentive was to save face, but, more importantly, the 
preservation of a working relationship with the United States’ largest trading partner—
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Great Britain. Yet, the discussions were part of a larger picture relating to Anglo-
American relations in general. Along with the disagreements over enforcement of anti-
slave trade laws, an enduring dispute over the U.S.-Canadian border saw Congress 
preparing for war in Maine and New Brunswick in 1839. Luckily, the Aroostook War 
ended with a diplomatic compromise. This set the stage for the British Minister Lord 
Ashburton, an abolitionist and seasoned slave trade politician from Prime Minister 
Peel’s government, to resolve both the border and slave trade issues in Washington.  
Slave Trade Compromises: The Webster-Ashburton Treaty and the “Right of 
Search” 
 
Efforts to consolidate alliances against suppressing the slave trade lost 
momentum in February 1842, when France unexpectedly refused to ratify the Quintuple 
Treaty negotiated in December 1841 between Great Britain, Austria, France, and 
Russia.49 Before France’s rejection, the four European powers had agreed to declare the 
slave trade piracy, but, more importantly, to allow the “right of search” for one another’s 
cruisers in specified areas. Furthermore, other European maritime powers, not already 
part of the anti-slaving treaty system, were invited to consent to the new accord.50 
Although France and smaller maritime nations had previously granted the “right of 
search,” the unlikeliness of the other three signatories’ cruisers venturing to the African 
coast made the treaty’s purpose simply declaratory. Actually, the agreement solidified 
internationally the system and methods for suppressing the slave trade developed by 
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Great Britain. Yet, renunciation by France prevented the “right of search” during 
peacetime from becoming customary policy for European nations. Moreover, the course 
of action taken by France allowed the United States diplomatic cover to continue 
declining the “right of search” as a treaty stipulation.  
Because of France’s action regarding the Quintuple Treaty, the United States’ 
position against Great Britain’s ceaseless pressure to allow the “right of search” gained 
significant strength. Lewis Cass, the minster of the United States in Paris, opposed the 
treaty from the very beginning. Louis Philippe notified the British ambassador that “the 
American Minister was very busy in inciting the Opposition Deputies to resist the 
ratification.”51 President Tyler recognized the importance of the treaty’s failure in a 
private letter to Secretary of State Daniel Webster, arguing that “the refusal of France to 
ratify the treaty” gave “more sea-room with Lord Aberdeen.”52 He also encouraged U.S. 
representatives to continue promote the idea of “maintaining the freedom of the seas.”53 
Ultimately, the U.S. diplomatic pressure thwarted Britain’s plans of establishing “a new 
rule of international law,” resulting in Whitehall’s need to send an ambassador to the 
United States to negotiate a compromise on the “right of search.”54 
Arriving in the United States in the spring of 1842, Lord Ashburton immediately 
began negotiations. However, Ashburton deliberately tabled discussions of maritime 
policy because of the long history of friction over the “right of search” between the 
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United States and Great Britain. This was the first time since the failed Convention of 
1824 that a realistic and coordinated scheme for the suppression of the slave trade 
emerged, and Ashburton hoped to avoid discussion of more sensitive issues until 
absolutely necessary. The emergence of a compromise was paramount, as it would 
replace the sidetracking and fruitless squabbles of the past. 
Secretary of State Daniel Webster took the lead in negotiating with Ashburton, 
but, like Great Britain’s representative, he too consciously abstained from insistence 
upon any particular position the United States government would take towards the “right 
of search” or other issues. It was clear, however, that no compromise could be achieved 
if discussions were carried out as they had been previously. Yet, in early 1842, Webster 
had anticipated a possible change in traditional policy for the United States regarding 
freedom of the seas. This perceived shift in attitude, prompted Webster in an April letter 
to clarify his personal stance, along with outlining the terms he proposed to Lord 
Ashburton:  
Our position in respect to these maritime questions is peculiar. Hitherto, we have
 been contending…for the freedom of the seas…[Therefore,] I have proposed to
 Lord Ashburton, that England and the United States shall maintain for a limited
 time, each an independent squadron on the coast of Africa, comprising such a
 number of vessels and of such force as may be agreed upon, with instructions to
 their commanders respectively to act in concert, in order that no slave ship, under
 whatever flag she may sail, shall be free from visitation and search…[which]
 Lord Ashburton, so far, appears to think well of.55 
 
Obviously, cooperation was both Webster and Ashburton’s desire because of the recent 
wave of high-profile and divisive incidents. Particularly thorny was the Creole case, 
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wherein a British court in the Bahamas freed several slaves who had revolted aboard an 
American brig in November 1841.56 Britain considered the slaves to be freedpeople; the 
Americans thought them mutineers. While cooperation appeared to be the logical 
approach, and supporters of the administration agreed with this course of action, 
Webster had previously established himself as a diplomatic servant of slavery.57 His 
position as a Cotton Whig representing Massachusetts’ industrial interests made him 
dependent on British capital and the free flow of cotton (and thus, by extension slavery) 
and thereby affected his negotiating position. But dependency cut both ways, for 
Ashburton knew British mills would be shuttered and thousands thrown out of work in 
the absence of American cotton. Great Britain’s textile industry thus relied on (and 
helped perpetuate) American slavery to supply the raw cotton. 
Webster drew his proposal from the Paine-Bell Report, composed by U.S. naval 
officers on the African coast, where Lieutenant Bell had entered into a private agreement 
with Commander Tucker of the Royal Navy in 1840. Ashburton received a draft of the 
report, and its major suggestion was “that a squadron should be kept on the coast of 
Africa to cooperate with the British or other nations interested in stopping the slave 
trade.”58 Moreover, the “most efficient mode” required that “vessels…cruise in couples, 
one of each nation.”59 However, this copy included a clause stating that “either of the 
cruisers may examine a suspicious vessel so far as may be necessary to determine her 
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national character; while any further search would be only pursued by the vessel having 
a right from the law of nations, or from existing treaties.”60 Although this section 
implied Britain had the “right of visit” to determine the nationality of a vessel, it did not 
appear in the official report because of its removal, which Ashburton believed Webster 
had done.61 The specific deletion of this clause demonstrates how prominent the issue of 
the “right of visit” and the “right of search” was to the American public and for Anglo-
American relations.  
Ashburton received Webster’s proposal enthusiastically, but, like his counterpart, 
avoided any volatile matters. After his arrival, Ashburton observed the U.S. public’s 
calmness in waiting for the conclusion of negotiations and their disposition “to be 
satisfied with reasonable terms.” “I trust and hope,” he continued, “that what we may do 
may appear to deserve that character.”62 Consequently, he quickly agreed to the draft of 
the Webster-Ashburton Treaty that did not involve a discussion of the “right of visit” or 
“right of search,” which Ashburton in turn recommended to Lord Aberdeen. At the same 
time, Ashburton remained cognizant of the difficulties faced by Webster, who was open 
to criticism that he had appeased Great Britain. In an earlier letter to Aberdeen, 
Ashburton had outlined those complications, stating that “the greater part of the 
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American public both individually and collectively” had a “singular jealously of, and 
sensitiveness to, everything we do,” which led to “incessant misrepresentations and 
exaggerations.”63 Therefore, these feelings and actions led to difficulties in diplomacy 
because American leaders were “often deterred from doing what [they might want] by 
the scrutiny of a lower description of public.”64 Yet, even with the unpredictability of 
American attitudes toward foreign policy, Ashburton maintained that the political 
climate at the time favored him and his mission. He asserted that because the cabinet had 
“no supporting party in either House of Congress,” a “complete and satisfactory 
settlement with me [would] give them popularity.”65 However, at the same time “we 
must not too hastily infer that anything the government may do may not be condemned 
by a party in violent opposition.”66 Ashburton knew of the long conflict dating back to 
the War of 1812 between the United States and Britain over the “right of search.” 
Consequently, his caution demonstrated that the issue played a major role in American 
politics and that U.S. legislators would not endorse a treaty allowing British naval 
vessels to stop American ships, for fear of losing their Senate seats. This fear of 
supporting anything British, although Britain had become the United States’ leading 
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investor and trading partner, had long dictated political actions of U.S. leaders because 
both parties employed Anglophobia to “demonize their political opponents.”67   
After demonstrating his enthusiasm and caution regarding the U.S. public, 
Ashburton detailed the technique proposed for suppressing the slave trade. He argued the 
“excited prejudices of the country must be considered…the mode” for ending the trade.68 
On the one hand, he insisted the plan “I am considering with Mr. Webster will be 
more…effectual, than even the accession of America to the principles of the Quintuple 
Treaty.”69 On the other hand, Ashburton claimed that the “senseless [clamor] about the 
right of search, liberty of the seas, etc.,” continued to echo throughout the United States, 
which caused the French to oppose Great Britain as well.70 Therefore, achieving any 
efficient “right of search” would be difficult. Additionally, the “practice of visitation” 
gave “little practical remedy [to] the tricks of the slave traders”; when the Royal Navy 
did exercise the right of search, the United States criticized British action.71 Ultimately, 
Ashburton’s knowledge of the difficulty of gaining the “right of search” and the 
weaknesses of the “right of visit,” allowed him to formulate a plan to which both nations 
could agree.  
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Because Ashburton obtained permission to establish a joint-cruising operation off 
the coast of Africa, he like his American counterpart Daniel Webster borrowed from the 
Paine-Bell Report believing the “vexed question of the right of visit [would] settle itself 
under” the agreement.72 Instead of having a reciprocal “right of search,” which “would 
always be restricted with much jealousy and often give rise in its execution to irritating 
collisions,” each nation would contribute cruisers to a joint naval operation with the 
ability to board and capture their own nation’s vessels.73 Moreover, this “naval 
cooperation would also double the strength on the slave coast at a reduced expense, and 
relieve us from the charge and embarrassment of sending detained vessels to distant 
American ports.”74 Ashburton also asserted that if enacted, the “American cruiser would 
be likely to act with more freedom than our own” in detaining U.S. slaving vessels or 
those suspected of engaging in the trade.75 These cruisers could also deal with “cases of 
vessels ‘not navigated according to law.’”76 Ashburton had “strong hopes” that a 
compromise would bring “effective cooperation for stopping this miserable traffic in the 
vessels of this country where it has taken its last refuge.”77 Because Webster’s plan was 
the best arrangement available under the circumstances, Lord Aberdeen responded that if 
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Ashburton “should not find it possible to induce the government of the United States to 
become a party to any Convention, conferring a mutual right of search, Her Majesty’s 
government would willingly accede to an arrangement of the nature described in your 
Lordship’s [dispatch].78 By giving Ashburton permission to establish a joint operation 
with the United States off the coast of Africa, Aberdeen demonstrated a change in 
Britain’s foreign policy. Great Britain would now allow the U.S. Navy to work with the 
Royal Navy if it meant ending a slaver’s ability to gain protection from American colors. 
However, a major issue regarding freedom of the seas reared its head once again—
impressment—a practice that Great Britain had never linked to the foreign policy of 
abolitionism until now. 
For about two hundred years, Britain had refused to accept limits upon what it 
insisted upon as the Royal Navy’s right to impress its seamen from neutral vessels. 
Therefore, Prime Minister Peel’s administration, like others before, refused to make any 
concessions which might jeopardize that long-held presumption. Yet the continued threat 
of impressment—which, ironically, many Americans considered a form of 
enslavement—was one of the chief concerns of the United States regarding the 
concession of a “right of search” to the Royal Navy. Because abuses of this right often 
occurred in times of war, what would prevent Britain from doing the same in a time of 
peace? During the negotiation process, Webster brought this concern to Ashburton’s 
attention. This prompted Ashburton’s appeal to Whitehall requesting authorization to 
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make a determination on the subject. In his dispatch, Ashburton argued in “all 
discussions” with the U.S. government “respecting maritime rights, and the practice at 
sea of visiting and searching, or otherwise, the apprehension always uppermost in the 
public mind is, that they may in some way or other lead to the impressment of seamen 
during any future war.”79 Consequently, having a “satisfactory” response on the issue of 
impressment “would go far to ensure success to our other negotiations, and, which is 
more important, remove the most serious cause of animosity and ill-will.”80 What is 
important to note is that Ashburton was not asking authority to make this a part of any 
treaty. Instead, he wanted to privately guarantee Webster that if Great Britain entered 
into a war where the United States remained neutral, “impressment from [U.S.] merchant 
ships navigating the High Seas will not be practiced.”81 Since this issue was crucial to 
the negotiation process, Ashburton reminded Aberdeen that his mission in the United 
States might result in “not only the settlement of existing differences, but the 
establishment if possible, of a more wholesome state of the public mind, by which future 
differences may be averted.”82 It was for this reason that a decision regarding the future 
impressment was required.83  
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As was the case in the dialog over the “right of search,” Ashburton’s approach to 
impressment further illustrated his desire to achieve a realistic settlement, approved by 
both nations and without futile debates over legal rights. Following his description of the 
United States’ staunch opposition to impressment, Ashburton questioned whether it 
would occur again because the practice was an “anomaly hardly bearable by our own 
people.”84 More importantly, the “first exercise of this practice would produce war.”85 
Therefore, was it not “better to surrender with a good grace a pretended right, while the 
surrender may bring you some credit,” rather than maintain a claim that Britain may not 
have the “power to execute” later on?86 Due to this view, Ashburton pressed Whitehall 
for a constructive response to Webster’s proposal because “it would be of great benefit 
to the general success of our negotiations, and abundantly productive of future harmony 
and good will.”87  
In June 1842, Aberdeen declined to consent to the proposition, which he saw as 
“tantamount to an absolute and entire renunciation of the indefeasible right inherent in 
the British Crown to command the allegiance and services of its subjects, wherever 
found.”88 Clearly, Ashburton was shocked by this stern response because in a reply on 
June 29, 1842, he outlined how impressment had been “repeatedly” discussed “between 
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the two Governments, and has, at no time that I can find, been considered in the light of 
the abandonment of a great principle.”89 Ashburton also rejected the notion that he 
suggested any “dangerous novelties” or “the abandonment of any valued rights” in an 
effort to achieve successful negotiations.90 Several weeks after his letter to Aberdeen, 
Ashburton, on August 9, wrote an official note to Webster, which affirmed that “no 
differences have, or could have, arisen of late years” concerning impressment, because 
the practice has, since the peace, wholly ceased.”91 Besides, the practice cannot return 
because of “existing laws and regulations for manning Her Majesty’s navy.”92 Yet, 
unbeknownst to Ashburton, Webster had previously written, “the American government, 
then, is prepared to say that the practice of impressing seamen from American vessels 
cannot hereafter be allowed to take place.”93 In addition, the crew of any legally 
registered “American merchant-vessel…will find their protection in the flag which is 
over them.”94 The August correspondence between Ashburton and Webster indicated the 
elimination of impressment from the deliberations concerning the “right of search.”95 
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American fear of impressment was unwarranted because, Ashburton asserted, Great 
Britain had abandoned the policy.  
Although it appears unlikely that the repudiation of impressment by Whitehall 
would have provoked the United States to accede to the “right of search,” it did illustrate 
the metamorphosis which American understandings of international law had 
experienced. More importantly, it demonstrated Great Britain’s willingness to make 
concessions for its foreign policy of abolitionism. For example, Edward Everett, 
Minister to Britain, asserted that the United States should, in good faith and policy, offer 
to join the Quintuple Treaty, in response to Britain’s retraction of impressment. In March 
1843, Everett wrote that if Great Britain had agreed “we should have carried a very great 
point, and it seems to me should have reconciled our people to coming into the 
Quintuple Treaty.”96 However, he also maintained that “if [Britain] did not agree, we 
should have put them decidedly in the wrong.”97 While Everett’s response demonstrates 
a change in American attitudes, the fact remains that impressment was an obsolete 
practice which lacked sufficient British support to initiate enforcement again. Moreover, 
bargaining the “right of search,” a contemporary policy, in return for the renunciation of 
an archaic practice would not have worked because the Royal Navy had not practiced 
impressment for some time. In the past, a compromise might have been struck, but it was 
far too late. Aberdeen had already considered this arrangement, but he did not believe it 
advisable because of it curtailed British power. Prior to the Webster-Ashburton 
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negotiations, Everett recounted a conversation with Aberdeen where he stated “we could 
settle everything, but for the question of impressment.”98 This dialogue demonstrated to 
Everett that opinion in Britain had shifted, which set the stage for an easy settlement 
because:  
Lord Aberdeen admitted the fact that a change had taken place, but said there 
 was still very much the same sensibility as to the right of impressment in 
 England, that there was on the subject of search, in the United States. He 
 admitted that there would be no disposition again to enforce on board American 
 vessels, the right claimed by England to the services of her subjects, but thought 
 there would be extreme difficulty in expressly renouncing it.99  
 
Webster utilized this knowledge, while meticulously preserving U.S. bargaining power 
regarding the “right of visit and search,” when he obtained a virtual, if not a formal, 
abandonment of impressment by Great Britain in Ashburton’s response to his note.  
Ultimately, Webster and Ashburton used the Paine-Bell agreement as their 
framework for the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, but they excluded the stipulation that 
when both nations’ cruisers were sailing together they had the right to detain one 
another’s vessels. Although Great Britain supported this clause, the United States could 
not accept this provision because it gave Britain a virtual “right of search.” Even if 
accompanied by the U.S. Navy, Webster knew that neither the American government 
nor public would agree to the arrangement because of the persistent fear of a renewed 
effort by the Royal Navy to impress U.S. citizens. By linking impressment to the “right 
of search,” it demonstrates that conversations surrounding impressment had lived on 
well into the 1840s, when it is often considered, by scholars, to have been (effectively) 
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settled by 1815.100 More importantly, the discussion of impressment during the treaty 
negotiations illustrates how the issue became linked to the policing of the transatlantic 
slave trade. Ironically, Americans wholeheartedly resented the act of impressment even 
though they willing allowed, protected, and, in some cases, actively participated in an 
institution that ripped individuals from their homes and forced them into bondage in 
foreign lands—the Atlantic slave trade. Furthermore, Ashburton and Aberdeen’s 
acknowledgement that impressment had disappeared because the Royal Navy and 
British society had rejected the practice, gestures to a major shift in British national and 
foreign policy in which abolitionism had now assumed an importance greater than the 
previously-vaunted “indefeasible” right to impress the Crown’s subjects.  
Interpreting Article Eight: Concluding the Controversy of the “Right of Search” 
While negotiating the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, both Webster and Ashburton 
anxiously attempted to reconcile the maritime dispute, without directly confronting the 
problem of the “right to visit.” However, their avoidance of the issue simply postponed 
the discussion because before the ink dried on the treaty, a vigorous international debate 
erupted over its slave trade provisions. The final copy of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty 
included an eighth article stipulating that each contracting party “shall prepare, equip, 
and maintain in service, on the coast of Africa, a sufficient and adequate squadron, or 
naval vessels, of suitable numbers and descriptions, to carry in all not less than eighty 
                                                 
100 For a traditional interpretation of this viewpoint, see Gilje, Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights. 
  
 
184 
guns.”101 This was the set minimum, which Ashburton assured “may and will increase,” 
but a nation had only to send the number of vessels required.102 Both squadrons were to 
be independent of one another, “the two governments stipulating nevertheless to give 
such orders to the officers commanding their respective forces, as shall enable them 
most effectually to act in concert and cooperation, upon mutual consultation, as 
exigencies may arise.”103 Although a compromise was achieved, the treaty was simply 
the same proposition John Quincy Adams had advanced twenty years earlier as an 
alternative to the “right of search,” which had been refused by Great Britain. The only 
differentiation was the size and permanence of the force sent to Africa. Prime Minister 
Peel and Foreign Secretary Aberdeen argued that Great Britain’s position remained 
unaffected and the empire retained the “right of visit.” In the United States, President 
Tyler and Secretary of State Webster saw the “right of visit” as a provision no longer 
needed because the U.S. government agreed to send cruisers to Africa to quell abuses of 
the American flag. But a powerful minority in the United States believed otherwise. This 
vocal faction asserted that the Tyler administration, while enhancing U.S. obligations 
abroad, had done nothing to obtain any subsequent concessions from Great Britain. 
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 In multiple messages to Congress, President Tyler outlined the official position 
of the United States. In his First Annual Message, on December 7, 1841, Tyler stated 
that “however desirous the United States may be for the suppression of the slave trade, 
they can not consent to interpolations into the maritime code at the mere will and 
pleasure of other governments.”104 Furthermore, Tyler insisted that American citizens 
operating under the U.S. flag and engaged in lawful commerce on the African coast were 
“not responsible for the abuse or unlawful use of that flag by others.”105 Consequently, if 
these vessels were “molested, and detained while pursing honest voyages…and violating 
no law…they are unquestionably entitled to indemnity.”106 In August 1842, while 
presenting the Webster-Ashburton Treaty to the Senate for consideration, Tyler 
expounded on his position regarding the eighth article. Here he argued that the United 
States must “execute its own laws [against the slave trade] and perform its own 
obligations by its own means and its own power.”107 More importantly, any 
“examination or visitation” of a nation’s merchant-vessels by another’s cruisers “for any 
purpose except those known and acknowledged by the law of nations…may lead to 
dangerous results.”108 Therefore, the United States in “accordance with the stipulations 
of the treaty of Ghent,” and in an effort to stop individuals from “violating the 
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immunities of the American flag” on the seas, need not fear the Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty because it contained “no alteration, mitigation, or modification of the rules of the 
law of nations.”109 Although this address illustrated Tyler’s explicit support of the 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty, it also revealed that the United States denied the existence of 
the “right of visit” in the law of nations. This denial eliminated all pretexts for such a 
violation of the law of nations now taken under Article Eight. Finally, in December 
1842, this position received official confirmation in Tyler’s Second Annual Message to 
Congress. During his speech, Tyler remarked that even though Aberdeen had “expressly 
disclaimed all right to detain an American ship on the high seas, even if found with a 
cargo of slaves on board,” and that British cruisers could only “visit and inquire,” his 
office could not discern how a “visit and inquiry could be made without detention.”110 
For him, Great Britain used the “right of visit” as a “new form” of the “right to search,” 
but “expressed in different words.”111 Yet, as a result of the treaty all pretenses were 
“removed for interference with our commerce for any purpose whatever by a foreign 
government.”112 In the end, the United States agreed to the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 
but, as Tyler’s messages indicate, the U.S. government continued to refute the idea that 
the “right of search” was part of the law of nations or that Britain had the right to search 
or visit its vessels.  
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 President Tyler’s remarks prompted an immediate and candid response from 
Foreign Secretary Aberdeen because it expressly undermined Britain’s foreign policy of 
abolitionism. He asserted that throughout the negotiation process Great Britain 
demanded no concessions, nor required the United States to make any over maritime 
policy. Aberdeen then pledged Britain to “fulfill the conditions of this engagement,” but 
from the “principles which she has constantly asserted, and which are recorded in the 
correspondence between the Ministers of the United States in this country and 
myself.”113 At the same time, Aberdeen reassured President Tyler that “Great Britain 
will always respect the just claims of the United States.”114 Great Britain had “no 
pretension to interfere in any manner whatever, either by detention, visit, or search, with 
vessels of the United States, known or believed to be such,” the Secretary stated.115 Yet, 
the British Empire would “maintain, and will exercise, when necessary, our right to 
ascertain the genuineness of any flag which a suspected vessel may bear.”116 Aberdeen 
also guaranteed that while exercising this right, whether it be from “involuntary error, or 
in spite of every precaution, loss or injury should be sustained, a prompt reparation will 
be afforded.”117 However, he asserted that entertaining the “notion of abandoning the 
right itself would be quite impossible.”118 
 Following Aberdeen’s response, Prime Minister Peel further defined Britain’s 
position in the House of Commons. During his address, Peel referred to President 
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Tyler’s message, as “that message, which, I am sorry to say, does not give a correct 
account of the negotiations relative to the right of visit.”119 In response to the President’s 
claim that the “right of visit” was the clever rephrasing of the “right of search,” Peel 
asserted:  
There is nothing more distinct than the right of visit and the right of search. 
 Search is a belligerent right, and not to be exercised in time of peace, except 
 when it has been conceded by treaty. The right of search extends not only to the 
 vessel, but to the cargo also. The right of visit is quite distinct from this, though 
 the two are often confounded. The right of search, with respect to American 
 vessels, we entirely and utterly disclaim…The right we claim is, to know 
 whether a vessel pretending to be American, and hoisting the American flag, be 
 bona fide American.120 
 
Peel continued that Britain had never abandoned the “right of visit,” and that the United 
States’ detachment of an eighty-gun naval force was not an “equivalent for any right 
which we claimed.”121 The United States, after all, “liberally [exercised] this right in the 
seas adjacent to their own coast.”122 As Peel noted, if a “Mexican vessel were to hoist 
the British flag under suspicious circumstances, the United States would not hesitate to 
exercise the right of exposing fraud.”123 Ultimately, Peel expressed his surprise that 
President Tyler made such assertions regarding the treaty. He also reminded the 
American executive that the United States practiced these same rights in its own waters. 
 The schism between the two nations had become so problematic over the treaty 
and the foreign policy of abolitionism that Webster embarked on a mission to reconcile 
the conflicting viewpoints. On February 24, 1843, Henry S. Fox, the British Minister, 
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wrote Aberdeen of a discussion he recently had with Webster. In this conversation, 
Webster recalled his astonishment at “what Sir Robert Peel had said in the Debate on the 
Address,” along with his misinterpretation of Tyler’s response to the treaty.124 More 
importantly, Webster asserted that “no discussion between Lord Ashburton and himself 
on the right of search [occurred]; and that the article of the treaty providing for the 
cruising squadrons was adopted with the hope” of ending present and future discussions 
on the issue.125 He also continued to defend the United States’ position in opposition to 
both search and visit because of the abuses experienced by merchant-vessels from 
cruiser interference. Lastly, Webster insisted that President Tyler did not give any 
“countenance to the idea that the American flag could protect anything but American 
vessels,” which is why the United States had “proposed a policy of its own, and for 
itself, which it was hoped would keep it clear of those controversies.”126 Fox did not 
accept Webster’s attempt at clarification. Instead, Fox deemed this explanation 
ambiguous and unacceptable. He remarked on “the awkwardness and confusion of 
meaning, which were so very evident throughout the whole statement.”127 In his 
subsequent dispatch, Fox commented that “in the beginning Mr. Webster sought to gain 
credit in America by putting forward one interpretation of the treaty,” but at the moment 
“he now seeks to recover his character for fair dealing with Great Britain by offering 
another interpretation.”128 Furthermore, President Tyler “may have been deceived into 
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thinking that the construction of the treaty most [favorable] to American pretensions was 
the true one.”129 
 By this point, Webster had committed to the idea that there was no fundamental 
difference between the British and American interpretations of the Article Eight. In the 
same February 25 letter, Fox reported on a Senate debate regarding the treaty stating: 
“Mr. Archer of Virginia, the Chairman of the Senate’s Committee of Foreign Affairs,” 
argued that the President had no intention to suggest the idea that “Great Britain had 
made any surrender of the right of visit, but only that an arrangement had been devised, 
which would effectually do away with all occasion for exercising that right.”130 Also, 
both President Tyler and Prime Minister Peel’s understanding of the Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty “are essentially the same, and that no just cause exists for misunderstanding or 
dispute.”131 Even with Archer’s comment, Fox maintained “it is not easy to construe the 
text of the President’s Message into an accordance with these explanations,” but if an 
official response by the president’s administration were produced it would “perhaps be a 
sufficient satisfaction to Her Majesty’s government.”132 
 Although Webster attempted to ease tensions, President Tyler’s interpretation of 
the Webster-Ashburton Treaty did not fit into this explanation. More importantly, as Fox 
contended, Tyler vigorously insisted that the “treaty most [favorable] to American 
pretensions was the true one,” even though Webster constantly claimed that Great 
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Britain had not conceded the “right of visit.”133 Several years later Tyler admitted there 
was “no express recognition” of Great Britain forfeiting the right in the correspondences 
between Webster and Ashburton, but his address illustrated the end to Britain’s claim 
and established the United States’ ability to uphold their own laws.134 Moreover, 
Whitehall’s approval of the Eighth Article “with the message before her was equivalent 
to a renunciation of the claim.”135 For this reason, Tyler, the most fiercely pro-southern 
and pro-slavery president, and his southern cadre endorsed the Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty because they believed that when Great Britain agreed to the convention Britain 
abandoned its claim to the “right of search.”136 More importantly, slaveholder approval 
of the accord also demonstrated that while they pursued a “vigorous foreign policy [of 
slavery] and a strong military establishment” to protect the institution at home and 
abroad, pro-slavery leaders were also “slow to clamor for actual war” because they were 
aware of the “unique danger war presented for a slave society.”137 Specifically, Southern 
slaveholders feared not knowing the outcome of a war with Great Britain, along with 
how open warfare would affect the institution of slavery.  
 Along with addressing complaints from Great Britain, the Tyler administration 
also faced internal attack from Democrats in Congress—led by Thomas Hart Benton—
who published their views in newspapers. Initial criticisms stoked partisan fears of a 
United States subservient to British interests and Whigs complicit in America’s 
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emasculation. Benton called the African Squadron, “the African tribute of men and 
ships” because “Great Britain was going to execute our laws for us if we did not execute 
them ourselves; and this squadron…was the price we had to pay…to escape search from 
Great Britain.”138 He also believed this was “a case for resistance, not for submission” 
for the United States.139 Furthermore, he argued that the Eighth Article was obviously a 
reprise of the illegitimate 1840 Tucker-Paine Agreement of joint-cruising.140 However, 
he misconstrued a major difference between the two accords. The former allowed a 
mutual right of seizure and detention, but the Webster-Ashburton Treaty specified that 
the cruisers enforce their national laws separately and independently. For Benton, any 
right claimed by Britain, whether it was termed visit or search, was inconsequential 
because any vessel forcibly detained was humiliating to Americans and harmful to the 
nation’s commerce. Lastly, the Tyler administration failed to obtain any explicit 
renunciation of the “right of search” by Britain, a failure that made the Webster-
Ashburton Treaty a major threat to the United States.  
 Future President James Buchanan had likeminded views of the Webster-
Ashburton Treaty’s eighth article. Although published in the Washington Globe after the 
discussions, Buchanan, during the August 1842 ratification debates, an editorial he 
published demanded that the article be deleted because “there is no reciprocity, except in 
name, in this article of the Treaty.” Like his colleague Benton, he considered it “the 
price paid to the British government for a relinquishment of its claim…[and] for the 
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privilege of not being searched by British cruisers.” However, Buchanan’s biggest fear 
revolved around both Great Britain and the United States’ right to void Article Eight 
after five years, and more specifically, the conditions which would be implemented after 
its nullification. He maintained that all the “arrogant and unjust pretensions of the British 
government to visit and examine American vessels will then revive” because the treaty 
did not include a clause renouncing these pretenses. The absence of such a stipulation 
strengthened Great Britain’s ability to reinstate the “right of search” because “we have 
purchased a temporary exemption from its exercise.” Ultimately, the United States had 
made a critical mistake because the Webster-Ashburton Treaty did not force Whitehall 
to “renounce the right of search, but have obtained from us an implied acknowledgment 
of the existence of such a right, by our engagement” in the treaty.141 Therefore, Great 
Britain’s foreign policy of abolitionism made a major breakthrough without weakening 
British international power.   
In February 1843, the same group of congressmen failed to cut appropriations 
from the Navy budget for the African Squadron.142 In their attempts to harass Tyler’s 
administration, the Democrats slightly reinvigorated American fears of the Royal Navy 
reengaging in activities that led to the War of 1812. Moreover, they considered the 
Eighth Article completely unbalanced because the United States’ new responsibilities 
would be difficult to execute, while Great Britain had made no comparable 
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concession.143 Furthermore, the fear of impressment made its way into discussions once 
again, despite Webster’s official decree that the United States would not tolerate this 
practice in the future and Ashburton’s confession that the custom had ended. Yet, the 
major question which still loomed was: if the “right of visit” allowed for an inspection of 
a vessel’s papers to justify the use of the American flag, what prevented the boarding 
officer from questioning the truthfulness of those papers, the flag, crew, and cargo? 
Therefore, after gaining access to ships to verify their nationality, might “he not insist on 
the propriety of ‘the verification of the nationality of the seamen?’ And, if he finds 
naturalized American sailors, whom he chooses to make his prey, will be not find law 
enough in his code to seize them, as soon as he would Africans on board a slaver?”144 In 
another article, a senator argued, “eighty guns was nothing to England who had twenty 
guns to our one.”145 In the end, criticism of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty bombarded 
the Tyler administration, which added to his already unpopular presidency.146 However, 
even the supporters of the accord did not agree on one particular issue—the “right of 
visit.” 
Although a large number of congressmen disapproved of the treaty, the 
agreement’s own backers were divided over the legality of the “right of visit.” Several 
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members of the House and Senate misinterpreted the differences between piracy in 
international law and existing laws addressing the slave trade. Specifically, they stressed 
that the “right of visit” was separate from the “right of search” in cases of alleged piracy. 
One congressman maintained that “if you deny the right, you must take the ground that 
the flag protects the ship: and if you find Turkish [colors] on a ship, that bears the name 
of the ‘Sarah Ann, of New York,’ on her stern, you have no right to visit her.”147 Others 
held opposing views, remaining categorical in their denial of the rights. Senator William 
Rives of Virginia, who voted for ratification, declared “that in time of peace, there is no 
right, in any case, on the part of a foreign cruiser, to interrupt or detain the vessels of 
another nation upon the high seas.”148 Besides, any ship on the high seas, “in time of 
peace, partakes of the inviolability of her territory; and that any entry on board such a 
vessel, without consent, is, in the eye of the law, a trespass.”149 Although he conceded 
the Royal Navy’s right to visit, detain, and search Portuguese, Spanish, and Brazilian 
vessels that had illegally flown the American flag, Rives did assert that those ships 
apprehended and investigated must actually have done what they were suspected of. 
Senator Rives also gestured towards a long overlooked part of maritime law:  
Every right, too, has its corresponding remedies. If British cruisers have the right 
 to visit and detain all flags they meet on the ocean, to satisfy themselves, by 
 personal examination, of their genuineness—they might enforce that right, in 
 case of any attempt to resist or evade it on the part of vessels sought to be visited, 
 by the summary naval remedies of capture and confiscation. This is the settled 
 maritime law, in regard to the right of search of neutral vessels in time of war. If 
 a neutral vessel attempt to resist or escape from the exercise of the right of 
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 search, she, by that fact alone, subjects herself to capture and condemnation as 
 lawful prize.150  
 
While this seemed to afford Great Britain a tremendous amount of naval authority, this 
law also asserted that the “same consequences would analogically attend the right of 
visit claimed by Great Britain in time of peace, if it exists (as she contends it does), 
under the law of nations.”151 Consequently, any British merchant-vessels on the high 
seas “unwilling to submit to the indignity and vexation of an inquisitorial visit from a 
British cruiser, might find herself punished,” which expanded the foreign policy of 
abolitionism even during a time of peace.152  
 Even though the legality of the “right of visit” was ambiguous, the supporters of 
the treaty insisted the eighth article negated the existence of that right. Senator Rives 
admitted the same point by quoting Foreign Secretary Aberdeen’s justification for the 
“right of visit,” specifically, that the “fact of the abuse of the American flag constitutes 
that reasonable grounds for suspicion which the law of nations requires in such a 
case.”153  However, when the United States takes steps to “prevent this abuse of their 
flag, by the employment of an adequate squadron…the visitation or detention of 
American vessels…must cease with it.”154 Lastly, ending such practices “requires no 
express agreement, under these circumstances to create the obligation of abstaining from 
the visitations and detentions of the American flag.”155 
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 As debates over the Webster-Ashburton Treaty grew ever more intense in 
Congress, President Tyler throughout 1843 provided further explanations in messages to 
the Senate and House of Representatives.156 In his address to the House, Tyler argued 
that the new declarations of Great Britain could cause “doubt whether the apparent 
difference between the two Governments is not rather one of definition than of 
principle.”157 More importantly, he said, the “right of search” was “disclaimed by Great 
Britain, but even that of mere visit and inquiry as asserted with qualifications 
inconsistent with the idea of a perfect right.”158 Tyler’s message referred to Aberdeen’s 
promise that if the British Navy unintentionally trespassed on American vessels, which 
had already happened in some cases, the British government would pay reparations. 
However, the promise of compensation was not enough to allow Britain the “right of 
visit” on American vessels because the eighth article fostered the creation of the African 
Squadron suitable enough for the enforcement of U.S. laws against the slave trade. Tyler 
also saw the eighth article as “removing all possible pretext on the ground of mere 
necessity to visit and detain our ships upon the African coast because of any alleged 
abuse of our own flag by slave traders of other nations.”159 Furthermore, when the 
United States rejected any nation’s “right to exercise any such general police over the 
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flag of independent nations, we did not demand of Great Britain any formal renunciation 
of her pretension; still less had we the idea of yielding anything ourselves in that 
respect.”160  
 After the publication of Tyler’s address, Senator Benton remarked that the 
President had misconstrued the treaty on both fronts, while another detractor complained 
of its “incautious admission…that Great Britain had any right whatever of visitation,” 
even in case of ordinary piracy.161 Nevertheless, the British minister Fox informed 
Aberdeen in March 1843, that the President Tyler, “after much hesitation, and with 
much circumlocution, does in fact recede, to a considerable extent, from the position 
which he had assumed in his annual Message of last December.”162 To demonstrate this 
argument, Fox pointed to the concluding paragraph in Tyler’s address, which stated the 
United States had not demanded Great Britain to concede any right. Because of this 
passage, Fox argued the “right of visit appears to remain nearly in the same condition as 
before the conclusion of the late Treaty—the United States persisting in their objection 
to the exercise of the right; but acknowledging that Great Britain has not agreed to 
relinquish it.”163 However, there was a “great probability” that the eighth article of the 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty would end the practice of the right.164 Yet, the heated debates 
surrounding the treaty did not end.  
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 On March 25, 1843, the Washington National Intelligencer published an article 
on the Slave Trade Convention of 1824 further fueling the apprehension of Benton and 
his supporters. This daily periodical, as Fox had earlier indicated to Aberdeen, 
“generally speaks Mr. Webster’s opinions,” and had regularly backed Webster 
throughout Senate debates on the treaty.165 Following the publication of the editorial, 
Fox recounted it to Aberdeen, where he stated:  
Mr. Webster informs me today, confidentially, that the…article was written by 
 himself…to show…that the chief political leaders…against the exercise by Great 
 Britain of the limited right of visit…did all of them, in 1824, vote for the 
 concession of that very right of search in its fullest extent.166  
 
If negotiations had not been ended due to arguments over “extending the exercise of the 
right to the coast of North America, the flag of the United States would for the last 
eighteen years, with their full consent, have been subject to that right of search.”167 Men 
presently against the current treaty, were “disinclined to make undue sacrifices for the 
abolition of the slave trade, [and] voted in the Senate, in 1824,” to concede to Great 
Britain the “right of search,” but exempting the United States coast.168 Even when 
Britain’s promoters of its foreign policy of abolitionism exposed partisan hypocrisy, it 
did not work to sway votes one way or another. Yet, by the end of March 1843, Webster 
had decided to address Aberdeen’s complaints regarding President Tyler’s interpretation 
of the eighth article. This explanation fostered the creation of a dispatch to Edward 
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Everett, the Minister to Britain.169 In this statement, Webster outlined the United States’ 
case against the “right of visit,” which Tyler later articulated, stating that the issue was 
subjected “to a close and searching revision. Every word was weighed and reweighed in 
Cabinet Council, and received my entire approval.”170 
In a letter to Everett, Webster admitted that throughout the discussions 
concerning the treaty, no concessions regarding the “right of visit” were a part of the 
1842 negotiations. Therefore, the only conceivable explanation for Article Eight was that 
“Great Britain had claimed as a right that which this government could not admit as a 
right, and, in the exercise of a just and proper spirit of amity, a mode was resorted to 
which might render unnecessary both the assertion and the denial of such claim.”171 This 
portion of Webster’s argument revolved around Congressional discussions, which 
argued, “what Lord Aberdeen calls a right of visit, and which he attempts to distinguish 
from the right of search, ought to have been expressly acknowledged by the government 
of the United States.”172 Yet, at the same time some congressmen thought that the 
“formal surrender of such right of visit should have been demanded by the United States 
as a precedent condition to the negotiation for treaty stipulations on the subject of the 
African slave trade.”173 Nevertheless, Webster maintained the treaty “neither asserts the 
claim in terms, nor denies the claim in terms; it neither formally insists upon it, nor 
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formally renounces it.”174 Ultimately, these stipulations did not exist, which meant the 
treaty met the demands of both nations.  
After demonstrating how the treaty met the approval of Great Britain and the 
United States, Webster addressed the issue of the legality of the “right to visit.” 
Referring to Prime Minister Peel’s speech on February 2, 1843, in which he articulated 
the difference between the “right of visit” and the “right of search,” Webster insisted that 
no clear distinction of their differences existed.175 What Great Britain and the United 
States understood by the belligerent “right of search” was referred to by continental 
writers and jurists as the “right of visit”’ As for the “right of visit” regarding ships 
“justly suspected of violating the law of nations by piratical aggression,” a definition 
excluding slave trading pirates, but those seen as pirates in municipal law, no “right of 
visit” existed.176 Instead, a full right of search and capture prevailed. In addition, 
Webster contended, Britain’s offer to compensate the United States if any American 
merchant vessels were mistakenly visited significantly damaged the claim of visit as a 
right. Specifically, he asserted that it “is not easy to perceive how these consequences 
can be admitted justly to flow from fair exercise of a clear right. If injury be produced by 
the exercise of a right, it would seem strange that it should be repaired, as if it had been 
the effect of a wrongful act.”177 Because the typical “rule of law certainly is, that, in the 
proper and prudent exercise of his own right, no one is answerable for undersigned 
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injuries.”178 Consequently, any type of compensation “implies, at least in its general 
interpretation, the commission of some wrongful act.”179  
Webster also assessed the possible effects expected from embracing the “right of 
visit.” Here he discussed an instance, already outlined by Senator Rives, of a legitimate 
American vessel, involved in lawful commerce, which chose not to be apprehended, and 
opposed a visit. Because any resistance to the belligerent “right of search” suffered the 
punishment of capture and condemnation, what would happen to this vessel? In response 
to this question, Webster argued that there was no distinguishable difference between the 
two, because a simple inspection of papers, without a supplemented examination of the 
crew, the vessel, and its cargo, a visit became useless.180 Ultimately, he concluded that 
the Royal Navy had “no right at all to detain an American merchant-vessel. This Lord 
Aberdeen admits in the fullest manner.”181 Any “detention of an American vessel by a 
British cruiser is therefore a wrong, a trespass; although it may be done under the belief 
that she was a British vessel…and the trespass therefore an involuntary trespass.”182 
Although compensation was guaranteed in cases such as this, a mere payment was not 
sufficient enough to repair any serious damages or inconveniences caused because the 
“amount of loss cannot be always well ascertained. Compensation, if it be adequate in 
the amount, may still necessarily be long delayed.”183 Besides, detentions such as these 
“produce nothing but ill effect on the amicable relations existing between the two 
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countries.”184 In the end, the United States government, although it has not granted a 
mutual right of visit or search does not admit that, “by the law and practice of nations, 
there is any such thing as a right of visit, distinguished by well-known rules and 
definitions from the right of search.”185 
Although Webster’s interpretation of the treaty appealed to international law and 
practices already in place, no “right of visit” existed. More importantly, even if the 
current situation prompted the development of such a right in international law, 
resistance by the United States made any modification of the laws impossible. Aberdeen 
recognized the validity of the argument, although Great Britain did not renounce their 
claim until 1858. After conveying the message to the Foreign Office, in an official 
dispatch dated April 27, 1843, Foreign Minister Everett wrote Webster, recounting the 
Foreign Secretary stating “he agreed with you in denying, that there is any distinction 
between a right of visit and right of search.”186 On the same day, Everett sent a private 
letter to Webster, which further detailed Aberdeen’s response. Here Everett illustrated 
how Aberdeen saw the treaty as an “excellent document,” which should not be altered.187 
Moreover, Aberdeen “concurred with [Webster] in the proposition that there is no such 
distinction as that between a right of search and a right of visit, [also] that he did not 
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agree with Sir Robert Peel on that point.”188 Consequently, this memo demonstrated that 
the British Foreign Secretary acknowledged there was no difference between the “right 
of search” and the “right of visit,” although he could not publicly admit it. This 
admission demonstrated that Britain had made a significant foreign policy concession in 
an effort to get the United States to enforce their anti-slave-trading laws and end abuses 
of American colors.  
Even though Aberdeen admitted that the treaty failed to add the “right of visit” to 
international law, the possibility of the Royal Navy stopping a ship flying American 
colors still existed. The only reason for this action to occur involved cases where vessels 
flew the American flag in hopes of fooling the British cruisers into thinking the ship did 
not belong to a nation that Great Britain had a “right to search” treaty with. Therefore, if 
detainment occurred, it happened not because of a right, but as a precaution. Yet, if the 
ship’s papers and crew proved its authenticity, then Britain paid reparations for the 
mistake. Although this was a tenuous solution, it remained acceptable only if trespasses 
remained few and irregular enough to not provoke dissent from the United States. 
However, this stability relied on the efficiency in which the United States performed its 
treaty obligations. The eighty-gun squadron implemented by the treaty had to regularly 
patrol the African coast, and if it accomplished this purpose, incidents between the Royal 
Navy and American merchant vessels would end. Nonetheless, if the treaty dissolved 
and abuses of the American flag resumed, British cruisers would unavoidably become 
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entangled in maritime disputes. Ultimately, America’s African Squadron had to subdue 
abuses of the American flag, which would in turn confine the British Navy to its 
“proper” sphere: namely, policing British ships and shipping lanes.  
Although British naval interferences occurred very rarely after 1842, a few 
incidents arose before the signing of the treaty, but they were quickly settled. After 1842, 
only one case contesting British visitation occurred before 1857.189 In January 1843, the 
Rhoderick Dhu, an American ship, was seized on the African coast. Three other cases 
also transpired during this time, but one was aboard a Spanish ship, while the others had 
entered British territorial waters, making their capture legal.190 Due to the infrequency of 
incidents, President Tyler, after his presidency in 1858, while discussing the “right of 
visit,” stated, “I would have fought against the claim, if after the treaty it had been 
exercised; but notwithstanding Peel’s bluster, the treaty, during my term, and for years 
after, extinguished the practice.”191 Ultimately, Great Britain’s foreign policy of 
abolitionism, through the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, ends up not only forcing the 
United States to enforce its anti-slaving laws, but also contributed to an important shift 
in international law de facto if not de jure—there would be no more arguments for the 
“right to search” or “right of visit” from Great Britain.  
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Although the eighth article had its flaws, the article was successful in its 
objectives because it demonstrated the change in international relations between Great 
Britain and the United States. By this time, the old American principle of freedom of the 
seas had ended. Britain’s navy continued to be the major maritime police force for the 
slave trade; its position only strengthened with the enumeration of an effective “right of 
search” power. Although never agreeing to the “right of search” or the “right of visit,” 
the United States consented to maintain a force of eighty guns to stop abuses of the 
American flag. So friendly were relations between Great Britain and the United States 
after the signing of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, that British Minister Henry S. Fox 
reported that during President Tyler’s December 1843 address, he did not mention the 
disputes regarding the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. Instead, Fox maintained, “the 
excitement and irritation upon these subjects, amongst the people of the United States at 
large, subsided.”192 The danger of the “same excitement being again raised” over those 
issues had dissipated.193 Ultimately, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty temporarily ended 
the long dispute between Great Britain and the United States over issues of “right to 
search” and “right to visit,” along with addressing slavers’ abuse of the American flag.  
The negotiations between Great Britain and the United States that transpired 
around the treaty illustrated major shifts in international relations regarding both 
countries. Until the passage of the treaty, the U.S. Navy had an occasional presence off 
the coast of Africa. It was only after 1842, that an increase in activity occurred, but the 
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location of the main base in the Cape Verde Islands often led to long stretches of time 
without an American presence off the major ports of embarkation. Consequently, the 
lack of an American presence allowed slaving vessels the opportunity hoist American 
flags when they encountered British cruisers. This absence did represent a major 
limitation in the global effort to end the slave trade, but the United States’ willingness to 
assign a permanent force to police the trade off the coast of Africa demonstrated a 
change in American attitudes towards the international slave trade. Although this about-
face in the United States’ position resulted from several embarrassing cases where 
American vessels were captured by British cruisers violating American laws, 
enforcement and punishment of American citizens involved in the trade increased. At the 
same time, abuses of the American flag decreased.  
Along with agreeing to establish a stable African Squadron and reduce the use of 
American colors to avoid detainment by the Royal Navy, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty 
demonstrated Whitehall had made the decision to take a harder stance than it had 
previously against the United States because of continued abuses of American anti-
slaving laws. On the high seas this resulted in British cruisers detaining vessels adorned 
with American colors and, on certain occasions, escorting captured ships to U.S. ports. 
Furthermore, Whitehall continued to criticize the U.S. government’s failure to enforce 
the nation’s anti-slave-trading laws. Of course these denunciations aroused the ire of 
Peel and Aberdeen’s counterparts in the United States. In the end, both countries’ 
rhetorical posturing regarding the slave trade devolved into mere saber-rattling because 
the negotiators of the treaty had to make concessions.  
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Although Great Britain and the United States publicly drew a line in the sand 
over issues involving the policing of the slave trade, at the negotiating table both Foreign 
Minister Ashburton and Secretary of State Webster were willing to sacrifice to a certain 
extent each nation’s anti-slavery principles for the “greater good” of global 
commerce.194 In their initial discussions, subjects such as the “right of search,” “right of 
visit,” and impressment were avoided due to the controversial history associated with 
each topic. However, the bravado of each nation’s leaders and representatives forced 
these issues to the forefront of international politics and debates. Luckily, both men’s 
determination to reach a successful compromise permitted them to encourage their 
prospective leaders to privately relax each nation’s stance on these issues. On the one 
hand, Great Britain’s leadership acknowledged that the practice of impressing sailors on 
the high seas did not fit with the laws of Britain nor its navy. Moreover, Whitehall 
agreed to pay reparations to the United States if the Royal Navy mistakenly detained an 
American merchant vessel. Both of these concessions demonstrated that Great Britain’s 
foreign policy of abolitionism had reached the limit of its capacity to influence 
policymaking. On the other hand, the American government agreed to send a squadron 
comprised of eighty-guns to patrol the African coast in an effort to end abuses of the 
American flag and assist in policing the slave trade. The United States’ willingness to 
sign the treaty, as Matthew Karp asserts, demonstrated how pro-slavery leaders utilized 
the “most forceful possible diplomacy short of actual war” in an effort to “combat 
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British antislavery.”195 American leaders, in other words, feared the potentially 
devastating effects a war with their largest trading partner might produce. More 
importantly, it illustrates that America’s foreign policy of slavery was malleable enough 
to accommodate Britain’s foreign policy of abolitionism and its demands regarding the 
slave trade, so long as that compromise protected the U.S.-Anglo trade agreements. This 
flexibility did not mean U.S. slaveholders relaxed their efforts against British 
abolitionism. For the time being, however, the two most powerful nations within the 
Atlantic basin had reached a compromise. A compromise that Southern slaves ultimately 
paid the price: peaceful Anglo-American relations facilitated the flow of cotton and 
capital, which meant misery for millions of U.S. slaves.
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
After the British Empire abolished its own slave trade in 1808, it adopted a 
foreign policy of abolitionism, thereby initiating a decades-long struggle to police the 
African slave trade, and, more importantly, end international involvement in the trade 
through diplomatic negotiations. By 1823, the French, Spanish, and Portuguese empires 
had shrunk considerably because of war and revolution, causing colonial slavery to 
decline in most places save for Brazil (which became independent from Portugal in 
1822), Cuba and Puerto Rico, Texas, and the Southern United States. While Great 
Britain was not the only nation to abolish their trade in 1808 (the American slave trade 
officially ended at the same time), Great Britain became the leading promoter of 
abolitionism abroad through its efforts to end the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Yet, this 
monumentally difficult mission met immense opposition at every turn because both the 
slave trade and slavery had become essential to the economic success of those nations 
still engaged in the trading and enslavement of human beings.   
 By the mid-1830s and early 1840s, Great Britain had successfully advanced its 
mission to end the trans-Atlantic slave trade by utilizing the foreign policy of 
abolitionism through a series of treaties with several nations. The Anglo-Spanish Treaty 
of 1835 declared the Spanish slave trade “totally and finally abolished,” but more 
importantly, included the equipment clause allowing “visit” and condemnation of 
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merchant-vessels if specific equipment appeared onboard.1 In 1842, several years after 
the Texas Revolution, Great Britain signed a treaty with the budding Texas Republic 
granting a reciprocal “right of search.” In the same year, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty 
created the United States’ African Squadron, a flotilla which added to Great Britain’s 
naval presence once it was deployed to the African coast. These achievements illustrate 
that the slave trade had reached a critical-juncture in its history because Great Britain 
had gained permission to search the vessels of most nations if suspected of slaving. And 
Britain, moreover, was no longer alone in policing the trade. Ultimately, Great Britain’s 
foreign policy of abolitionism achieved a major victory, but that triumph was tested at 
every turn.   
Confronting the Sugar Colony: Britain, Spain and the Cuban Slave Trade 
When Spain signed the Treaty of 1835, it threatened Cuba’s supply of slaves by 
placing a target on all vessels and slavers using the Spanish flag. In 1835, the same year 
of the treaty, the Spanish trade to Cuba had reached an all-time high, landing 24,959 
slaves on the island.2 Therefore, the Anglo-Spanish treaty came at time when the slave 
trade to Cuba was not only flourishing but expanding. The British West African 
Squadron saw the new treaty as a blessing because the agreement expanded its authority 
immensely. Between 1830 and 1835, the Royal Navy captured an average of ten Spanish 
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slaving vessels a year, all with slaves onboard.3 Once the treaty took effect, the 
squadron’s average rose to thirty-five between 1835 and 1839.4 Thus, the numbers of 
slaves transported to Cuba gradually declined throughout the end of the 1830s, with only 
one increase occurring in 1838.5 This begs the question: why did Whitehall send David 
Turnbull to Cuba?  
As the data illustrates the trade to Cuba fell very slowly after the passage of the 
1835 treaty because Spain continued to protect the slave trade. This slow decline also 
spoke to both the ingenuity of slave traders who found loopholes in the treaty and the 
Spanish commissioners on the Court of Mixed Commission who dragged their feet on 
the question of enforcement. The actions and inaction taken by Spain, the slavers, and 
commissioners, set the stage for Foreign Secretary Palmerston to send an ardent 
abolitionist to Cuba—David Turnbull. Although his tenure as Consul and Superintendent 
of Liberated Africans was short, the slave trade decreased drastically during Turnbull’s 
time on the island. In 1840, when Turnbull arrived, approximately 17,739 slaves entered 
Cuba, but when he departed in 1842, the amount had fallen to 4,739.6 However, 
Whitehall could only let Turnbull and the foreign policy of abolitionism go so far. In late 
1842, after losing his consulship and leaving Cuba, Turnbull’s quest to end the slave 
trade revealed the limits of Great Britain’s commitment to abolitionism.  
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Throughout his tenure as Consul, Turnbull attempted to investigate reports that 
free Africans had been abducted from the Bahamas and enslaved in Cuba. After arriving 
in Nassau, Turnbull recommenced his investigation where he learned that British 
subjects in an area between Gibara and Holguin, commonly known as English Cuba, had 
received and re-enslaved several hundred Bahamian freed-people to work their 
plantations. Prompted by the hope of restoring liberty to former British slaves, Turnbull 
deceived the son of the Spanish Consul in New Providence into giving Turnbull his 
passport. Afterwards, he chartered a sloop captained by a former smuggler and crewed 
partly by free blacks. In October 1842, less than two months after his departure, Turnbull 
landed in the city of Gibara near Matanzas. An Englishman in the area recalled that the 
former consul’s visit was “strange [and] it did a great deal of harm by unsettling the 
negroes.”7 Already on the lookout for him, the Cuban authorities immediately seized 
Turnbull, his black servant, and their belongings. They sent them to Holguin, where the 
Lieutenant-Governor informed Captain-General Valdes. Valdes then had both men 
transferred to Havana. Once in Havana, a subsequent investigation found Anabaptist 
literature from the Baptist Missionary Society referencing Leviticus 25:10, which spoke 
of proclaiming liberty throughout the land.8 The discovery of these materials reaffirmed 
Spanish fears that Turnbull, having no official post, had chosen to return to Cuba to 
spread his rebellious doctrines and plan a violent slave revolution. Disturbed by 
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Turnbull’s initial visit and fearful of another, sixteen immigrant planters from the United 
States and the British West Indies, residing in the area where Turnbull had landed, 
petitioned the Captain-General for protection from the British threat.9 Even the British 
Consul Crawford saw Turnbull’s actions as problematic, but the formidable abolitionist, 
never faltering in his crusade, insisted the Spanish government compensate him for his 
imprisonment. Although the Foreign Office did not support Turnbull’s demands, 
considered his conduct inexcusable, and were suspicious of him, Aberdeen expressed his 
regret for Turnbull’s suffering in a later letter to the abolitionist.10 
While in prison, another incident occurred further solidifying Turnbull’s 
reputation as an instigator to the Cuban officials. Spanish authorities arrested the British 
mulatto Mitchell who claimed Turnbull as his protector. During his trial, the Cuban 
Military Commission discovered that Mitchell came from Africa, not the British West 
Indies.11 Crawford intervened on Mitchell’s behalf, arguing that there was no evidence 
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pointing to the mulatto’s involvement in seditious activities.12 Nevertheless, the Spanish 
sentenced Mitchell to death on the charge of inciting insurrection among the slaves. 
Although later commuted to life imprisonment, Mitchell’s association with the British 
and Turnbull resulted in this harsh sentence. Valdes utilized the case of Mitchell as 
evidence to support his unbreakable conviction that Turnbull needed to leave the 
Caribbean permanently. No matter where Turnbull resided in the West Indies, “he will 
not give up his plans and in spite of constant vigilance he might succeed sometime in an 
unforeseen manner.”13 The Captain-General’s colleagues at the Ministry of Marine and 
Colonies in Madrid agreed and they prepared to authorize Valdes to try and sentence 
Turnbull according to Spanish law “with the appropriate penalty, even if it is the 
ultimate” should the abolitionist ever come to Cuba again.14 The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs suggested that the threat of death be omitted because they did not want colonial 
officials to execute a former British consul, which would undoubtedly bring the full 
weight of Britain down on Spain.15  
 Luckily for Turnbull, since he had no official position, his trial ended with his 
permanent expulsion from Cuba. In fact, the passport issued to Turnbull by the Spanish 
Vice-Consul at Nassau saved his life because the European population had pressured 
Valdes to execute him. Valdes labeled Turnbull’s actions as subversion because they 
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went “against the social order of the island of Cuba.”16 Specifically, Turnbull wanted to 
“introduce disorder among the slave gangs on the estates,” which by his own 
“declaration ‘that many others had a right to their liberty,’” might cause the slaves to rise 
up in rebellion.17 Disregarding his own desire to execute Turnbull, Valdes, to his 
subsequent expense, banished the abolitionist from Cuba. But Valdes warned that if 
Turnbull returned, “he will be dealt with as a disturber of the public peace.”18 
“Thousands turned out to see the fellow off” as Spanish officials escorted Turnbull to the 
steamer Thames on November 6. Allegedly before his departure, Turnbull promised that 
he would “yet be martyred to the cause.”19 Crawford wrote to the Foreign Office after 
Turnbull left Cuba, asserting “[Turnbull] will not long be still where he is but will 
meddle with what does not concern him very soon or make some exaggerated and 
offensive misrepresentation of someone or something which will give trouble.”20 Since 
he still had powerful allies in Great Britain, Foreign Secretary Aberdeen did not concede 
to Spanish wishes and recall Turnbull to London. Instead, he gave Turnbull a judgeship, 
where he served seven years, on the Court of Mixed Commission in Jamaica in 
accordance with an Anglo-Portuguese anti-stave trade treaty. Because of this 
appointment, Spanish agents closely monitored Turnbull’s activities. Although Aberdeen 
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did not remove Turnbull from the Caribbean, he did abolish the office of Superintendent 
of Liberated Africans.21 Yet, even with this concession, the Spanish government, hearing 
of Turnbull’s move to Jamaica and fearing the worst, recommenced their movement to 
have Aberdeen remove Turnbull from the Antilles.22 Valdes saw no other reason for 
Turnbull’s move to Jamaica “than his definite mission to cause insurrection in this island 
in order to carry forward his abolitionist ideas.”23 However, the Spanish authorities did 
not know that Aberdeen had warned Turnbull to be mindful of his actions once he 
arrived in Jamaica. In a November 1842 letter to Turnbull, acknowledging his “zeal” to 
end the slave trade and the reasoning behind his removal from Cuba, Aberdeen informed 
Turnbull of his intentions to give “the first suitable employment” opportunity to him, but 
with one caveat.24 Aberdeen asserted that Turnbull’s new post necessitated “calmness, 
impartiality, and discretion in your conduct. [Furthermore] the absence of these qualities, 
in your former Office, have sometimes been noticed by my Predecessor, as well as by 
Myself.”25 Having Turnbull in Jamaica was hardly any better than him being in Havana, 
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which meant Turnbull’s transfer had done nothing to ease mounting Cuban anxieties of 
British abolitionism.  
In March 1843, the slaveholders’ greatest fears came to fruition when a massive 
slave rebellion erupted in Matanzas, the center of Cuba’s slave-based sugar economy. 
The uprising was quickly and violently put down, but it inaugurated a massive wave of 
unrest and repression in 1844: the so-called conspiracy of La Escalera. Because of 
widespread repression and violence in 1844, the entire year has been labeled el Ano del 
Cuero—the Year of the Lash—in Cuban history. Although Turnbull had been forcibly 
removed and La Escalera ushered in a period of unprecedented brutality in Cuba, it is 
important to examine the number of slaves taken to Cuba in the years during these 
events and after. In 1843 and 1844, the slave trade brought 8,012 and 9,897 slaves into 
Cuba following Turnbull’s departure and during the Year of the Lash.26 However, the 
numbers dropped to 2,865 in 1845, and to their lowest point ever in 1846, when only 432 
slaves entered the sugar colony.27 While Turnbull was not singlehandedly responsible 
for this significant drop, his presence became a catalyst to the Cuban abolitionist 
movement by tapping into long-standing grievances and abolitionist sentiment among 
Cuba’s population of enslaved people. More importantly, the drop in the amount of 
slaves to Cuba after the Anglo-Spanish treaty in 1835, even though there were increases 
in certain years, demonstrates that Great Britain’s foreign policy of abolitionism had 
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succeeded in Cuba during the 1830s and 1840s. However, this tremendous achievement 
had its limits because 1846 marked the end of diminished slave importations into Cuba. 
The following year initiated several years of intensified slave trading, and the numbers 
increased every year, but one until 1859.28  Ultimately, the foreign policy of abolitionism 
had to wait nearly three decades after Turnbull left Cuba to see the slave trade end in 
Cuba.  
Texas Joins the Union: Britain and Charles Elliot’s Failure to Thwart Texas’ 
Annexation  
 
 The Mexican Constitution of 1824 combined the provinces of Texas and 
Coahuila, after the successful conclusion of the Mexican War of Independence in 
September 1821, forming the state Coahuila y Tejas.29 Due to the lack of residents, the 
Mexican government relaxed previously stringent immigration policies, which in turn 
allowed Anglos from the United States to legally migrate to the region. These new 
immigrants mostly came from the southern United States, resulting in an influx of slaves 
in Texas. By bringing their slaves and families with them, white Southerners quickly 
outnumbered the Tejanos (Mexican-born residents of Texas).30 As the 1820s ended, the 
region teetered on the brink of rebellion because in 1829 the Mexican government 
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abolished slavery in the republic.31 In response to possible revolt, President Anastasio 
Bustamante implemented the Laws of April 6, 1830, which banned further immigration 
to Texas from the United States, but, more importantly, reiterated the abolition of 
slavery.32 Because no effective enforcement mechanism existed to impose the new 
statutes, settlers either circumvented or ignored the laws, resulting in the population of 
Anglos in Coahuila y Tejas reaching about 30,000 by 1834.33 Furthermore, the slave 
population reached nearly 5,000 by the end of 1835.34 Continued unrest and the eventual 
governmental crackdown led to the outbreak of the Texas Revolution, which concluded 
with the founding of the Republic of Texas in 1836. 
 Once Texas gained its independence, the fledgling nation’s constitution quickly 
legalized the institution of slavery. However, the new government did outlaw the 
importation of slaves by sea, which slavers easily circumvented because Texas lacked an 
efficient navy. Violations of the anti-slaving law became so frequent that by the summer 
of 1837, Texas appealed to the United States to send cruisers to police the coast in 
response illegal slave importations. The U.S. government obliged and sent a naval 
squadron to the Gulf of Mexico to stop the flow of slaves into Texas and the United 
States from Cuba. Although the Texas constitution ended the slave trade by sea and the 
U.S. squadron aided in ending the illicit trade, the constitutional stipulation and naval 
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enforcement did not forbid the introduction of slaves into Texas by overland routes.35 
Therefore, the slave population in Texas steadily increased until the republic joined the 
Union in 1845, even though Great Britain had gained the “right of search” on Texas 
vessels and the charismatic charge d’affaires Charles Elliot had (at least temporarily) 
convinced Mexico to recognize Texas independence. 
 In February 1845, Elliot’s fear had come to fruition. It was at this time that the 
United States Congress approved the Brown Resolution, which authorized Texas 
annexation.36 To further complicate matters on March 4, 1845, Jackson’s protégé James 
K. Polk assumed his position as the president of the United States. In his inaugural 
address, Polk claimed that annexation was a matter “belonging exclusively to the United 
States and Texas.”37 At the time of his inauguration, it appeared that Polk would be the 
president who finally brought the Texas Republic into the Union. Texas experienced 
continued conflict with Mexico, Indians, and economic hardships; the republic had never 
completely succeeded in establishing itself as a power in the American Southwest. The 
vast majority of Anglo-Texans enthusiastically anticipated annexation, hoping that 
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statehood would bring the capital and white immigration thought essential to the 
region’s growth. 
 Several obstacles to the merging of the republics persisted. Mexican officials had 
warned that any effort by the United States to annex Texas, which it continued to assert 
as its own, would represent an act of war. Yet the most serious potential impediment, as 
far as the United States government was concerned, was the ambivalent position the 
republic’s leaders took regarding the congressional resolution. Texas’s president, Anson 
Jones, insinuated that he and the “Majority of the intelligent portion of this Community 
[preferred] the preservation of their separate National existence.”38 Furthermore, his 
predecessor, Sam Houston, whose associations with the British government provoked 
the Tyler administration into annexation talks in the first place, saw the annexation bill 
as a “source of great mortification and disappointment.”39 
In 1844, the British government’s actual (and perceived) attempts to entangle 
itself in the matters of the Texas Republic had produced in both Texas and the United 
States apprehension and suspicion of both the Peel government and its representative in 
Texas. Concern over British duplicity drove the annexation movement from the 
beginning, but by now it had become entrenched, invigorated by the commonly-held 
belief among American expansionists that Texas might be seized by Britain. Naturally, 
American Anglophobes embellished the magnitude of British influence. Yet, in Elliot 
they found confirmation of British malfeasance for which they had searched.  
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Since his initial arrival in August 1842, Elliot devoted all of his energy to 
promoting a stable and independent Texas. However, his efforts were unsuccessful 
because of Mexico’s continued denial of the republic’s sovereignty. Yet, by 1845 a 
major policy shift in Mexico City offered a glimmer of hope. The pro-annexation 
platform and outcome of the recent U.S. presidential election proved to Mexican 
president Santa Anna that the annexation of Texas was inevitable. In a final desperate 
move to avoid unification, he was finally prepared to acknowledge what had been 
evident for several years—that Texas was an independent republic and not a rebellious 
province of Mexico.40 This surprising shift in policy offered the “Foreign Office reason 
to believe that, even at this late stage, the westward ambitions of the United States could 
still be thwarted.”41 Therefore, in late January, Elliot received new directives from 
London, requesting him to convince the Texas government to “abstain from any act on 
their part” regarding annexation until Mexico’s new stance could be investigated.42 
Aware of the Brown Resolution, Elliot made his way to Washington-on-the-
Brazos accompanied by the French minister, Alphonse Dubois de Saligny. Upon their 
arrival, they met with President Anson Jones, who decided to postpone action on the 
impending U.S. offer for ninety days.43 The arrangement, known as the Jones 
Memorandum, allowed the two European powers time to acquire recognition of Texas’s 
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sovereignty by the Mexican government.44 Because Britain had advocated regularly that 
Mexico recognize the independence of Texas, the proposition itself was not especially 
notable.  Yet, the way in which the agreement was transmitted to Mexico City rose 
alarm. Convinced that the situation called for drastic measures, Elliot proposed to carry 
the memorandum to its government himself. These actions alone represented a serious 
departure from his directives, but Elliot went further and recommended a plan that was 
dramatic. He would travel to Mexico City anonymously and, with the British minister 
there, acquire Mexico’s official endorsement of Texas’s independence. Not paying 
attention to the political climate, Elliot believed that the republic would willingly reject 
the United States annexation offer if it had nothing to fear from Mexico.  
Although Elliot thought his plan would be successful, his superiors in London 
were cognizant of the political atmosphere and knew that even the smallest indication of 
British meddling would be enough to propel American expansionists into bouts of 
apoplexy. Aberdeen and the prime minister suspected the mission would not stay secret 
for long, and if exposed would cause greater damage to British interests in the western 
hemisphere than if Elliot had done nothing. If known to the public, Elliot’s intrigues 
would electrify the passions of American Anglophobes who had always suspected 
Britain of interfering in their affairs. However, both Peel and Aberdeen failed to restrain 
their overzealous consul, who had already put his plan into motion. After meeting with 
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President Jones, Elliot returned to Galveston where, in discussions with the city’s well-
known citizens, he revealed his plans to travel to Charleston, South Carolina, to visit 
family. On April 5, Elliot embarked on his journey to the United States from Galveston 
Bay on the British ship Electra. Yet, once the ship was out of sight of land, the 
ambassador transferred to another British vessel, the Eurydice, a warship captained by 
his cousin, George Elliot. Six days later, the Eurydice arrived in Vera Cruz, where 
Charles Elliot, his face concealed by a large white hat, disembarked and, in the company 
of his cousin, rushed toward Mexico City.45 
As British officials feared, Elliot’s plans went awry almost immediately. The 
pair’s activities drew the attention of U.S. citizens in Vera Cruz, and by the end of the 
month, the State Department received word that “Capt. Elliot, the British agent,” was in 
Mexico.46 But Elliot was so meticulous in his planning and played the part so well that 
the State Department disregarded the report, presuming that the individual cited in the 
communication was George Elliot, the diplomat’s relative. In the Mexican capital, 
however, events conspired against the Elliot. By the time they arrived, Mexican 
president Santa Anna had lost power and his replacement, Jose Joaquin Herrera, who 
lacked the public backing to begin any major policy initiatives of his own, submitted the 
Jones Memorandum to Congress. There it met stiff resistance from legislators still 
resentful over the loss of Mexico’s northern territory. For three weeks it deliberated 
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before consenting to the proposal, thus officially conceding, nine years after San Jacinto, 
that Texas was independent.  
Yet back in the Republic of Texas, annexation, not continued independence, was 
the topic of discussion. After Elliot left Texas, support for the Brown Resolution began 
to crystalize, particularly considering continued—although, still ambiguous—reports 
that the Texian government was secretly cooperating with the British to sustain Texas’s 
independence. By May, President Jones bent to the will of the people and called for a 
convention to be held on July 4 to vote on the United States’ proposal. In the meantime, 
sightings of Elliot in Mexico continued to be received with skepticism in Texas and the 
United States. Even the New Orleans Daily Picayune, a newspaper always on the 
lookout for British duplicity, at first lent little credibility to these reports. Nevertheless, 
there was correspondence published from a reporter illustrating that the British diplomat 
truly was on assignment in Mexico and representing Texas. It was not until these reports 
were corroborated that the paper gave any official attention to the incident, 
supplemented by an editorial denunciation of British deception and scheming.47 Elliot’s 
cover had been blown.  
By the time Elliot returned to Galveston at the end of May, he found the city 
wracked by turmoil regarding his secret mission. Newspapers that had previously 
ignored reports of Elliot sightings in Mexico now publicized any information on him, 
which further contributed to confusion and an aura of mystery to the affair. Furthermore, 
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the Texas National Register asserted that the “‘Man of the White Hat,’ the mysterious 
agent, the secret Texian commissioner, was certainly [in Mexico], if he ever was 
anywhere.”48 The identity of this enigmatic figure, who had been seen sporting a large 
white hat, became the topic of immense speculation in the Southern press. It would be 
several weeks before the Texas government disclosed that no Texas agent accompanied 
Elliot to Mexico; it was then that it became obvious that the now-infamous ‘man in the 
white hat’ was none other than Elliot himself.49  
In the end, Elliot’s melodramatic last-ditch effort to gain Mexican recognition for 
the Texas Republic had come too late to be afforded significant consideration by most 
Texans, whose minds by early summer of 1845 had been made up. They had never put 
much stock in Mexican peace proposals, particularly considering that country’s 
confrontational posturing since annexation discussions became public in the spring of 
1844. Because of constant Mexican troop movements below the Rio Grande and 
speculations of an approaching invasion reported in the papers, few Anglo-Texans were 
motivated to view the initial accord Elliot brought back from Mexico as a satisfactory 
substitute for annexation. 
Amidst the uproar caused by the British charge d’affaires’ mission to Mexico, 
what little support there was for Texas’s independence disappeared. By this time, only 
the Texas National Register advocated for continued independence, noting that if “Elliot 
[had] procured our recognition from Mexico two years ago he might have defeated 
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annexation for years to come.”50 The editors also argued that Texans who saw any action 
taken by Great Britain as a threat misinterpreted Elliot’s actions. “Americans have one 
passion,” they wryly noted, “[which was their] jealousy of England; and Texians 
[inherited] it.”51 In mid-May the former Texas President Sam Houston openly professed 
his support for the Brown Resolution, contending that his friendship with Great Britain 
had all been purely a ploy and that he had “coquetted a little” with its government in an 
effort to rouse the jealousy of the United States.52 In May, the dying Jackson penned to 
his protégé in the white house, “all safe…I knew British gold could not buy Sam 
Houston.”53 
On the African Coast: The U.S. African Squadron Policies the Slave Trade 
 Once Great Britain and the United States agreed to the terms outlined in the 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty, President Martin Van Buren revived the U.S. naval patrols 
on the African coast. Matthew Perry was selected to lead the new force, which consisted 
of the flagship Saratoga and four other vessels. Although Perry had previously visited 
the coast in the 1820s, he had turned a blind eye to the evidence of slave trading, and, 
keenly, prevented ships flying American colors from being searched by British cruisers. 
Furthermore, Perry established the squadron’s base of operation in the Cape Verde 
Islands which, though offering a healthier climate than coastal Africa, was too far from 
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the centers of the traffic to be effective.54 More importantly, none of the U.S. vessels 
were concerned with equipment clauses regarding the traffic. Instead, their primary 
mission revolved around protecting American trade, which the Secretary of Navy John 
Mason told Perry’s replacement, Admiral Charles Skinner: “The rights of our citizens 
engaged in lawful commerce are under the protection of our flag. And it is the chief 
purpose, as well as the chief duty of our naval power, to see that those rights are not 
improperly abridged.”55 Ultimately, Perry and his successors lacked both abolitionist 
zeal and any official orders to effectively curtail the slave trade.  
 Eventually, Admiral Skinner succeeded Perry in 1844, and Captain Andrew Hull 
Foote replaced him in 1849. Nevertheless, after a while, the squadron’s presence on the 
coast meant slave ships began to be captured by the United States. In 1845, the Yorktown 
seized the Pons, which had 896 slaves onboard. The following year, Lieutenant Bisham 
of the Boxer captured the Malaga, an auxiliary to the slave trade. The criminal case 
against it fell through, however, because no proof existed of slaving on the part 
auxiliaries, which never carried slaves. The slaving vessel Senator also experienced 
detainment by Bisham, but was released. Eventually, the Senator took on 900 slaves, 
300 of which died on the Middle Passage. In the end, the owners of the Malaga sued 
Bisham for false arrest. Therefore, naval officers had no incentive to energetically 
pursue the enforcement of anti-slaving laws. In spite of these obstacles, the Africa 
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Squadron continued to patrol. In 1848, Lieutenant O.H. Berryman, on the Onkahye, 
detained the U.S. whaler Laurens. In the same year, Lieutenant Commander William W. 
Hunter of the Allegheny, seized the Louisa and Juliet although neither had slaves 
onboard. Ultimately, the United States’ squadron captured twenty-eight slaving vessels 
between 1844 and 1854.56  
 Even with this limited success, the American naval patrol was easily 
circumvented. In 1853, a British diplomat in Washington, John Crampton reported that 
“the United States naval officers are zealous enough in capturing slavers, but the force is 
so small.”57 Furthermore, the “difficulty of getting slavers condemned by Admiralty 
courts when captured…is another encouragement to the slave traders.”58 Crampton also 
argued that the guarantee of a conviction appeared “much greater in the northern states 
which profess abolitionism, than in the south, where slavery exists. However, northern 
shipbuilders interested in earning a profit from the slave trade, the minister maintained, 
continued to furnish “by far the greatest part of the vessels under whatever flag they 
afterwards sail.”59 Between 1840 and 1845, sixty-four ships constructed in the United 
States were bought and sold in Rio alone and, during the same time, fifty-six vessels left 
or entered the same port for or from Africa.60  
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 Although Americans continued to furnish a large portion of the ships used in the 
slave trade, the United States Navy during the 1850s began to have some success 
detaining vessels engaged in the Cuba trade. In 1853-54, Commander Isaac Mayo of the 
Constitution detained the Gambrill, which was about to load a shipment of slaves. Then, 
in 1854, Lieutenant Richard Page, on the Perry, captured the Glamorgan. It was also in 
the 1850s, that both the Royal Navy and the United States Navy began a joint-cruising 
operation, even though “the flagships of the American and British squadrons on the 
coast in the years 1855, 1856, and part of 1857 met only once and that at sea.”61  
 In 1857, the quest against the slave trade experienced a renaissance. Between 
January 1857 and 1858, the Royal Navy captured twenty-one slavers, while American, 
Spanish, and even Portuguese patrols seized six.62 However, the British public once 
again pressed Whitehall to end the Cuban trade. On May 25, 1857, the London Times 
published an article arguing for the British government to implement a blockade of 
Cuba’s ports. Despite the British public’s renewed interest and condemnation of inaction 
regarding the Cuban slave trade, the Royal Navy, in April 1858, began harassing 
American vessels in Cuban waters, starting with the Cortez. By the end of May, British 
officials boarded 116 ships, of which sixty-one were American-owned. These drastic 
measures demonstrated to both northern and southern states that Great Britain had had 
enough of American involvement in the Cuban slave trade.  
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 Great Britain’s actions, before the outbreak of the Civil War, saw calls from 
southern slaveholders to reopen the slave trade to the United States. While ideas such as 
this were not new—the Courier had proposed it in 1839—it was not until the 1850s that 
the suggestion appeared with any regularity. In 1853, the editor of the Standard, 
Leonidas Spratt, and Robert Barnwell Rhett of the Mercury, in Charleston, advocated the 
trade’s restoration. In 1856, the governor of South Carolina, James Hopkins Adams, 
began promoting the return of the African slave trade. In March of 1858, the Louisiana 
House of Representatives requested the importation of 2,500 free African apprentices. 
Similar ideas were presented in the Southern Commercial Convention in Vicksburg, 
Mississippi in 1859.63 Ultimately, these proposals were ignored, even though the famous 
case of the Wanderer occurred in the late 1850s, and the African Squadron continued to 
operate.64 
 From late 1859 to mid-1861, the United States Navy captured twenty-two 
slavers. However, these successes ended abruptly when the Civil War began in April 
1861, which caused the African Squadron to withdraw from the African coast that 
summer. Although the squadron disbanded because of the Civil War, President Abraham 
Lincoln continued its legacy to end the American involvement in the African slave trade. 
After assuming office, Lincoln reinforced the long neglected U.S. Abolition Acts of 
1807 and 1820, which effectively ended American capital, ships, and crews participating 
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in the Cuban slave trade. Any Cuban aspirations for U.S. annexation to protect and 
preserve slavery ended. More importantly, the Washington Treaty was signed on June 7, 
1862. The new Anglo-U.S. treaty granted Great Britain’s navy a limited “right of 
search,” contained an “equipment clause,” similar to the one in the 1835 treaty with 
Spain, established Courts of Mixed Commission in New York and Sierra Leone, and, 
finally, permitted the Royal Navy to arrest slavers flying American colors.65 In the end, 
this treaty gave Great Britain’s squadron enough authority to effectively police the 
African coast. On the other side of the Atlantic, the Cuban administration and its Spanish 
counter parts in Europe, with pressure from Great Britain, were inclined to officially 
abolish the trade. Although small numbers of Africans continued to be shipped in vessels 
under false papers and colors in the early 1860s, the flow of these enslaved individuals 
dwindled to a trickle. Ultimately, by 1867, even those shipments ended.   
Epilogue 
In the end, assessing the effectiveness of Great Britain’s foreign policy of 
abolitionism must be divided into two categories: one focusing on the foreign policy of 
ending the slave trade and the second, which emphasizes a foreign policy of abolishing 
the institution of slavery. As this dissertation has shown it is difficult to disconnect one 
from the other because both movements rested under the umbrella of abolitionism. 
However, it is imperative that scholars separate the two because actions taken to end the 
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slave trade were much different from those to end slavery. After 1808, Great Britain 
began policing the slave trade in an effort to coerce or entice other nations to follow suit. 
Alternatively, those nations would give the British Royal Navy the authority to search 
and seize vessels guilty of or suspected of participating in the slave trade. By the 1820s, 
Great Britain and its international partners had established numerous Courts of Mixed 
Commission to adjudicate captured slavers. Nevertheless, as this dissertation illustrated 
neither the British nor their combined efforts with their allies were effective in 
suppressing the African slave trade. Consequently, Great Britain readjusted its foreign 
policy of abolitionism regarding the trade by directly attacking sovereign states in Africa 
and the Americas. Although Great Britain limited how far the assaults went, Whitehall 
did post abolitionist diplomats in those nations to promote anti-slavery, utilize its 
immense wealth to steer nations to policies of Britain’s choosing, and maintain a fleet to 
police the slave trade.  
When it came to promoting the abolition of slavery (as opposed to the 
transatlantic trade), Great Britain never used forced to achieve this goal. Although 
numerous British representatives believed Great Britain could achieve this, specifically 
through trade policy, Whitehall never took any type of direct action as it had when trying 
to end the international traffic. Because African slaves had become so deeply entrenched 
in the commercial life of the western world and a crucial piece of the economies of 
Spain, Cuba, Texas, the United States, and, by proxy, Great Britain’s textile industry, 
Britain could not successfully attack and end an institution so vital to its and those 
nations’ economic survival. Therefore, slavery in each of these countries had to end on 
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its own, which typically occurred through violent civil strife or political turmoil. Yet, the 
abolitionist movements of the late eighteenth century and the nineteenth century 
eventually led to the end of slavery itself.  
Throughout the 360-year history of the slave trade, nearly two-thirds of the 
forced African migration occurred after 1750. More importantly, as historian David Eltis 
rightly asserts, it was during the “last 115 years of [the trades] existence 7.8 million 
captives were carried from Africa across the Atlantic.”66 The Portuguese and Spanish 
became the major facilitators of the trade after Great Britain’s Abolition Act of 1833.67 
The Netherlands, France, and the United States, even after the trade’s official abolition 
in 1808, played minor roles throughout the span of the trade.68 While slight variations 
for departures occurred between 1740 and 1800, massive fluctuations transpired during 
the nineteenth century. Between 1829 and 1831, the traffic declined by almost four-
fifths, and after rising again to nearly earlier levels, it plummeted again from 1849 to 
1852 by 90 percent.69 Finding these types of drastic variations, again, as David Eltis 
maintains, in any other “major commodity in the Atlantic word during this time” would 
be difficult whether it be sugar or coffee going to Europe and manufactured goods going 
to the Western Hemisphere.70 Although fluctuations on that scale did not occur with 
those goods, the drastic increases and decreases in the number of Africans transported in 
slave trade developed because of one factor—Britain’s foreign policy of abolitionism.  
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By applying the foreign policy of abolitionism framework to the extreme 
variations in the number of slaves taken from Africa, it becomes quite clear that in 
certain years and decades, Great Britain’s policy worked, but in others, it did not. 
Moreover, examining the ways in which Great Britain applied that foreign policy in 
diplomatic negotiations in different countries sheds light upon, not just on its failure or 
success, but also on how abolitionism became an integral part of Atlantic diplomacy 
during the nineteenth century. This method of analysis also illuminates what types of 
human trading and enslaving the foreign policy of abolitionism covered. During the time 
in which Great Britain utilized this foreign policy, an entirely different type of human 
traffic and enslavement coexisted alongside the African institutions. Furthermore, 
Britain’s foreign policy of abolitionism became a mechanism by which abolitionism 
could counter the Southern United States’ slaveholders’ foreign policy of slavery.   
Concrete attacks on the trade began with Denmark in 1803, although its 
involvement in the trade was miniscule, but, more importantly, in 1808 when Great 
Britain and the United States abolished their trades. The United States did continue its 
involvement in the illicit trade until 1862, which caused Great Britain to take the lead in 
policing slave trade. As the nineteenth century progressed Britain’s foreign policy of 
abolitionism developed, which Britain eventually used as a hard power. According to 
Joseph Nye, hard power “is the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and 
military might to make others follow your will.”71 On the one hand, if we apply this 
concept of hard power to the foreign policy of slavery, the “carrots” become Great 
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Britain’s use of diplomatic recognition of Texas and its promises to protect Spanish-
Cuba from American annexation, in return for ending or cracking down on slave trade 
violations. On the other hand, the “sticks” appeared when Great Britain sent abolitionists 
to spread abolitionism to Cuba and Texas. More importantly, the Royal Navy became 
Britain’s major “stick” when it began to attack the sovereignty of nations violating anti-
slaving laws, especially the United States, Spain, and Portugal. It was not until Great 
Britain took these actions that the African slave trade finally came to an end. However, 
one question, has plagued scholars since the study of abolition began: why did Great 
Britain abolish its trade, begin a global mission to end it, and, eventually, emancipate its 
800,000 slaves? Ultimately, the Atlantic slave trade ended because changing social 
values deemed it morally wrong. But what we have neglected to study, and what this 
dissertation has worked to sketch out, were the ways in which countless abolitionists 
projected those values onto the world in the shape of a coherent foreign policy vision. 
Yet, once the foreign policy of abolitionism achieved its goal of ending the slave trade 
and, subsequently, the institution of slavery, it did not morph into a general 
humanitarianism or morality in foreign relations focusing labor. Instead, abolitionism 
and abolitionists shifted away from the forced-labor question to other political matters of 
the time, which allowed new coerced and semi-coerced labor systems to replace slavery, 
such as Chinese and Indian coolies and Native American apprenticeship. Therefore, it is 
naïve to conclude that abolitionism fundamentally redefined global perspectives on the 
laborers who cultivated the raw materials used to produce the commodities fueling 
consumerism.  
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